Al–madhwani v. Obama

• Decision Date: 27 May 2011
• Docket Number: No. 10–5172.,10–5172.
• Citation: 642 F.3d 1071,395 U.S.App.D.C. 250
• Parties: Masaab Omar AL–MADHWANI, Detainee, Camp Delta and Ali Omar Madhwani, as Next Friend of Mussab Omar Al–Madhwani, Appellantsv.Barack OBAMA, President of the United States et al., Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

642 F.3d 1071

395 U.S.App.D.C. 250

Masaab Omar AL–MADHWANI, Detainee, Camp Delta and Ali Omar Madhwani, as Next Friend of Mussab Omar Al–Madhwani, Appellants

v.Barack OBAMA, President of the United States et al., Appellees.

No. 10–5172.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued March 10, 2011.Decided May 27, 2011.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, (No. 1:04–cv–01194).Darold W. Killmer argued the cause for the appellants. Mari Newman was on brief. Sara J. Rich entered an appearance.August E. Flentje, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, argued the cause for the appellees. Robert M. Loeb, Attorney, was on brief.Before: GINSBURG, HENDERSON and TATEL, Circuit Judges.Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge:

Musa'ab Omar al-Madhwani (Madhwani), a Yemeni detainee at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, appeals the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Madhwani claims that there was insufficient evidence to find that he was “part of” al-Qaida and argues further that the district court relied on evidence outside the record, abused its discretion in denying additional discovery and committed various legal errors. Because we find no merit in Madhwani's evidentiary and legal arguments, we affirm the district court.

I.

In early summer 2001, Madhwani met two men in a coffee shop somewhere in Yemen. The two spoke to him about the “new Islamic state” in Afghanistan. Merits Hearing Tr. at 62, 69, Anam v. Obama, C.A. No. 04–1194, 2009 WL 3430115 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2009) (Tr. 10/27). One of them suggested to Madhwani—a recent high school graduate who was unemployed—that he go to Afghanistan to “witness the situation” for himself. Id. at 71–72. Madhwani accepted a plane ticket and a small sum of money from the man and left Yemen in August 2001. The stated purpose of his trip, according to Madhwani, was “adventure” and “to see what things are like in Afghanistan.” Id. at 73. Once he arrived in Afghanistan, Madhwani accompanied a group of fellow Yemenis he had met along the way to “the Arab guesthouse” in Kandahar, where his passport and return airline ticket were confiscated. Id. at 108–09. Madhwani was told that his travel documents would be returned after he completed two months of military training. Madhwani reluctantly agreed to the arrangement and, by mid-August, he was transported to a remote mountain camp to begin a course of physical conditioning and small arms instruction.

Madhwani was still at the training camp when al-Qaida attacked the United States on September 11, 2001. The camp was closed down, for fear that it would be bombed, and Madhwani and the other trainees were given permission to leave. Madhwani took a rifle from the camp's armory and, in the company of two trainers from the camp and a score of fellow recruits, wandered for several months through a succession of Afghan cities. Madhwani claimed that they were all traveling in search of their passports, which—like Madhwani's—had been confiscated before they were sent to the camp. They ended up in Kabul just three days before the capital fell to the United States-led military coalition. Madhwani was reunited with his passport, mysteriously, infra p. 1075–76, and he then went to neighboring Pakistan. There he remained for the better part of one year—aside from a brief trip to Iran—moving from one clandestine location to another. Madhwani believed the Pakistani authorities would arrest him, as an Arab, if he were to travel openly to an airport or to the Yemeni embassy to seek help in returning home.

Madhwani was captured along with several other Arabs on September 11, 2002, when Pakistani security forces raided the Karachi apartment building where he had been hiding from the authorities. Two of Madhwani's associates—one from the same apartment and another from across the hall—fought and died in a two-and-one-half hour gun battle with Pakistani soldiers. After spending five days in a Pakistani prison, Madhwani was turned over to U.S. military custody. Madhwani was then taken to a “dark prison” where he claims to have been tortured. He was transferred in October 2002 to the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Madhwani filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on July 15, 2004. The district court conducted a four-day merits hearing in 2009, which included testimony from Madhwani himself, who testified by way of remote video connection from Guantanamo, and by an expert witness who discussed Madhwani's psychological condition. The district court applied the “command structure” standard of detention, under which an individual is considered to be “part of” al-Qaida—and therefore lawfully detained—if he has “ ‘receive[d] and execute [d] orders or directions' ” from the terrorist organization, Anam v. Obama, 696 F.Supp.2d 1, 4 (D.D.C.2010) (quoting Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F.Supp.2d 63, 75 (D.D.C.2009))—a formulation of the “part of” inquiry that we have since rejected as unduly narrow, Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C.Cir.2010), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1814, 179 L.Ed.2d 773 (2011). The district court held that evidence showing Madhwani “voluntarily attended an al-Qaida training camp ... and then traveled, associated, and lived with members of al-Qaida” was sufficient to establish that he functioned under the “command structure” of the organization and thus was “part of” al-Qaida. Anam, 696 F.Supp.2d at 14–15. Accordingly, the district court denied Madhwani's petition. Id. at 16.

II.

The President's detention authority originates with the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which authorizes the President “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.” Pub.L. No. 107–40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224; see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004) (AUMF “authorized detention” of enemy combatants). We have held that the authority conferred by the AUMF covers at least “those who are part of forces associated with Al Qaeda or the Taliban or those who purposefully and materially support such forces in hostilities against U.S. Coalition partners.” Al–Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872 (D.C.Cir.2010), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1814, 179 L.Ed.2d 794 (2011). Determining whether an individual is “part of” al-Qaida or the Taliban is an inquiry that “ ‘must be made on a case-by-case basis by using a functional rather than a formal approach and by focusing upon the actions of the individual in relation to the organization.’ ” Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 752 (D.C.Cir.2010) (quoting Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C.Cir.2010)). “We review the district court's ... habeas determination de novo....” Al–Bihani, 590 F.3d at 870. Because we agree with the district court's conclusion that Madhwani was more likely than not “part of” al-Qaida and find no other error in the district court's handling of the case, we affirm.

A.

Madhwani argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the district court's conclusion that he was “part of” al-Qaida. Madhwani bears a “heavy burden” in challenging “the district court's factual findings that are the underpinnings of its determination.” Al Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8, 14 (D.C.Cir.2010), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1812, 179 L.Ed.2d 772 (2011). We review factual findings for clear error and “do not weigh each piece of evidence in isolation, but consider all of the evidence taken as a whole.” Awad, 608 F.3d at 7. The clear error standard “ ‘applies to the inferences drawn from findings of fact as well as to the findings themselves.’ ” Al Odah, 611 F.3d at 15 (quoting Overby v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 595 F.3d 1290, 1294 (D.C.Cir.2010)).

At the outset, we clarify the body of evidence upon which we base our conclusion. The district court considered 260 exhibits and held a four-day merits hearing, during which Madhwani himself testified for over one day. The district court discounted a substantial portion of the Government's evidence—twenty-three reports of interrogations conducted in 2003 and 2004—based on its finding that the evidence was tainted by the mistreatment Madhwani claims to have suffered prior to arriving at Guantanamo Bay. Anam, 696 F.Supp.2d at 5–9. Madhwani now argues that the district court should have disregarded statements he made to the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) and Administrative Review Board (ARB) at Guantanamo Bay because those, too, were tainted by the earlier coercion.¹ See id. at 9–10. We have no need, however, to reach Madhwani's evidentiary challenge—or for that matter to evaluate the district court's treatment of the allegedly tainted evidence—because the record contains sufficient evidence unaffected by any claim of coercion to uphold the district court's determination that Madhwani was “part of” al-Qaida. See Esmail v. Obama, No. 10–5282, 639 F.3d 1075, 1075–76, 2011 WL 1327701, at *1 (D.C.Cir. Apr. 8, 2011). That evidence consists almost entirely of Madhwani's own testimony.

Notwithstanding the innocent gloss he attempts to graft onto his narrative, Madhwani's testimony reveals a wealth of incriminating detail. When Madhwani arrived in Kandahar, he stayed at an Arab guesthouse that served as a staging area for foreign recruits to be transported to military training facilities. Madhwani's passport and return airline ticket were confiscated by two individuals in the guesthouse, which “was ‘standard al Qaeda and Taliban operating procedure[ ]’ when checking into an al Qaeda guesthouse in Afghanistan.” Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 406 (D.C.Cir.2011) (quoting Al Odah, 611 F.3d at 15). He was then taken to a camp “in the middle...