Allison v. Stevens, 8 Div. 953
| Decision Date | 28 May 1959 |
| Docket Number | 8 Div. 953 |
| Citation | 112 So.2d 451,269 Ala. 288 |
| Parties | Gay Austin ALLISON v. Mrs. Oscar STEVENS and David Lee Allison, Admrx. and Admr., et al., and Cross-Appeal. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Harold T. Foster, Scottsboro, and Lusk & Lusk, Guntersville, for appellant.
Harold O. Weeks and Jas. M. Proctor, Scottsboro, for appellees.
George W. Allison died testate on May 2, 1954. Appellant (complainant below and widow of George W. Allison) dissented from the will. Appellees, other than Clyde Woodall, the executor, are the sole surviving heirs of the testator and were the respondents below. (The death of one of the appellees, Tom D. Allison, has been suggested and on motion the cause was revived in the name of his administrators and heirs at law.)
Complainant filed a bill in equity seeking the removal of the administration of the estate of the testator from the Probate to the Equity Court, discovery, Homestead, dower and quarantine rights and personal exemptions. By amendment to the bill, complainant also sought to have set aside certain deeds executed by the testator and the complainant to some of the respondents. Respondents' answer to the bill set up an antenuptial agreement between complainant and the testator wherein complainant released all rights of 'dower, homestead exemptions, statutory right, distributive share and other claims against the estate of George W. Allison' including her right to dissent from the will. Respondents also averred that complainant had joined in the execution of the deeds in question 'of her own free will and accord and that neither of them [complainant and testator] was influenced at the time of the execution of said deeds by the respondents or anyone else * * *' and that 'by voluntarily joining in the execution of said deeds she created an estoppel by deed and is now estopped to challenge their efficacy'.
The trial court, in its final decree, annulled the antenuptial contract and as a result thereof held that complainant was entitled to homestead and personal property exemptions and a distributive share in the personal property of the estate of George W. Allison. The trial court refused to set the deeds aside and denied complainant any dower in the properties conveyed by said deed.
Complainant has appealed and assigns as error the action of the trial court in refusing to set aside the deeds; respondents have cross-appealed and assign as error the action of the trial court in annulling the antenuptial contract between complainant and testator.
It appears from the evidence that George W. Allison, a widower, in 1942 made a will in which he devised and bequeathed all of his property to his children. Shortly thereafter he began 'courting' the complainant and in 1944 they were married. Some three days prior to their marriage, Mr. Allison and complainant entered into the agreement referred to above, whereby complainant released her dower rights and distributive share, homestead and other rights, in the estate of Mr. Allison in consideration of the purchase by Mr. Allison of complainant's dwelling house from the complainant for $2,500 and the devising of said house to her in his will. It further appears that complainant had purchased the house for $2,500, she had made payments in the amount of $800 thereon and she owed a balance of $1,700 which she was paying 'like rent'. The testator paid complainant $800; she conveyed the property to him and the testator executed a codicil to his will in which he devised the house free of incumbrances to the complainant.
It is clear that an antenuptial agreement of one party to release rights and interests in the estate of the other party in consideration of marriage or supported by other valuable consideration is enforceable in equity. Because of the confidential relationship of the two parties, such contracts are scrutinized by the courts to determine their justice and reasonableness. Where an antenuptial agreement is asserted as barring the wife's share in the estate of her husband, the husband or his representives has the burden of showing that the consideration was adequate and that the entire transaction was fair, just and equitable from the wife's point of view or that the agreement was freely and voluntarily entered into by the wife with competent independent advice and full knowledge of her interest in the estate and its approximate value. Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Hubbard, 222 Ala. 518, 133 So. 723, 74 A.L.R. 646; Norrell v. Thompson, 252 Ala. 603, 42 So.2d 461; Collier v. Tatum, 230 Ala. 218, 160 So. 530; 17A Am.Jur., Dower, § 172; 26 Am.Jur., Husband and Wife, §§ 282, 288; 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 80; 27 A.L.R.2d 883.
No useful purpose would be served by setting out all the evidence bearing on the fairness or adequacy of the consideration for the agreement in the case at bar. Suffice it to say that after a close scrutiny of the evidence we are satisfied that the value of the home which was devised to the complainant by the testator is greatly disproportionate to the value of complainant's rights in the estate of the testator. We also conclude that the value of the estate of George Allison at the time the agreement was entered into was substantially the same as that at the time of his death. It is not shown by the evidence that complainant had competent independent advice nor did the respondents meet the burden of proof resting on them to show that complainant had full knowledge of her interest in the estate and the approximate value thereof. We find no error, therefore, on the part of the trial court in refusing to enforce the antenuptial contract.
In April, 1950 and more than five years after the marriage of the subject parties, testator, joined in by complainant, executed several conveyances of real property to his children, the respondents, excepting party respondent Woodall, the executor. Complainant now seeks to have said conveyances set aside for the reason that their execution was so connected with the antenuptial agreement that they should be construed as a part thereof and consequently are affected with the same invalidity as the antenuptial agreement. Complainant does not contend that the conveyances are a postnuptial...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Mallen v. Mallen
...v. Lipnick, 377 Mass. 666, 389 N.E.2d 385 (1979); Merrill v. Merrill's Estate, 275 Or. 653, 656, 552 P.2d 249 (1976); Allison v. Stevens, 269 Ala. 288, 112 So.2d 451 (1959). However, we believe Georgia law to be more consistent with the states that have rejected such a protective stance. Se......
-
Williams v. Williams
...postnuptial agreements are scrutinized by the same standard. Tibbs v. Anderson, 580 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Ala.1991). In Allison v. Stevens, 269 Ala. 288, 112 So.2d 451 (1959), our supreme court stated that the proponent of a prenuptial agreement has"the burden of showing that the consideration ......
-
Brown v. Brown
...of the two parties, such contracts are scrutinized by the courts to determine their justice and fairness.' Allison v. Stevens, 269 Ala. 288, 291, 112 So.2d 451, 453 (1959). Antenuptial agreements must satisfy one of two tests to be considered valid. Allison, 269 Ala. at 291, 112 So.2d at 45......
-
Campbell v. Campbell
...wife, whether made before or after marriage, are recognized as valid in this state. Code of Alabama 1975, § 30-4-9; Allison v. Stevens, 269 Ala. 288, 112 So.2d 451 (1959); Norrell v. Thompson, 252 Ala. 603, 42 So.2d 504 (1949). While it is true that these agreements are to be subjected to c......