Allman v. State
| Decision Date | 26 March 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 31067,31067 |
| Citation | 253 Ind. 14,235 N.E.2d 56 |
| Parties | Larry Ray ALLMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Thomas M. Mote, Columbus, for appellant.
John J. Dillon, Atty. Gen., R. Robert Yeager, Deputy Atty. Gen., Rex Killian, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.
This is an appeal from a judgment of guilty on charge of first degree burglary entered by the trial court pursuant to a plea of guilty entered by the appellant at arraignment without the advice of counsel. Pauper Counsel was appointed by the trial court to perfect this appeal.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to vacate the plea and permit him to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, upon the timely filing of a verified petition requesting the court to do so.
The record before us reveals the following chronological sequence of events:
(1) August 5, 1966. The appellant was apprehended, arrested and incarcerated in the Bartholomew County jail. He remained in said jail without the advice of counsel and was subjected to questioning by several police officers on the 5th, 6th and 7th days of August, over the week end.
(2) August 8, 1966. At 9:00 A.M. an affidavit was filed against the appellant charging him with the offense of first degree burglary and a bench warrant was ordered for his arrest immediately upon such filing.
(3) August 8, 1966. Within a matter of a few minutes after such filing the appellant was brought before the court for arraignment, without the benefit or advice of counsel, at which time he entered his purported plea of guilty and the court fixed August 11, 1966 for sentencing and ordered a pre-commitment investigation and report. At the arraignment, Sheriff Nolting suggested to the court that the appellant might lack comprehension sufficient to understand the nature of the charge filed against him whereupon the court appointed Doctors George C. Weiland and H. J. Norton to examine the appellant and fixed August 11, 1966 for a hearing on appellant's sanity.
(4) August 8, 1966. At the time of the filing of the charge against him, to-wit: 9:00 A.M. of said day, appellant's parents, brothers and sisters were in the offices of Dalmbert and Pushor arranging for counsel to appear and represent the appellant. At this time said attorneys and appellant's relatives were without any prior knowledge of the matters set forth in items (2) and (3) above.
(5) August 9, 1966. Dalmbert and Pushor, attorneys at law, entered their appearance for the appellant.
(6) August 10, 1966. Dr. Weiland asked for continuance on the sanity hearing until August 17, 1966. The request was granted.
(7) August 11, 1966. Appellant, by his attorneys, filed a verified motion to vacate the plea and enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. This petition was also set for hearing August 17, 1966, the same day as the sanity hearing referred to in item (6) above.
(8) August 17, 1966. The questions of appellant's sanity and motion to withdraw plea of guilty were submitted to the court for hearing and after testimony from the court appointed physicians, a continuance of the hearing was ordered until August 23, 1966, at defendant's request.
(9) August 23, 1966. The appellant, by his attorneys, filed a request for a continuance for the purpose of obtaining psychiatric examination of appellant by physicians of their own choice in Marion County, Indiana, the nearest available place for such professional consultation and for authority from the court to have him transported for such purpose.
The Affidavit for Continuance and Request for Psychiatric Examination in Marion County, Indiana, omitting the formal parts, reads:
'Robert L. Dalmbert, being duly sworn upon oath, says:
1. That he is one of the attorneys for the defendant, Larry Ray Allman, in the above entitled cause and that he makes this affidavit for and on behalf of said defendant.
2. That heretofore on August 17, 1966, said defendant and his attorneys appeared in this Court at which time the Court continued a hearing on defendant's Petition to Withdraw Plea of Guilty until August 23, 1966, at 1:30 P.M.
3. That notwithstanding due diligence on the part of said defendant and his attorneys, it has been impossible to employ a qualified psychiatrist to come to Columbus, Indiana, and examine said defendant; that a total of eight psychiatrists known to said attorneys have been contacted and for reasons of vacation, business or otherwise each has been unwilling to come to Columbus and examine said defendant.
4. That defendant and his attorneys believe that in order to have the defendant examined by a competent psychiatrist, it will be necessary for the Sheriff of Bartholomew County to take said defendant to the Indianapolis General Hospital or the Indianapolis Veterans Hospital so that defendant can be examined by a psychiatrist or staff of psychiatrists.
5. That defendant believes that a continuance of one week will be necessary in order to complete such examination; that defendant further believes that it would be prejudicial to the substantive rights of said defendant if he is not permitted such an examination and continuance.
WHEREFORE, defendant prays the Court that he be granted a continuance and that the Sheriff be ordered to take him to Indianapolis for psychiatric examination.'
(10) August 23, 1966. Thereafter, argument was heard and the Affidavit for Continuance was overruled. On this same date the hearing on the question of defendant's sanity and his Verified Petition to Withdraw Plea of Guilty resumed, witnesses were sworn and defendant presented evidence and rested.
Immediately thereafter the defendant reasserted his request for a continuance and for a psychiatric examination in Marion County, Indiana, and also moved to have the question of his sanity submitted to a jury and the court delayed ruling on these motions until the conclusion of the hearing. The State presented evidence and rested.
The court then denied defendant's request for continuance and request for psychiatric examination by physicians of his own choice in Marion County, Indiana.
Immediately thereafter, on said date, the court made the following entry:
'The Court finds from a consideration of all of the evidence heard on the question of the defendant's sanity and on the defendant's petition to withdraw plea of guilty that the defendant is presently able to know and understand the nature of the charges against him; the nature of the proceedings involved, and that he is able intelligently to cooperate in his defense.
'The Court further finds that at the time of the defendant's arraignment he was able to know and understand the nature of the charge against him and the nature of the arraignment proceedings, and that he was capable at that time of intelligently entering either a guilty or a not guilty plea.
'IT IS ADJUDGED AND CONSIDERED BY THE COURT that the defendant was sane at the time of his arraignment and that he is presently sane.
'His petition to withdraw his plea of guilty is therefore denied.
'From a consideration of all the evidence introduced on the question of the defendant's sanity and on the defendant's petition to withdraw his plea of guilty, the Court finds no reasonable ground for believing the defendant to be insane, therefore, the motion of the defendant to submit the question of his sanity to a jury prior to judgment is denied.
'The defendant is informed in open Court that the Court finds him guilty of First Degree Burglary as charged in the affidavit by reason of his plea of guilty entered August 8, 1966, and that the Court finds him to be 21 years of age.' (Our emphasis.)
The above chronological sequence of the proceedings, leading to the trial court's findings and judgment, and specifically to the denial of the appellant's motion to vacate his plea of guilty, have been set forth at length to indicate the rather unique and unusual character of the proceedings relied upon by the trial court in its determination.
The sole question presented by this appeal goes directly to the issue of whether the court below exercised sound judicial discretion. It has long been established by this Court that it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to decide whether to allow a plea of guilty to be withdrawn. However, it may also be said that the soundness of an exercise of judicial discretion in a given instance is always reviewable by courts of appellate jurisdiction when the question is properly presented. Bowers, Judicial Discretion of Trial Courts.
Thus the question before this Court is whether the denial of the appellant's request to withdraw his plea of guilty was within the trial court's sound judicial discretion. If such denial was in the exercise of sound judicial discretion there was no error in the ruling; conversely, if the trial court abused or exceeded sound judicial discretion in denying the verified petition, there has been reversible error.
The term 'sound judicial discretion' always brings into question on appeal whether discretion was 'wisely or unwisely' exercised, or 'unreasonably exercised', or constituted 'prejudicial abuse' of discretion; or, as stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, whether its exercise was 'clearly erroneous'. It would appear that the descriptions, as above recited, when used by the various courts, very aptly and accurately express the exact judicial meaning of the term 'abuse of discretion.' Generally speaking there are two conditions which must be shown to exist to justify a court of appellate jurisdiction in setting aside a ruling made by a trial court in the exercise of judicial discretion:
(1) that the action complained of must must have been unreasonable in the light of all attendant circumstances or it must have been clearly untenable or unreasonable; and
(2) that such action was prejudicial to the rights of the complaining party.
When such conditions...
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