ALLIED VISION INC. v. RLI PROF. TECH. INC.
Decision Date | 13 February 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 95 C 3783.,95 C 3783. |
Citation | 916 F. Supp. 778 |
Parties | ALLIED VISION GROUP, INC., Plaintiff, v. RLI PROFESSIONAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Mark L. Yeager, Brent R. Austin, McDermott, Will & Emery, Chicago, IL, for plaintiff.
James Kenneth Borcia, Jacqueline A. Criswell, Tressler, Soderstrom, Maloney & Priess, Chicago, IL, for defendant.
Defendant RLI Professional Technologies, Inc. ("RLI") moves the court to dismiss Count II of the Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff Allied Vision Group, Inc. ("Allied") pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For reasons set forth below, the court grants RLI's motion to dismiss.
At the time the agreement was executed, in October, 1992, Allied introduced RLI to Target Industries ("Target"), a wholesaler of optical supplies. (Am.Complaint ¶¶ 7, 10.) Between October, 1992, and June, 1994, RLI conducted extensive discussions and negotiations with Target. Among other things, RLI had Target's stock appraised, toured Target's facilities, and reviewed Target's financial performance. (Am.Complaint ¶¶ 11-14.) In June, 1994, RLI and Target signed a "Letter of Intent" to merge, and in May, 1995, RLI purchased Target. (Am.Complaint ¶¶ 15, 20.) At all times between October, 1992, and May, 1995, Allied believed that negotiations continued between RLI and Target; and Allied communicated this belief to RLI. Relying on this belief, Allied refrained from investigating other potential acquirors of Target. (Am.Complaint ¶¶ 16-18.)
In November, 1994, RLI told Allied that RLI would refuse to pay Allied its finder's fee on the ground that "RLI initially abandoned its interest in the acquisition of Target Industries in June of 1993." This appears to be the first time RLI took the position that it had abandoned its interest in Target at any time between October, 1992, and May, 1995. (Am.Complaint ¶¶ 19, 22.)
Count I of Allied's Amended Complaint alleges that RLI breached its agreement with Allied by refusing to pay Allied a finder's fee. (Am.Complaint ¶ 26.) In particular, Allied alleges that negotiations between RLI and Target were continuously "pending" from the time Allied introduced RLI to Target in October, 1992, to the time RLI and Target merged in May, 1995. (Am.Complaint ¶ 25.)
Count II of Allied's Amended Complaint, entitled "Unjust Enrichment," alleges that Allied conferred valuable benefits on RLI by refraining from introducing Target to any other entities that may have been interested in purchasing Target. Allied's forbearance in this regard enhanced RLI's bargaining position with Target because Allied was no longer seeking purchasers who might compete with RLI for the opportunity to acquire Target. (Am.Complaint ¶ 29.) Allied's forbearance stemmed from its belief that RLI was engaged in continuous negotiations with Target from the time of their initial meeting to the time of their merger, and that Allied ultimately would be compensated for its forbearance with a finder's fee under the terms of the agreement. If, contrary to Allied's belief, negotiations between RLI and Target ceased at some point, then Allied and RLI were no longer bound by the agreement. In that case, Allied's forbearance conferred valuable benefits upon RLI in reliance upon RLI without payment or compensation to Allied. (Am.Complaint ¶ 30.) Count II alleges that RLI knowingly, wilfully, intentionally and unfairly accepted and enjoyed the benefit of Allied's continued forbearance, and that it would be inequitable for RLI to retain such benefits without adequately and fully compensating Allied. (Am.Complaint ¶¶ 31-33.)
RLI moves the court to dismiss Count II of Allied's Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. "A motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint, not the merits of the suit." United States v. Brickman, 906 F.Supp. 1164, 1167 (N.D.Ill.1995) (citing Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Chicago Housing Auth., 892 F.2d 583, 586 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845, 111 S.Ct. 129, 112 L.Ed.2d 97 (1990)). The court will dismiss a claim only where "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Chaney v. Suburban Bus Div., 52 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court "accepts as true the factual allegations of the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff ." Lashbrook v. Oerkfitz, 65 F.3d 1339, 1343 (7th Cir.1995) (citing Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 118, 110 S.Ct. 975, 979, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990)).
RLI argues — and the court agrees — that Allied cannot state a claim for unjust enrichment in Count II, because Allied admits that a contract governed the relationship between Allied and RLI with respect to the acquisition of Target. (See Am.Complaint ¶ 8 (alleging agreement); id. ¶ 28 (incorporating ¶ 8 into Count II).) The Supreme Court of Illinois has held unequivocally that "where there is a specific contract which governs the relationship of the parties, the doctrine of unjust enrichment has no application." La Throp v. Bell Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 68 Ill.2d 375, 12 Ill.Dec. 565, 572, 370 N.E.2d 188, 195 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 925, 98 S.Ct. 2818, 56 L.Ed.2d 768 (1978). Citing La Throp, the Seventh Circuit has stated with equal force that "under Illinois law, a plaintiff may not state a claim for unjust enrichment when a contract governs the relationship between the parties." First Commodity Traders, Inc. v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 766 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1985).
In this case, Allied and RLI entered into an agreement under which Allied would introduce RLI to companies that RLI might acquire, and RLI would pay Allied a "finder's fee" in the event of such an acquisition. (Am.Complaint ¶ 8.) Under the agreement, RLI would pay the finder's fee if RLI purchased or obtained an option to purchase the company within one year of the date that Allied introduced the company to RLI. (Am.Complaint, Ex. A, ¶ 3.) The only issue in the case, reflected in Count I of Allied's Amended Complaint, involves contract interpretation. In a nutshell, it is:
Because "a specific contract governed the relationship" between Allied and RLI, the court concludes that "the doctrine of unjust enrichment has no application" in this case. La Throp, 12 Ill.Dec. at 572, 370 N.E.2d at 195; see also Heinold, 766 F.2d at 1011. That the agreement between Allied and RLI was a contract is not in dispute. That the agreement governed the relationship between the parties, including Allied's right to a finder's fee, is equally clear to the court. Therefore, the doctrine of unjust enrichment has no application in this case and the court dismisses Count II of Allied's Amended complaint.
In an effort to avoid the logic of La Throp and Heinold, Allied makes two major arguments. First, Allied argues that its claim for unjust enrichment is based on the behavior of the parties after the agreement terminated. Even if this were true, however, the logic of La Throp and Heinold would still apply. As the Seventh Circuit explained in Heinold:
The fact that the agreement between the parties did not explicitly provide for allocation of customers or commissions upon termination does not allow the plaintiff to now invoke a quasi-contractual remedy. In entering the agreement, the plaintiff assumed the risk of losing customers to the defendant in return for the defendant's trading services. The plaintiff could have, but did not provide for the allocation of this risk under the terms of the contract. The plaintiff may not unilaterally alter the terms of the contract by now claiming unjust enrichment.
Id. at 1011 (citations omitted).
In this case, the agreement between Allied and RLI called for RLI to pay Allied a finder's fee in the event that RLI acquired a company introduced to RLI by Allied. (Am.Complaint ¶ 8.) The agreement specified that...
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