Allstate Ins. Co. v. Singh
| Decision Date | 20 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO.: 1:12-CV-129-TLS |
| Parties | ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. KULDEEP SINGH and PETER M. FORTRIEDE, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 21] filed by the Plaintiff, Allstate Insurance Company, on September 14, 2012. The Plaintiff requests a declaratory judgment stating that its policy provides no coverage for any and all claims arising out of injuries allegedly sustained by Defendant Peter M. Fortriede when Defendant Kuldeep Singh fired a handgun at the automobile in which Defendant Fortriede was sitting on September 20, 2009. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant the Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Plaintiff issued an automobile insurance policy to Nachhatar Singh to insure a 2006 Hummer H2, among other vehicles. The policy, No. 9 11 947733 08/12, was effective from August 12, 2009, until February 12, 2010, and it listed Defendant Kuldeep Singh as a driver. (See Auto Policy Declarations, ECF No. 21-1 at 7.) The policy provided as follows: "[Y]our policy protects an insured person from liability for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use, loading or unloading of an insured auto." (Id. at 28.) In the section of thepolicy entitled "Exclusions—What Is Not Covered," the policy excluded from coverage (Id. at 29.)
On September 20, 2009, Defendant Fortriede was stopped at a traffic light at the intersection of Dupont Road and Lima Road in Fort Wayne, Indiana. He was wearing a United States Army uniform because he was on active military duty at the time. Defendant Singh, driving the Hummer H2, was stopped at the same traffic light, in the lane to the left of Defendant Fortriede's vehicle, and his vehicle was pointed in the same direction as Defendant Fortriede's vehicle. Defendant Singh lowered the passenger window and fired a handgun at Defendant Fortriede's vehicle, striking the doorframe of Defendant Fortriede's vehicle with the bullet. Defendant Fortriede filed a Complaint for Damages against Defendant Singh in the Allen Superior Court (Compl. for Damages, ECF No. 21-2), and Defendant Singh pled guilty to criminal recklessness, a class D felony, on April 4, 2011 (Plea Agreement on Plea of Guilty, ECF No. 21-3).
On April 26, 2012, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment [ECF No. 1] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, seeking a determination that Defendant Singh is not entitled to liability insurance coverage under the automobile insurance policy issued by the Plaintiff. In the Complaint, the Plaintiff named both Defendant Singh and Defendant Fortriede as parties with whom the Plaintiff has an actual dispute concerning the applicability of the policy. The Plaintiff maintains that if its policy is found to apply in this case, it could be responsible for paying thecosts of Defendant Fortriede's alleged personal and emotional injuries and for defending Defendant Singh in the civil action.
On September 14, 2012, the Plaintiff filed its Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 21] along with a Memorandum of Law in Support [ECF No. 22]. The Plaintiff argues that a declaratory judgment is appropriate because Defendant Fortriede's alleged injuries did not arise "out of the ownership, maintenance or use" of the insured automobile, and because any alleged injuries to Defendant Fortriede resulted from Defendant Singh's intentional and criminal conduct. Defendant Fortriede entered a Response [ECF No. 23] on October 9, in which he concedes that the Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment because Defendant Singh's intentional and/or criminal conduct precludes coverage under the policy.
Defendant Singh entered a Response [ECF No. 24] and a Memorandum of Law in Support [ECF No. 25] on October 12, insisting that summary judgment is not appropriate. Defendant Singh disputes some of the facts submitted by the Plaintiff in its briefing, and submits the following alternate facts:
[O]n September 20th, 2009, Defendant Singh was sitting in his vehicle in the parking lot and/or drive through area of Taco Bell restaurant located at the intersection of Dupont and Lima roads in Allen County Indiana, at which time he was approached by Fortriede, while in his pickup truck. Fortriede exhibited behavior towards Singh that was strange, erratic and threatening. He would drive his truck in the parking lot areas of Walmart and Taco Bell at the aforementioned intersection, at high rates of speed, spinning and "squealing" his tires and causing his truck to spin in "doughnut" like motions. He would drive up to Singh's vehicle in this fashion and verbally berate him for no reason. He yelled ethnic and racially charged obscenities to Singh, telling him that "we are fighting you people over there, so that you can come here and take our jobs." He also yelled vulgarities and insults directed toward Singh's mother and family. Singh left the area and Fortriede continued to follow him, exhibiting the same driving behavior and yelling obscenities. Fortriede also motioned his thumb across his throat while shouting racial/ethnic insults, which placed Singh in fear, considering his other behavior. Fortriede pulled up next to Singh at the aforementioned intersection, at which time Singh discharged his firearm in thedirection of Fortriede's vehicle. Singh only meant to scare Fortriede in order to get him to cease his behavior and not follow him. He did not point his firearm directly at him, and was not intending to harm Fortriede.
(Mem. of Law in Supp. of Resp. 2-3, ECF No. 25.) Defendant Singh's version of the facts is supported by his Affidavit [ECF No. 24-2]. He argues that alleged injuries to Defendant Fortriede could have arisen from the operation, maintenance, or use of an insured vehicle because they arose from Defendant Singh's defense against Defendant Fortriede's acts of road rage. Defendant Singh also argues that because he pled guilty to reckless behavior, his acts were not intentional and/or criminal acts triggering the policy exclusion. Noting that Indiana caselaw is against him, Defendant Singh also suggests that he "should be allowed to ask the Indiana courts to revisit the issue" in light of the specific facts of his case as well as a 2001 Florida District Court of Appeal decision.
The Plaintiff filed a Reply [ECF No. 26] on October 26, arguing that no authority supports the proposition that an act of road rage is conduct arising out of the operation, maintenance, or use of a vehicle. The Plaintiff also argues that Defendant Singh's intentional, criminal act excludes this incident from coverage under the plain language of the policy whether or not Defendant Singh had the specific intent to shoot Defendant Fortriede.
The Motion for Summary Judgment is fully briefed and ripe for this Court's ruling.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the facts supported by materials in the record show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The motion should be granted so long as norational fact finder could return a verdict in favor of the party opposing the motion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses, or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50; Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1994). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of proving there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see also N.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(a) (). In response, the nonmoving party cannot rest on bare pleadings alone but must use the evidentiary tools listed in Rule 56 to designate specific material facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 2000); N.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(b) (). According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56:
Although a bare contention that an issue of fact exists is insufficient to create a factualdispute, the court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, view all reasonable inferences in that party's favor, see Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 491-92 (7th Cir. 2000), and avoid "the temptation to decide which party's version of the facts is more likely true," Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003) (...
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