Allison v. Ideal Laundry & Cleaners

• Decision Date: 21 September 1949
• Docket Number: 16265.
• Citation: 55 S.E.2d 281,215 S.C. 344
• Parties: ALLISON et al. v. IDEAL LAUNDRY & CLEANERS et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

55 S.E.2d 281

215 S.C. 344

ALLISON et al. v. IDEAL LAUNDRY & CLEANERS et al.

No. 16265.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

September 21, 1949

Price & Poag, Greenville, for appellants.

Wyche, Burgess & Wofford, Greenville, Rainey Fant & Morrah, Greenville, for respondents.

TAYLOR, Justice.

This case arises out of one of the most catastrophic occurrences in the State of South Carolina, certainly within the memory of this generation.

On the late afternoon of November 19, 1946, a terrific explosion took place on the premises of the Ideal Laundry and Cleaners one of the respondents in this case, located in Greenville S. C.

From the record it appears that prior to November 1946, the boilers of the Laundry had been fired with coal.Shortly prior to the explosion the proprietors of the Laundry, for the purposes of efficiency and no doubt in some part influenced by the attitude of the City of Greenville with respect to smoke abatement in that City, had had installed on the Laundry premises a Propane Gas System, with accompanying appliances, including a tank of about 6,500 gallons capacity for the purpose of firing the boilers with the gas.It was testified that the use of this gas in firing the boilers was somewhat more efficient than the use of coal and obviously resulted in an almost complete elimination of smoke and soot.

On the particular evening in question, an employee of the laundry noticed a substance escaping from the tank in which the supply of gas was contained which, according to his statement, was of a vaporish nature, giving the impression of fog.This escaping gas was also accompanied by a hissing sound which was quite noticeable.Immediately upon these facts having been brought to the notice of the operators of the Laundry, the fire department was called and the building cleared of employees and apparently everything at the moment was done humanly possible to avoid the tremendous destruction and loss of life which followed.

Despite these precautions, a few moments thereafter the escaped gas was ignited through some unknown means, it not having apparently been determined just what the cause of ignition was, although it was testified that the surrounding community was occupied by a number of colored residences which were heated by means of open fires, and speculation was to the effect that the ignition came about from this fashion.The immediate cause of ignition is immaterial.The explosion which ensued was heard and felt in some slight degree as far away as 60 miles and as above stated, several lives ere lost and a number of houses immediately adjacent to the laundry were completely destroyed and numberous buildings more remotely situated were damaged to a lesser degree.

The instant case involves the destruction of a house and apartment outbuildings which were situated quite near the laundry.

On the trial of the case before the Honorable William H. Grimball Presiding Judge, at the close of all of the testimony he directed a verdict on motion of respondents in favor of all of the defendants in this case with the exception of Superior Gas Corpaoration (which had gone bankrupt prior to the trial, and presented no defense), the substance of his Order being that the installation of the tank and other appliances having been performed by the Superior Gas Corporation, an independent contractor, and there being, in the opinion of the learned Judge, no evidence of negligence on the part of the respondent, Ideal Laundry and Cleaners, nor on the part of the remaining respondents, it was proper to grant the motion for a directed verdict.

Appellants rely upon the contended absolute liability of the owner of the premises for such injuries as resulted from the escape of the gas upon his premises, irrespective of negligence on his part.This doctrine appears to have been first announced in the English case of Fletcher v. Rylands, 1886, L.R.1 Exch. 265, 1 Eng. Rul.Cas. 236, Exch., affirmed in, 1868, L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 1 Eng.Rul.Cas. 256.It has been followed by comparatively few courts in this country and may be said to be generally repudiated here.SeeAnnotation, 169 A.L.R. 517andHunter v. Pelham Mills,1898, 52 S.C. 279, 29 S.E. 727, 68 Am.St.Rep. 904, as illustrative of the majority rule.

However, there is a well established exception to the general rule of non-liability where injury results and the means or manner of the activity of the owner, whether done by independent contractor or not, may be found to be inherently or intrinsically dangerous to others.

For discussion of the established exception to the rule of non-liability of the employer for acts of negligence of his independent contractor where the work involves inherent or intrinsic danger, see27 Am.Jur. 517, Independent Contractors, Sec. 39, 57 C.J.S., Master and Servant, § 590, page 359.Annotations: 65 L.R.A. 833; 23 A.L.R. 1084;76 A.L.R. 1257;A.L.I. Restatement, Torts, Negligence, 1142 et seq., Sec. 423, also p. 1147 et seq., Sec. 427.A well considered case is Davis v. Summerfield,133 N.C. 325, 45 S.E. 654, 63 L.R.A. 492.

The substance of the exception which raises this question was recognized and stated in our old case of Conlin v. City Council, 15 Rich. 201 (of historical interest because it contains the story of the first attempt after the Confederate War to replace the bell in the tower of St. Michael's Church, Charleston, resulting in the tragedy which gave rise to the litigation.Defense to liability for wrongful death included the claim that the negligence, if any, was that of an independent contractor or his servant.In remanding the case for new trial the court said: 'If the work involved the creation of a nuisance, owner and contractor become joint wrongdoers, and neither (either?) or both must answer for consequences.'Nuisance there was used to connote a condition of danger to others, temporarily, pending completion of the work.The definition as given in 2 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Rawle's Third Revision, is: 'Anything that unlawfully worketh hurt, inconvenience, or damage.3 Bla.Com. 5, 216.See Cooley, Torts 670.'Relied upon as contra is Rogers v. Florence R. Co.,31 S.C. 378, 9 S.E. 1059, but an examination of that case discloses that the point under discussion was not made.Secondly, it is common knowledge that fire (involved in that case) is a useful and frequent agency in the disposal of debris from newly cleared land which was the business there.The danger of it is clearly not comparable to the danger which is now known to be inherent in the storage and use of a large quantity of propane gas in a populated district of a metropolitan area.It would not impinge upon the authority of the Rogers case to hold that the facts of this case remove it from the rule stated therein and place it in the exception to the rule of non-liability for the negligence of an independent contractor except for one factor, to which we turn.

Liability of the employer in such cases depends upon his antecedent knowledge of the danger inherent in the work or a finding that the average, reasonably prudent man or corporation should, in the exercise of due diligence, have known.'Obviously the determining factor is knowledge, actual or implied, on the part of the employer of the dangerous nature of the work.'Luthringer v. Moore, Cal.Sup.1947, 181 P.2d 89, 98.

A review of the evidence, for the purpose of determining whether or not it would suppport a finding of the jury to the effect that liability would attach to the employer, discloses that the change from coal to gas for fuel was the result of pressure put upon the laundry by the city authorities to abate smoke.The executive head of the laundry corporation was Mr. Haynie, long experienced in the business.He testified, referring to...