Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim
| Decision Date | 26 September 2000 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 99-00728 ACK. |
| Citation | 121 F.Supp.2d 1301 |
| Parties | ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, an Illinois Corporation, Plaintiff, v. William S. KIM; Kay Kim; Lawrence Kim, a minor; and Tae C. Choi Defendants. |
| Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
Richard B. Miller, Tom & Petrus, Honolulu, HI, for Allstate Insurance Company.
Thomas D. Collins, III, Chester Kanai, Brian M.C. Pang, Honolulu, HI, for William S. Kim, Kay Kim, Lawrence Kim, Tae C. Choi.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING DEFENDANTS' CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This action stems from a homeowners insurance policy claim arising from an alleged assault by the policyholders' minor son, for which Allstate Insurance Company ("Plaintiff") asserts there is no coverage.
Defendant Tae Choi alleges that on October 14, 1997, Defendant Lawrence Kim ("Lawrence"), the minor son of Defendants William Kim ("Mr.Kim") and Kay Kim ("Mrs.Kim"), entered her apartment and assaulted her. Ms. Choi brought an action alleging such facts in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit of Hawaii on June 29, 1998, naming Lawrence and Mr. and Mrs. Kim as defendants. Ms. Choi further alleged that the Kims negligently failed to properly discipline their son or to obtain medical and/or psychological assistance for him and ratified and consented to their son's wrongful conduct. Ms. Choi is seeking general, special, and punitive damages in this underlying action.
The Kims tendered defense of the underlying action to Plaintiff under a Deluxe Homeowners Policy ("Policy") and a Comprehensive Personal Liability Policy ("Comprehensive Policy") issued by Plaintiff. Plaintiff provided a defense under a reservation of rights.
Plaintiff filed a claim against Mr. and Mrs. Kim, Lawrence Kim, and Ms. Choi on October 21, 1999, seeking a declaration from this Court that Plaintiff has no duty to defend or indemnify the Kims for claims arising from Lawrence's alleged attack of Ms. Choi.
The Kim's Homeowners Policy was in effect on the date of Lawrence's alleged attack upon Ms. Choi.1 The Policy contained the following provision regarding liability coverage:
Subject to the terms, conditions and limitations of this policy, Allstate will pay damages which an insured person becomes legally obligated to pay because of bodily injury or property damage arising from an occurrence to which this policy applies, and is covered by this part of the policy.
We may investigate or settle any claim or suit for covered damages against an insured person. If an insured person is sued for these damages, we will provide a defense with counsel of our choice, even if the allegations are groundless, false or fraudulent. We are not obligated to pay any claim or judgment after we have exhausted our limit of liability. Policy, at 27. The Policy further provided the following exclusions for claims arising from the intentional and/or criminal acts of an insured:
1. We do not cover any bodily injury or property damage intended by, or which may reasonably be expected to result from the intentional or criminal acts or omissions of, any insured person. This exclusion applies even if:
a) such insured person lacks the mental capacity to govern his or her conduct;
b) such bodily injury or property damage is of a different kind or degree than intended or reasonably expected ....
This exclusion applies regardless of whether or not such insured person is actually charged with, or convicted of a crime.
The Policy contains the following Joint Obligations clause:
The terms of this policy impose joint obligations on persons defined as an insured person. This means that responsibilities, acts and failures to act of a person defined as an insured person will be binding upon another person defined as an insured person.
Id. at 5. An "insured person" is defined as the policyholder and any relative or dependent person in the policyholder's care that is a resident of the policyholder's household. Id. at 3.
Allstate also issued a Comprehensive Personal Liability Policy ("CPL Policy") to the Kims, which was in effect on the date of the alleged attack.2 This policy provided for coverage of the following losses:
We will pay all sums arising from a loss which an insured person becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage covered by this part of the policy.
We may investigate or settle any claim or suit for covered damages against an insured person. If an insured person is sued for these damages, we will provide a defense with counsel of our choice. We will defend even if the allegations are not true. We are not obligated to pay any claim or judgment or defend any suit after we have exhausted the limit of our liability.
CPL Policy, at 5. The CPL Policy does not cover losses arising from intentional and/or criminal acts of an insured person:
1. We do not cover any bodily injury or property damage which may reasonably be expected to result from the intentional or criminal acts of an insured person or which is in fact intended by an insured person.
Additionally, the CPL policy contains a Limits of Liability Clause, which is referred to by the Defendants as a severability clause. It states:
4. Our Limits of Liability
This insurance applies separately to each insured person. Regardless of the number of insured person, injured persons, claims, claimants or policies involved, our total liability under the Family Liability protection coverage for damages resulting from one loss will not exceed the limit whose on the declarations page....
The CPL Policy does not contain a Joint Obligations clause. An insured person is defined as the policyholder and if a resident of the policyholder's household, any relative and any dependent person in the policyholder's care. See id. at 2.
Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on June 6, 2000, asserting that the claims asserted against the Kims in the underlying action are not covered under the insurance policies at issue because such claims involve intentional and/or criminal conduct on the part of an insured and are therefore excluded from coverage. Plaintiff's motion was supported by a Concise Statement of Facts, filed the same day.
Defendant Choi filed a Memorandum in Opposition on August 4, 2000, arguing that because the CPL Policy does not contain a Joint Obligations provision, the CPL does not bar coverage of Mr. and Mrs. Kim, who did not engage in the alleged intentional and/or criminal acts. Ms. Choi concedes that the Homeowners Policy precludes coverage for Mr. and Mrs. Kim's negligence and/or vicarious liability for the claims against them arising out of the criminal and/or intentional acts of their son, and the CPL Policy bars coverage to Lawrence. Ms. Choi argues alternatively that the exclusionary clauses violate public policy. Defendant Choi supported her opposition with a Concise Statement of Facts, filed July 7, 2000.
The Kim Defendants also filed a Memorandum in Opposition on August 4, 2000. The Kims argue, inter alia, that the intentional acts exclusion in the policies at issue are contrary to public policy and are therefore void. The Kims also assert that Lawrence is entitled to coverage because he was acquitted of the criminal charges "due to a successful identification defense."
Ms. Choi filed a Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on July 11, 2000, seeking a declaration from this Court that Plaintiff is obligated to indemnify the Kims under the CPL Policy and pay insurance benefits up to $300,000 to Ms. Choi for any award of damages, should Ms. Choi ultimately prevail on the merits in the underlying action.
The Kim Defendants also filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on June 30, 2000, supported by a Concise Statement of Facts. They argue that Plaintiff has a duty to defend and indemnify them in the underlying case according to the CPL policy.
Plaintiff filed a combined Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Cross Motions for Summary Judgment on August 18, 2000.
The Court heard these motions on August 30, 2000, and reserved its ruling in light of Defendant Choi's Objection to the Exercise of Discretionary Jurisdiction, filed on August 29, 2000, heard on September 19, 2000. After DENYING Defendants' Objection to the Exercise of Discretionary Jurisdiction, the Court now GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and DENIES Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.
Summary judgment shall be granted where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). The standard for summary adjudication is the same. See State of Cal. v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment procedure is to identify and dispose of factually unsupported claims and defenses. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
The United States Supreme Court has declared that summary judgment must be granted against a party who fails to demonstrate facts to establish an element essential to his case where that party will bear the burden of proof of that essential element at trial. See id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. "If the party moving for summary judgment meets its initial burden of identifying for the court the portions of the materials on file that it believes demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact [citations omitted], the nonmoving party may not rely on the mere allegations in the pleadings in order to preclude summary judgment." T.W. Elec. Serv. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.1987).
Rather, Rule 56(e) requires that the nonmoving party set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56,...
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