Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dana Corp.
| Decision Date | 09 November 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A02-9909-CV-666, No. 49A02-9906-CV-430. |
| Citation | 737 N.E.2d 1177 |
| Parties | ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY as Successor in Interest to Northbrook Excess & Surplus, f/k/a Northbrook Insurance Company, et al., Appellants-Defendants, v. DANA CORPORATION, Appellee-Plaintiff. Dana Corporation, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Insurance Company, Appellee-Defendant. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Maxwell Gray, Lowe Gray Steele & Darko, Indianapolis, Indiana, Stephen D. Cuyler, Thomas J. Castano, Cuyler & Burk, Parsippany, New Jersey, Attorneys for Allstate Insurance Co.
Robert F. Walsh, Susan M. Chesler, Melito & Adolfsen, New York, New York, Steven S. Lovern, Schreckengast Lovern & Helm, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company.
George M. Plews, Frederick D. Emhardt, Plews Shadley Racher & Braun, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Dana Corporation.
This consolidated appeal arises from a suit filed by Dana Corporation ("Dana") against Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate") and other insurance companies that have insured Dana in the past.1 Dana asserts that Allstate is contractually bound to indemnify it for costs arising from environmental cleanup operations at numerous properties that Dana owned or used for manufacturing or storage. Dana and Allstate both filed a number of dispositive motions with the trial court in regard to various provisions of Allstate's insurance contracts, and they are each appealing the trial court's resolution of those motions. Dana raises three issues, which we expand and restate as:
1) whether the trial court erred when it denied Dana's motion for reconsideration of its previous decision that the owned property exclusion in Allstate's policies precluded property damage liability coverage for costs imposed upon Dana to clean up pollution at sites owned by Dana;
2) whether the trial court erred when it denied Dana's motion for reconsideration of its previous decision that Allstate is required to indemnify Dana for Dana's environmental liabilities only if those liabilities were for damage that occurred during a policy period;
3) whether the trial court erred when it determined that Dana is judicially estopped from arguing that its insurance policies with Hartford Accident and Insurance Company ("Hartford") contain aggregate limits of liability on property damage;2 and
4) whether the trial court erred when it granted Allstate's motion for partial summary judgment on the question of whether Hartford's policies contain aggregate limits of liability for property damage.
Allstate raises four issues,3 which we consolidate and restate as:
5) whether the trial court erred when it granted Dana's motion for partial summary judgment on the question of whether the personal injury provisions of Allstate's policies provide coverage for environmental cleanup costs such as those imposed upon Dana;
6) whether the trial court erred when it granted Dana's motion for summary judgment as to Allstate's liability for cleanup costs imposed on Dana at the Old Forge landfill ("Old Forge"); and
7) whether the trial court erred when it awarded prejudgment interest to Dana as part of the Old Forge summary judgment.
We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The relevant facts follow. We begin by referring to our opinion from the first appeal in this case:
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Dana Corp., 690 N.E.2d 285, 288 (Ind.Ct.App. 1997), trans. denied, 698 N.E.2d 1191 ("Dana I"). We affirmed the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment to Dana. Id. at 298.
After the first appeal was resolved, the trial court set fifteen different sites for trial, to be tried in three sets of five sites. The trial court later amended the case management plan, determining that the first trial would determine the extent of Allstate's duty to indemnify Dana for Dana's liabilities at the Old Forge site alone and that trial for the other four sites in the set would be delayed until a later date.
While the case management plan was being revised, the parties filed four of the five motions that are the subject of this appeal. Dana filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking a ruling that Allstate is liable for cleanup costs that Dana incurred at ten properties that were owned by Dana, despite the existence of an owned property exclusion in Allstate's policies. Dana filed a second motion for partial summary judgment seeking a ruling that Allstate could be held liable for "all sums," or the entire amount of Dana's liability for damages, up to Allstate's limits under each policy that was triggered. Dana then filed a third motion for partial summary judgment seeking a ruling that the personal injury coverage in Allstate's policies extended to Dana's environmental liabilities. Subsequently, Allstate filed a motion for partial summary judgment in which it asked the trial court to declare that Dana's underlying insurance policies with Hartford had no aggregate limits on property damage coverage.
The trial court addressed Dana's motion on the "owned property" clause first. Because the trial court had previously entered summary judgment on this issue against Dana, it addressed Dana's motion as a request to reconsider its ruling and denied the motion, determining that the property damage to eight of the ten sites was not covered under Allstate's policies.4 The trial court ruled upon the "all sums" liability issue next. Because Dana had previously moved for partial summary judgment on this issue and had lost, the trial court addressed Dana's motion as a motion for reconsideration. The trial court denied Dana's motion, holding that Allstate would only be obligated to pay under a triggered policy for Dana's liability for damages that took place during the period of that policy. However, the trial court granted Dana's motion for partial summary judgment on the personal injury issue, determining that the personal injury provisions of Allstate's policies provided coverage for Dana's environmental liabilities. Finally, the trial court granted Allstate's motion for partial summary judgment on the aggregate limits issue, determining that Hartford's underlying policies do not provide aggregate limits to property damage liability coverage.
After these partial summary judgment motions were resolved, Dana filed a motion for summary judgment as to the Old Forge site, claiming that Allstate was required to indemnify Dana in full for its liability there. After reviewing the parties' memorandums and hearing oral argument, the trial court granted Dana's motion and determined that Allstate was liable to Dana for $3,004,420.00 plus $1,594,894.30 in prejudgment interest for a total of $4,599,314.30. In addition, the trial court certified its rulings on the "all sums" issue, the aggregate limits issue, and the personal injury coverage issue as final for the purposes of appeal. Subsequently, the trial court also certified its ruling on the owned property issue as final.
Before addressing the issues, we note our standard of review. When reviewing a grant or denial of summary judgment, we use the same standard as the trial court: whether the pleadings and evidence demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Dana I, 690 N.E.2d at 290. The appellant bears the burden of proving that the trial court erred. See Rosi v. Business Furniture Corp., 615 N.E.2d 431, 434 (Ind.1993)
. A genuine issue of material fact exists where facts concerning an issue that would dispose of the litigation are in dispute or where the undisputed facts are capable of supporting conflicting inferences on such an issue. Scott v. Bodor, Inc., 571 N.E.2d 313, 318 (Ind.Ct.App.1991). We construe the pleadings, affidavits, and designated materials in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and give careful scrutiny to assure that the nonmovant is not improperly prevented from having its day in court. Dana I, 690 N.E.2d at 291.
Summary judgment based upon construction of an insurance contract is a determination, as a matter of law, that the contract is unambiguous and that it is unnecessary to resort to the rules of contract construction in order to ascertain the contract's meaning. Terre Haute First Nat. Bank v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 634 N.E.2d 1336, 1337 (Ind.Ct.App.1993). The provisions of an insurance contract are subject to the same rules of construction as are other contracts, and the construction of a written contract is a question of law for which summary judgment is particularly appropriate. Id. If the language of a policy is clear and unambiguous, it should...
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