Allsberry v. Flynn

Decision Date14 September 2021
Docket NumberNo. SC 99257,SC 99257
Citation628 S.W.3d 392
CourtMissouri Supreme Court
Parties Karla K. ALLSBERRY, Respondent/Cross-Appellant, v. Patrick S. FLYNN, in his individual capacity, Appellant/Cross-Respondent.

Flynn was represented by Jesus A. Osete of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City, (573) 751-3321.

Allsberry was represented by David M. Duree of David M. Duree & Associates PC in O'Fallon, Illinois, (618) 628-0186.

PER CURIAM

I. Introduction1

The Honorable Patrick S. Flynn appeals the judgment declaring that he did not have authority, as the presiding judge of the 45th Judicial Circuit, to suspend Karla Allsberry, the elected circuit clerk of Lincoln County within the 45th Judicial Circuit. Allsberry cross-appeals the judgment denying her request for injunctive relief. This Court affirms the declaratory judgment, reverses the denial of injunctive relief, and remands the case to the circuit court to enter the requested injunctive relief.

II. Procedural and Factual Background

Both Judge Flynn and Allsberry were elected to their respective positions in the 2018 general election and took office in January 2019. Intense conflict between the two began immediately and escalated over the weeks and months. There was considerable evidence at trial about the parties’ acrimonious power struggle, the rift this discord created among the staff at the Lincoln County courthouse, and the disruption their dysfunctional professional relationship caused – the details of which are largely irrelevant to the legal questions presented in this appeal. The following are the facts salient to this Court's disposition.

After several problem-filled months, Judge Flynn issued Allsberry the following letter in May 2019:

The purpose of this letter is to inform you that pursuant to Section 478.240 RSMo., as Presiding Judge, I am temporarily placing you on administrative leave and suspending your access to the Justice Center, its employees and the records of the court. This action is necessary due to your conduct creating a dysfunctional work environment for the Lincoln County Circuit Court in your failure to operate in fact, truth, protocol and respect. This action will remain in effect for an indefinite period of time until I notify you otherwise. This administrative suspension will cease in the event you voluntarily resign from office at any time.
This administrative suspension is not a cause of action and will not cause any loss of pay or benefits for you during the period of suspension. If any action is imposed for any reason, you will be notified of the reasons at that time along with your due process rights in accordance with section 483.170, RSMo.
During this period of administrative leave and suspension of your duties you are not [ ] permitted to enter the Justice Center2 or represent this office in your official capacity at any time. However, you will be expected to remain available if called upon to return to work or meet with the Presiding Judge or anyone involved in bringing this to a resolution.

Section 478.240 – invoked by Judge Flynn in this letter – states, in relevant part, that "the presiding judge of the circuit shall have general administrative authority over all judicial personnel and court officials in the circuit." § 478.240.2.3

Also referenced in the letter is section 483.170, which, along with related sections of chapter 483, addresses the removal from office of an elected circuit clerk who has been found guilty of a misdemeanor in office and the clerk's suspension pending trial on such charges. During the summer of 2019, Judge Flynn notified the prosecuting attorney and the attorney general that he believed Allsberry had committed a misdemeanor in office. Investigations into his numerous allegations of misconduct were conducted by the relevant authorities. No actual charge of misdemeanor in office ever has been filed against Allsberry by any prosecutor or the attorney general.

Judge Flynn's suspension of Allsberry has been kept in effect continuously since May 2019; at this point, she has been suspended more than half of her four-year term in office. In March 2020, she filed a petition seeking a declaration that Judge Flynn was not authorized under any of the cited statutory provisions to place her on indefinite administrative leave and bar her from performing her duties as circuit clerk or entering the courthouse.4 She also sought the following injunctive relief: "restoring [Allsberry] to her office of elected Clerk of the Circuit Court," preventing Judge Flynn from barring her from the courthouse, "and ordering Judge Flynn to remove her from indefinite administrative leave."

This Court appointed the Honorable Richard G. Callahan, retired circuit judge, as a special judge. Several days of testimony and argument were presented, after which the circuit court entered judgment declaring that section 478.240 "does not grant a presiding judge the authority to order the suspension of an elected Circuit Court Clerk." Even if it did, the circuit court added, the presiding judge would need cause to suspend her and a "cause requirement has not been met." The circuit court also declared that section 483.170, and the suspension and removal procedures therein, did not apply in this case because no formal misdemeanor-in-office charges had been filed. Nevertheless, the circuit court went on to conclude that none of the misdemeanor-in-office allegations asserted by Judge Flynn against Allsberry were "supported by proof." Despite finding that her suspension was unauthorized, the circuit court denied Allsberry's request for injunctive relief restoring her to her office on the ground that it lacked the power "to mandate or enjoin what another circuit judge might do."

Judge Flynn appealed. Allsberry cross-appealed. The case was transferred to this Court following an opinion by the court of appeals pursuant to Rule 83.02.

III. Standard of Review

The standard of review in this action for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief is the same as in any court-tried case: the judgment will be affirmed unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Dohogne v. Counts , 307 S.W.3d 660, 665-66 (Mo. App. 2010). Both the appeal and cross-appeal raise claims that the circuit court erroneously declared and applied the law. These claims are reviewed de novo. Adams v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London , 589 S.W.3d 15, 26 (Mo. App. 2019). To the extent this Court's review involves the interpretation of statutes and constitutional provisions, the Court construes the words used in those provisions according to their plain and ordinary meaning. StopAquila.org v. City of Peculiar , 208 S.W.3d 895, 902 (Mo. banc 2006).

IV. Discussion

There are two legal questions before this Court: (1) whether Judge Flynn had the power under his general administrative authority as the presiding judge to suspend Allsberry, an elected circuit clerk, when the suspension was indefinite and had the effect of removing her from office; and (2) whether the circuit court had the power to grant Allsberry injunctive relief so as to undo any wrong done by Judge Flynn.

Presiding Judge's Authority

Judge Flynn contends that the circuit court erroneously declared and applied the law by holding that he did not have authority under section 478.240.2 to suspend Allsberry. He argues the general administrative authority vested in him pursuant to that statute is broad and necessarily includes the power to suspend disruptive personnel, even the elected circuit clerk. Judge Flynn concedes, however, that section 478.240 does not grant the presiding judge the power to remove an elected circuit clerk. He and Allsberry agree that an elected circuit clerk can be removed from her elected position only for a misdemeanor in office or by way of a quo warranto proceeding. Allsberry argues that, because Judge Flynn suspended her indefinitely and has continuously prevented her from acting in her official capacity, he has effectively removed her from office. Judge Flynn disagrees, claiming it was not a removal because the suspension with pay and benefits does not divest Allsberry of her title and does not create a vacancy of the office to be filled by the governor.

For the following reasons, however broad the presiding judge's general administrative authority is and whatever other administrative actions he might be empowered to take with respect to an elected circuit clerk, the presiding judge is not authorized to take any action that has the practical effect of removing an elected circuit clerk from office.

General Administrative Authority

Article V, section 15.3 of the Missouri Constitution states: "The presiding judge shall have general administrative authority over the court and its divisions." Section 478.240 similarly vests presiding judges with this general administrative authority:

Subject to the authority of the supreme court and the chief justice under Article V of the Constitution, the presiding judge of the circuit shall have general administrative authority over all judicial personnel and court officials in the circuit, including the authority to assign any judicial or court personnel anywhere in the circuit, and shall have the authority to assign judges to hear such cases or classes of cases as the presiding judge may designate, and to assign judges to divisions. Such assignment authority shall include the authority to authorize particular associate circuit judges to hear and determine cases or classes of cases.

(Emphasis added). As Allsberry points out, the statute does not expressly state that this authority extends over the circuit clerk. But the terms "judicial personnel" and "court official" plainly encompass all the people who are employed by the court or act in an official capacity for the court, including the elected circuit clerk.

This Court has described the presiding...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 cases
  • Van McGibney v. Mo. Dep't of Natural Res.
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • August 26, 2022
    ...895, 902 (Mo. banc 2006). Elevation Enters., LLC v. City of Springfield , 646 S.W.3d 716, 720-21 (Mo. App. 2022) ( quoting Allsberry v. Flynn , 628 S.W.3d 392, 395 (Mo. banc 2021) ).Following a circuit court's judgment in a § 536.150 proceeding to review an agency's decision in a non-contes......
  • Elevation Enters., LLC v. City of Springfield
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • June 8, 2022
    ...according to their plain and ordinary meaning. StopAquila.org v. City of Peculiar , 208 S.W.3d 895, 902 (Mo. banc 2006). Allsberry v. Flynn , 628 S.W.3d 392, 395 (Mo. banc 2021).Generally Applicable Charter Provisions and Legal Principles The City is a charter city subject to the laws of Mi......
  • Nichols v. McCarthy
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • December 14, 2021
    ...law.Standard of Review Our standard of review in a declaratory judgment action is the same as in any other bench-tried case. Allsberry v. Flynn , 628 S.W.3d 392, 395 (Mo. banc 2021) ; Farber v. Metro. Police Dep't of City of St. Louis , 558 S.W.3d 70, 73 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018). We will affirm......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT