Allstate Ins. Co. v. Menards, Inc.
Decision Date | 05 December 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 93620.,93620. |
Citation | 270 Ill.Dec. 64,782 N.E.2d 258,202 Ill.2d 586 |
Parties | ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, as Subrogee of Sam Lakhia, Appellant, v. MENARDS, INC., Appellee. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Mark S. Grotefeld, William Stewart Grotefeld and Brad M. Gordon, of Grotefeld & Denenberg, L.L.C., Chicago, for appellant.
Kurt E. Olsen, of Fitzgerald & Cross, Chicago, for appellee.
This case is before us on a question of Illinois law certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 145 Ill.2d R. 20. The certified question is:
"What is the applicable statute of limitations in Illinois for an action for damages to property based on the doctrine of strict liability in tort when that action is brought within the applicable statute of repose?"
For the reasons that follow, the answer to the certified question is five years.
We take the following facts from the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Menards, Inc., 285 F.3d 630 (7th Cir.2002).
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit noted that statutes of limitations reflect important policy choices by the state and have severe consequences for the administration of justice within the state. Allstate, 285 F.3d at 639. In addition, the Seventh Circuit mentioned that this court is "far more familiar with the policy choices that have been made, and [has] far more direct responsibility for the administration of justice within the state than do the members of [the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals]." Allstate, 285 F.3d at 639. The Seventh Circuit further acknowledged that the districts of our appellate court are in disagreement about the applicable statute of limitations for strict liability property damage actions and that this court has not had the opportunity to address the question squarely. Allstate, 285 F.3d at 639. Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the intrusion of "unguided federal precedent" into the situation would only further destabilize this state's jurisprudence on the issue and make it more difficult for the members of the Illinois bar to counsel their clients accurately. Allstate, 285 F.3d at 639. According to the Seventh Circuit, the issue at hand is, moreover, likely to arise with significant frequency both in state and federal forums. Allstate, 285 F.3d at 639. As a result, the Seventh Circuit certified the question to this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 20 (145 Ill.2d R. 20). For these same reasons, we accepted the certified question on April 17, 2002.
The dispute between our appellate districts, acknowledged by the federal courts, arises from differing interpretations of section 13-213 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/13-213 (West 2000)). The relevant text of section 13-213 reads as follows:
The other section of the Code at issue in this case is section 13-205. That section provides:
735 ILCS 5/13-205 (West 2000).
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent and meaning of the legislature. Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill.2d 76, 81, 196 Ill.Dec. 655, 630 N.E.2d 820 (1994). The statute's plain language is the best indicator of the legislature's intent. Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill.2d 455, 466, 250 Ill.Dec. 758, 739 N.E.2d 521 (2000). When statutory language is ambiguous, it is appropriate to resort to extrinsic aids of construction such as an examination of the legislative history. Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill.2d 519, 534, 228 Ill.Dec. 626, 689 N.E.2d 1047 (1997). When the language is clear, however, it will be given effect without resort to other aids for construction. Petersen v. Wallach, 198 Ill.2d 439, 445, 261 Ill.Dec. 728, 764 N.E.2d 19 (2002). The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, subject to de novo review. Yang v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill.2d 96, 103, 253 Ill.Dec. 418, 745 N.E.2d 541 (2001).
The districts of our appellate court have construed the language of section 13-213, reaching contrary conclusions. The First District has construed section 13-213 as providing a specific limitations period for products liability actions, with a statute of repose in subsection (b) and the statute of limitations in subsection (d), thereby trumping the limitations period for property damage specifically provided for in section 13-205. See Calumet Country Club v. Roberts Environmental Control Corp., 136 Ill.App.3d 610, 613-14, 91 Ill.Dec. 267, 483 N.E.2d 613 (1985). In particular, the First District has stated that a reading of section 13-213 "reveals that a plaintiff who knows, or should know, that a product has caused property damage must bring his action in products liability within two years of when he becomes aware of that damage." McLeish v. Sony Corp. of America, 152 Ill.App.3d 628, 630, 105 Ill.Dec. 648, 504 N.E.2d 933 (1987).
Conversely, the Second District reads section 13-213 as providing a statute of repose, with an exception to that statute of repose in subsection (d). American Family Insurance Co. v. Village Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 182 Ill.App.3d 385, 388-89, 131 Ill. Dec. 484, 538 N.E.2d 859 (1989). The Second District specifically rejected the First District's construction of section 13-213 and held that its own "interpretation is borne out by a close examination of the language" of subsection (d). American Family, 182...
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