Allstate Ins. Co. v. Semple, CV

• Decision Date: 11 October 1979
• Docket Number: No. CV,CV
• Citation: 36 Conn.Supp. 232,416 A.2d 1211
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Gloria SEMPLE. 79 0236083. -New Britain

Page 1211

416 A.2d 1211

36 Conn.Supp. 232

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Gloria SEMPLE.

No. CV 79 0236083.

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Hartford-New Britain.

Oct. 11, 1979.

Skelley, Vinkels, Williams & Rottner, Hartford, for plaintiff.

Perelmutter & Potash, Seymour, for defendant.

JACOBS, J., State Referee.

This is an appeal from an arbitration decision awarding the defendant, Gloria Semple, damages for personal injuries in the sum of $80,000. Gloria Semple, the claimant in the arbitration proceeding which is the subject of this application, was injured while riding as a passenger on an uninsured motorcycle. ¹ The motorcycle was involved in a collision with a truck. Both drivers were Connecticut residents. The accident occurred in Oakville, Connecticut, on May 30, 1977.

At the time of the accident, Gloria Semple, an Iowa resident, was visiting relatives in Connecticut. The arbitrator's findings disclose that the defendant was a resident of the household of her father and stepmother, who live in Sioux City, Iowa. The parents are the owners of insurance policies which they purchased from the plaintiff, the Allstate Insurance Company, in Iowa. The policies cover four vehicles owned by the Semples and included $20,000 uninsured motorist coverage on each automobile; thus, $80,000 total uninsured motorist protection is provided members of the Semple home.

Summarized, the relationship between the parties has been as follows: The plaintiff and the defendant's parents entered into written contracts of automobile insurance containing agreements in the policies for arbitration; on August 24, 1978, the defendant filed a demand for arbitration; on June 29, 1979, after an arbitration hearing held in New Haven, the arbitrator made a written award finding, inter alia, that the defendant was entitled to recover damages for personal injuries in the sum of $80,000 and that the laws of Connecticut should be applied to govern the recovery; on July 5, 1979, the plaintiff was duly notified of the arbitrator's award; on July 25, 1979, the plaintiff filed an application seeking to correct, modify or vacate the arbitrator's award pursuant to § 52-418(d) of the General Statutes; and on September 17, 1979 the defendant filed a motion to confirm the arbitrator's award. ²

The ground upon which the plaintiff seeks to correct, modify or vacate the arbitrator's award is § 52-418(d) of the General Statutes. That section entitled "Vacating awards," provides: "In any of the following cases the superior court . . . or, when said court is not in session, any judge thereof, shall make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration: . . . (d) if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter was not made."

The basic claim of the plaintiff, as set forth in its memorandum, is that "the award made by the arbitrator . . . is inherently inconsistent, in that it states Connecticut law applies, yet awards $80,000.00 to the claimant when no such award could be permitted under Connecticut law." Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the matter is a contract dispute; that the applicable Connecticut choice of law principle requires that the contract be interpreted in accordance with Iowa contract law; and thus, that only $20,000, not $80,000, is recoverable because Iowa, unlike Connecticut, does not permit the "stacking" of uninsured motorist coverage.

It is to be noted at the outset that the findings of an arbitrator are highly favored in Connecticut. " ' "It is the established policy of the courts to regard awards with liberality. Every reasonable presumption and intendment will be made in favor of the award and of the arbitrators' acts and proceedings. Hence, the burden rests on the party attacking the award to produce evidence sufficient to invalidate or avoid it." ' " Costello Construction Corporation v. Teamsters Local, 167 Conn. 315, 320, 355 A.2d 279, 282.

The plaintiff's argument is that the arbitrator imperfectly executed his duties in that he applied Connecticut's law on "stacking" and not Iowa's law which prohibits "stacking." ³ Because the submission consented to by the parties was a general one, the court need not review beyond the face of either the submission ⁴ itself or the award. "As we have noted, in deciding whether the arbitrators have exceeded their powers courts need only examine the submission and award to determine whether the award conforms to the submission; . . . (they) 'are not required to review the evidence on which the award was based or to ensure that the judgment of the arbitrators was either factually or legally correct.' Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation v. Southern New England Contracting Co., (164 Conn. 472,) 478 (, 325 A.2d 274)." Ramos Iron Works v. Franklin Construction Co., 174 Conn. 583, 590-91, 392 A.2d 461, 465.

Despite sufficient case law supporting the preceding argument, the court is compelled to address the merits of the plaintiff's contentions. It does so in an effort to clarify the objections and also because it is the opinion of the court that the findings of the arbitrator were fair, correct and just.

"It is well recognized that the conflict of laws field, and more specifically the choice of law problem have been the subject of much discussion and controversy during recent years. . . . (I)t would be particularly unfortunate to predicate an insured's right to compensation from his company on the combination of the terminology in the endorsement and the fortuity of the accident's location in relation to a state's choice of law rules. ⁵ Rather, this is another instance where the underlying objective of providing a source of indemnification for injuries the claimant had sustained should be the paramount consideration." Widiss, Uninsured Motorist Coverage (1970 Ed.) § 2.28, p. 58.

The plaintiff claims that because the contract was made in Iowa, the laws of Iowa must control. The court finds that argument to be lacking in merit. As one commentator said in discussing Hall v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 261 Iowa 1258, 158 N.W.2d 107: "The court is not impressed with the argument that this is an Iowa contract which should cover all losses for which the Iowa law permits recovery, an argument which has impressed other courts, and accepts the proposition that a motor insuror's liability may vary according to the law of the jurisdiction in which the vehicle is being operated, which some courts seem to find repugnant." "Recent Developments in the Conflict of Laws Iowa Personal Injury Cases," 23 Drake L.Rev. 47, 50. The question before this court does not truly involve an interpretation of the insurance contracts, but rather how much the defendant is entitled to recover. That is a matter of remedy. "(I)f the insurer ought reasonably to expect...