Allor v. Belden Corp.

Decision Date26 January 1981
Docket NumberNo. 67243,67243
Citation393 So.2d 1233
PartiesEdward J. ALLOR v. BELDEN CORPORATION.
CourtLouisiana Supreme Court

Roy S. Halcomb, Jr., Broussard, Bolton & Halcomb, Alexandria, for plaintiff-applicant.

Joseph Wilson, Gaharan and Wilson, Jena, for defendant-respondent.

DENNIS, Justice.

In this workers' compensation case, the injured worker suffered lumbosacral strain as a result of an on-the-job accident. Both the trial court and court of appeal awarded the plaintiff total temporary disability benefits calculated on the formula applicable for those employed on a "unit, piecework, commission or other basis." La.R.S. 23:1021(7)(d). We believe that the lower courts erred in determining the extent of the plaintiff's disability and the method for calculating his benefits. Accordingly, we must reverse with respect to these errors.

Allor, age 31, worked as a wire drawer for Belden Corporation and had been employed by that company approximately one year prior to his accident on March 16, 1978. He had worked 15 years before the accident doing strenuous manual labor without any physical problems. Allor became stiff and sore at work the day before the accident, but his low back pain became intense while he was lifting heavy spools of wire on March 16. He notified his supervisor who made an appointment with Dr. Sirikul, a local general practitioner. Dr. Sirikul examined Allor on March 20 and March 23. He found the plaintiff suffered from muscle spasms and tenderness in the lumbosacral area. The doctor took X-rays of the claimant's back which showed nothing abnormal. Dr. Sirikul diagnosed acute lumbosacral strain and referred Allor to Dr. Gamburg, an orthopedic surgeon in Alexandria. Dr. Sirikul stated that he believed that Allor's accident at work caused his back problems.

Dr. Gamburg treated Allor for several months and examined him numerous times. He confirmed Dr. Sirikul's diagnosis of lumbosacral strain. After three examinations, Dr. Gamburg found that the symptoms of Allor's back condition, i. e., pain and restricted mobility, had disappeared, and he released him to work in May, 1978. Upon returning to work, Allor again experienced severe localized lower back pain and muscle spasms and had to be hospitalized. Dr. Gamburg and a consulting neurologist found no disc herniation or neurological abnormalities. Dr. Gamburg diagnosed the claimant's condition as recurrent lumbosacral strain. The doctor testified that he thought Allor could again return to work as of July 19, 1978 on a trial basis although he admitted that Allor's symptoms could reappear if the claimant returned to work.

Allor tried a second time to resume work several weeks later but found that the pain recurred and was too severe to allow him to continue. He sought additional medical treatment, but because Dr. Gamburg had moved his practice, Allor was thereafter treated by Dr. Weiss, also an orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Weiss first saw Allor in August, 1978 and continued periodic examinations through March, 1979. He also confirmed earlier diagnoses of lumbosacral strain and prescribed a back brace for Allor to wear which seemed to help the claimant. It was his opinion that Allor should not attempt to return to his job as a wire drawer or to any other heavy manual labor. Although Dr. Weiss thought Allor's lumbosacral strain would heal sufficiently by July, 1979 to allow him to be symptom-free and to pursue lighter work, the doctor predicted that Allor's lumbosacral injury would most likely recur if he tried heavy manual work.

The virtually uncontradicted evidence of the attending physicians and of the lay witnesses prove that, following the work accident, the employee suffered painful symptoms typically related to a low back injury which will recur upon his attempt to return to his former occupation and which prevent his undertaking other heavy physical labor. The lower courts ruled that this evidence supported an award of benefits to the plaintiff only during the temporary period in which he manifested physical symptoms resulting from the work accident. The primary question before us is whether a causal connection between the work accident and the plaintiff's permanent inability to return to heavy manual work has been shown by the plaintiff.

CAUSATION

The employee in a workers' compensation proceeding has the burden of establishing the disability and causal relation with the employment accident by a preponderance of the evidence. Nevertheless, it is not necessary for the experts to determine the exact cause of the disability in order for the employee to recover. The complaint need show only by a preponderance of the evidence that somehow the work accident caused the disability. Lucas v. Ins. Co. of North America, 342 So.2d 591, 595 (La.1977); Malone & Johnson, Workers' Compensation, § 252, p. 547 (2d ed. 1980).

On the specific issue of the causal connection between the accident and the disability, the claimant is entitled to the benefit of a presumption in certain cases. If an otherwise healthy worker suffers an accident at work and is thereafter disabled, it is presumed that there is a causal connection between the two, so long as the medical evidence establishes a reasonable possibility of such a connection. See Cadiere v. West Gibson Products Co., Inc., 364 So.2d 998 (La.1978); Haughton v. Fireman's Fund American Ins. Cos., 355 So.2d 927 (La.1978); Lucas v. Ins. Co. of North America, 342 So.2d 591 (La.1977); Bertrand v. Coal Operators Cas. Co., 253 La. 1115, 221 So.2d 816 (1969); Malone & Johnson, supra, § 259, p. 572-3. This presumption is not conclusive, but it forces the defendant to come forward with sufficient contrary evidence to rebut it.

Also we note that an injured worker is still entitled to compensation even though the work accident would not have been disabling to the average healthy employee. Numerous disability awards to injured employees have been granted when the evidence showed that some preexisting deficiency contributed to the disabling consequences of a work accident, even though the disease or condition might have brought about disability in any event in its ordinary course of progress. E. g., Roberson v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 316 So.2d 22 (La.App.3d Cir. 1975); Jones v. Douglas Public Service, 264 So.2d 267 (La.App.4th Cir. 1972); Lum v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, 216 So.2d 889 (La.App.2d Cir. 1968).

The defendant relies heavily on segments of Dr. Weiss's testimony to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie showing of a causal connection between the accident and the disability. The doctor refused to state that an accident precipitated the employee's inability to return to heavy manual work because he had not been given a "history of a specific accident on the job." He testified that he preferred to say that engaging in labor too heavy for a slight body had caused Allor's disability. Dr. Weiss also stated at one point that Allor would not suffer "any permanent impairment" from his injury.

When read in the context of his whole testimony and the entire record, however, these passages of Dr. Weiss's testimony do not constitute sufficient contrary evidence to rebut the presumption that there was a causal connection between Allor's work accident and his disability. First, it is clear Dr. Weiss only meant that Allor would suffer no permanent impairment insofar as his ability to perform light physical work was concerned. He testified repeatedly that Allor should not return to his job as a wire drawer or other heavy manual labor because this would reactivate his lumbosacral injury. Second, it is understandable that Dr. Weiss was reluctant to relate Allor's disability to an accident since the doctor did not have a "history of a specific accident on the job," although it is hard to understand why he was without a history of an accident which was well documented by the other attending physicians. Third, when he was asked whether he would relate Allor's "continued complaints" to a specific incident of heavy lifting, assuming that it occurred, the doctor said, "I think it is contributory (in) the sense that we know he got it, and that he will probably get it again if he goes back to doing heavy work."

The thrust of Dr. Weiss's testimony seems to be that Allor's physical disability was inevitable given the claimant's physique and work history. However, this does not prevent the claimant's accident from being a legal cause of his disability. We have said, "(i)t is immaterial that the disability could have been brought on by causes other than a work-related trauma, if, in fact, trauma on the job which meets the standards of accidental injury is a disabling factor." Parks v. Insurance Company of North America, 340 So.2d 276, 281 (La.1976). See Bertrand v. Coal Operators Cas. Co., 253 La. 1115, 221 So.2d 816 (1969). We have held, moreover, that an accident which aggravates or accelerates a pre-existing...

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