Allstate Indem. Co. v. Rice
| Decision Date | 28 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:12-CV-00178-BCW |
| Parties | ALLSTATE INDEMNITY COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. LEVINA RICE, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Before the Court are Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #18) and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #19). The Court being duly advised of the premises, having reviewed the parties' briefs in this matter, for good cause shown, and for the following reasons, grants Plaintiff's Motion (Doc. #19) and denies Defendant's Motion (Doc. #18).
BACKGROUND
This suit arose out of a single-car accident that occurred on October 10, 2010. Defendant Rice was injured while riding as a passenger in a 2008 Nissan Altima owned by Sherry and Timothy Underwood. At the time of the accident, Howard Wiebe, a relative to the Underwoods, was driving the vehicle with permission. The car was insured by Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company through an automobile liability policy issued to Sherry and Timothy Underwood. Defendant has recovered damages from the Underwood's automobile liability policy and from Wiebe's Farmers Insurance Company's motor vehicle liability policy. Defendant now seeks to recover damages from the Underwood's Allstate Indemnity Company Personal Umbrella Policy. Plaintiff filed this suit requesting the Court declare Wiebe not an "insured person" under the terms of the Personal Umbrella Policy and to declare Plaintiff has noobligation to provide liability coverage to Howard Wiebe for the car accident that led to Defendant's injuries.
The parties have agreed the Court's determination on the instant dispositive motions will resolve this matter. Plaintiff and Defendant both asserted undisputed or uncontroverted facts. See Docs. #19, #20. The parties dispute the definition of "insured person" under the insurance policies at issue and have each filed motions for summary judgment. The Court must determine if an ambiguity exists regarding the definition of an "insured person," if Howard Wiebe falls under that definition, and thus, which party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Missouri law governs the Court's analysis because the Court applies the substantive law of the forum state in which it sits when jurisdiction, as here, is based on diversity of citizenship. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment shall be granted when the moving party demonstrates there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is not a disfavored procedural shortcut; instead, it is "an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (internal quotation omitted).
DISCUSSION
General rules for interpreting whether ambiguity exists in contract language are applicable to insurance contracts. Todd v. Mo. United Sch. Ins. Council, 223 S.W.3d 156, 160 (Mo. banc 2007). Determining ambiguity in an insurance policy is a question of law. Id. When construing an insurance policy's terms, the Court "applies the meaning which would be attached by an ordinary person of average understanding if purchasing insurance, and resolvesambiguities in favor of the insured." Ritchie v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 307 S.W.3d 132, 135 (Mo. banc 2009) (citing Seeck v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 212 S.W.3d 129, 132 (Mo. banc 2007)). An insurance policy is designed to furnish protection and will, when reasonably possible, be construed to provide coverage rather than defeat it. Burns v. Smith, 303 S.W.3d 505, 512 (Mo. banc 2010) (citing Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins. Co. of Mo. v. Schmidt, 751 S.W.2d 375, 376 (Mo. banc 1988)).
The Court, when analyzing an insurance contract, must consider the entire policy, not just isolated provisions or clauses. Rice v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 301 S.W.3d 43, 47 (Mo. banc 2009) (internal quotation omitted). Missouri law holds that where there exists a multicoverage policy, each coverage may be analyzed as a separate contract of insurance. See Trabue v. Dwelling House Ins. Co., 121 Mo. 75 (1894) (). This doctrine has also been applied to support the proposition that coverage against loss from one type of risk is, in effect, a separate contract from coverage against loss from another type of risk. See Consumer's Money Order Corp. of Am., Inc. (Mo.) v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 386 S.W.2d 674, 677 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) ().
The parties present two competing definitions of "insured person." Plaintiff relies upon the definition in the Personal Umbrella Policy issued by Allstate Indemnity Company and Defendant points to the definition in the automobile liability policy issued by Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company. Missouri Courts have found insurance contracts containing different policies to be divisible and severable but here, the Court's analysis need not extend this far.
Two separately incorporated companies are separate and distinct legal entities. See Renaissance Leasing, LLC v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 322 S.W.3d 112, 125 (Mo. banc 2010) ( "[e]ach company is a distinct legal entity with the right to own property, sue and be sued, contract, and acquire and transfer property"); Smith v. City of Lee's Summit, 450 S.W.2d 485, 489 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970) (). The only company named in this suit is Allstate Indemnity Company. The two policies asserted have been issued by separate entities; therefore the Allstate Indemnity Company Personal Umbrella Policy is the only policy relevant to the Court's inquiry.
The language in the Personal Umbrella Policy expressly states Doc. #20-2 at 12 (emphasis in original). As a result, the definition of "insured person" from the Personal Umbrella Policy issued by Allstate Indemnity Company is the only definition relevant to the Court's interpretation analysis.
Ambiguity in a contract exists where there is ...
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