Allord v. Municipal Officers Electoral Bd. for the Village of South Chicago Heights, 1-97-0986

• Citation: 224 Ill.Dec. 564,682 N.E.2d 125,288 Ill.App.3d 897
• Decision Date: 06 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. 1-97-0986,1-97-0986
• Parties: , 224 Ill.Dec. 564 Jay L. ALLORD, Petitioner-Appellee, v. MUNICIPAL OFFICERS ELECTORAL BOARD FOR THE VILLAGE OF SOUTH CHICAGO HEIGHTS, and Donald E. Cull, Burton S.Odelson, and Samuel J. Ruffolo, in their capacity as Members of the Municipal Officers Electoral Board for the Village of South Chicago Heights, and David L. Owen, Melinda Villareal, Lucian "Big Lou" Bednarek, Joseph F. Kudra, Jr., and John M. Ross, Respondents-Appellants.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 125

682 N.E.2d 125

288 Ill.App.3d 897, 224 Ill.Dec. 564

Jay L. ALLORD, Petitioner-Appellee, v. MUNICIPAL OFFICERS ELECTORAL BOARD FOR THE VILLAGE OF SOUTH CHICAGO HEIGHTS, and Donald E. Cull, Burton S.Odelson, and Samuel J. Ruffolo, in their capacity as Members of the Municipal Officers Electoral Board for the Village of South Chicago Heights, and David L. Owen, Melinda Villareal Lucian "Big Lou" Bednarek, Joseph F. Kudra, Jr., and John M Ross, Respondents-Appellants.

No. 1-97-0986.

Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Fifth Division.

June 6, 1997.

Ancil, Glink, Diamond, Cope & Bush, P.C., Chicago, (Robert Bush, David Lincoln Ader and Keri-Lyn Krafthefer, of counsel); and Kusper & Raucci, Chtd., Chicago (Andrew Raucci and Barbara Goodman, of counsel), for Respondents-Appellants.

Rosenthal, Murphey, Coblentz & Janega, Chicago (Katherine Janega, of counsel), for Petitioner-Appellee.

Presiding Justice HARTMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondents, the Municipal Officers Electoral Board for the Village of South Chicago Heights (Board), its individual members, Donald E. Cull, Burton S. Odelson, and Samuel J. Ruffolo, and five candidates (candidates) for public office in South Chicago Heights, appeal the circuit court's decision reversing the Board's ruling that the candidates' names be included on the ballot, and ordering that the candidates' names not appear on the ballots for an approaching consolidated municipal election.

The five candidates--David L. Owen, Melinda Villarreal, Lucian "Big Lou" Bednarek, Joseph M. Kudra, Jr., and John M. Ross, members of a new political party--were candidates for each office to be filled in the Village of South Chicago Heights' elections to be held on April 1, 1997. Each candidate filed a statement of economic interests on December 19, 1996, pursuant to section 4A-105 of the Governmental Ethics Act. 5 ILCS 420/4A-105 (West 1996) (section 4A-105) (Ethics Act). On January 13, 1997, each candidate filed nomination papers pursuant to section 10-5 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10-5 (West 1996)) (section 10-5). Petitioner, Jay L. Allord, filed objections to the nominating documents, asserting that each was invalid because the candidates failed to file a statement of economic interests within the calendar year of 1997. Allord also made several other objections, none of which are relevant to this appeal.

Each candidate moved to dismiss Allord's objections, which the Board consolidated at a hearing held on February 3, 1997. In five separate but identical written opinions issued on February 10, the Board granted the candidates' motions and overruled Allord's objections to the nomination papers, finding that the candidates' filing of the statements of economic interests on December 19, 1996, satisfied the requirements of both the Election Code and the Ethics Act.

On February 19, 1997, Allord filed a petition for review in the circuit court, seeking reversal of the Board's decision pursuant to section 10-10.1 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10-10.1 (West 1996)), and naming only the Board and its three individual members (collectively Board) as respondents. Allord argued that the Board's decision ignored the plain language of section 10-5 and misinterpreted the scope of section 4A-105.

The Board moved to dismiss Allord's petition pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1996)), urging that the candidates, as well as the Cook County Clerk (Clerk), were necessary parties to the litigation, and the failure to name them in the petition as respondents was a fatal jurisdictional defect because the ten-day limitations period for filing section 10-10.1 administrative review complaints had passed. Allord then moved for leave to add the five candidates as respondents to the petition.

The circuit court denied the Board's motion to dismiss and granted Allord leave to amend his petition. On March 19, 1997, after hearing arguments from the candidates, the Board, and Allord, the court reversed the decision of the Board, holding that because the candidates filed their statements of economic interests before the beginning of the statutory period for filing nomination papers, the filings were insufficient and the candidates' names would not be included on the ballots. The court also denied the candidates' joint motion to dismiss the petition for failure to name the Clerk as a respondent. The Board and the candidates appeal.

Because of the need to render a decision before the impending elections, this court granted appellants' emergency motion to expedite the appeal. On March 27, 1997, we reversed the decision of the circuit court, ruling that the Board's decision in favor of the candidates, and their inclusion on the April 1 ballot, would remain in effect, with a written order or opinion to follow, which we now file.

I

The Board and candidates contend that the Board's ruling is entitled to deference, and the circuit court exceeded its authority when it determined the proper construction to be given section 10-5 without considering the interpretation of that statute contained in the Board's written findings. Because we dismiss this appeal for reasons set forth in point II of this opinion, we do not reach this issue for decision.

II

The Board and candidates argue that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over Allord's petition for two reasons: (1) Allord failed to serve the candidates personally with notice of his petition within ten days of his filing the petition; and (2) Allord failed to make the Clerk a party to the proceedings before the circuit court.

Courts do not possess inherent authority to hear election contests, and may exercise jurisdiction in such cases only when and as provided by statute. Pullen v. Mulligan, 138 Ill.2d 21, 32, 149 Ill.Dec. 215, 561 N.E.2d 585 (1990); In re Contest of the Election for Governor, 93 Ill.2d 463, 474, 67 Ill.Dec. 131, 444 N.E.2d 170 (1983). Special statutory jurisdiction, as exercised by the circuit court in this case, is limited to the language of the conferring statute, and if the prescribed statutory procedure is not strictly pursued, no jurisdiction can be invoked in the court. Fredman Brothers Furniture Co. v. Department of Revenue, 109 Ill.2d 202, 210, 93 Ill.Dec. 360, 486 N.E.2d 893 (1985).

The circuit court in the present case purported to exercise jurisdiction over the petition pursuant to section 10-10.1 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10-10.1 (West 1996)) (section 10-10.1), which allows parties to seek judicial review of an electoral board's decision, but imposes certain procedures that must be followed:

"The party seeking judicial review must file a petition with the clerk of the court within 10 days after the decision of the electoral board. The petition shall contain a brief statement of the reasons why the decision of the board should be reversed. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition upon the electoral board and other parties to the proceeding by registered or certified mail and shall file proof of service with the clerk of the court. No answer to the petition need be filed, but any answer must be filed within 10 days after the filing of the petition." (Emphasis added.) 10 ILCS 5/10-10.1 (West 1996).

The Board and candidates contend that Allord did not comply with section 10-10.1 because the candidates were not served with or named in the original petition. They interpret section 10-10.1 to require that all respondents in the circuit court proceeding be served within 10 days after the petition is filed, in order to allow them to file an answer to the petition within the statutory time period. Further, they argue, under section 10-10.1, a petition must contain the names of all necessary parties when it is filed within 10 days of the board's decision, and may not later be amended to add other parties. The original petition, they claim, did not comply with the requirements of the statute, resulting in want of jurisdiction.

The paramount rule of statutory construction, rising above all other canons and rules, is to "ascertain and give effect to the true intent and meaning of the legislature." Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan Construction Co., 149 Ill.2d 190, 194, 172 Ill.Dec. 200, 595 N.E.2d 561 (1992). In determining legislative intent, the plain language of the statute first must be examined; unambiguous terms, when not specifically defined, will be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Hernon, 149 Ill.2d at 194-95, 172 Ill.Dec. 200, 595 N.E.2d 561. Here, section 10-10.1 includes four explicit requirements that must be met before the circuit court may obtain jurisdiction over the case: (1) a challenging petition must be filed with the clerk of the court within ten days after the electoral board issues its decision; (2) the petition shall state briefly the reasons why the board's decision should be reversed; (3) the petitioner shall serve copies of the petition upon the electoral board and other parties to the proceeding by registered or certified mail; and (4) the petitioner shall file proof of service with the clerk of the court.

A review of the record confirms that Allord did not comply with all four requirements, preventing the circuit court from exercising jurisdiction over the case. Although he filed the petition on February 19, 1997, within the requisite ten days after the electoral board issued its decision, and his petition stated the reasons why he believed the Board's decision should be reversed, he served only the members of the Board, their attorney, and the attorney for the candidates who had appeared before the Board. He failed to name the candidates who were parties to the Board's proceeding in his petition, however. Lastly, Allord filed proof of service, a copy of which was attached to the petition, which did not show service of the petition upon the candidates.

The Board and candidates assert that there was neither a proper ...