Almeida v. Lewis

Decision Date01 July 2014
Docket NumberCase No. 1:12-cv-00793 MJS (HC)
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
PartiesCARLOS H. ALMEIDA, Petitioner, v. GREG LEWIS, Warden, Respondent.
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DECLINING
TO ISSUE CERTIFICATE OF
APPEALABILITY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent is represented by Ivan P. Marrs of the office of the California Attorney General. Both parties have consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (ECF Nos. 8, 28.)

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Tulare, following his conviction upon pleading, on June 4, 2008, no contest to assault with a deadly weapon and various enhancements. (Clerk's Tr. at 162.) On August 13, 2008, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to serve a determinate term of fifteen (15) years in jail. (Id.)

Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth AppellateDistrict, on December 3, 2008. (Lodged Doc. 5.) On April 21, 2009, the court reversed the judgment and remanded the matter to the trial court for reconsideration of Petitioner's motion to withdraw his plea. (Lodged Doc. 8.) After holding a two day hearing, the superior court denied the motion to withdraw the plea, and reinstated the original sentence. (Lodged Doc. 11 at 2-3.) Petitioner again appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on July 8, 2010. (Lodged Docs. 10-11.)

Petitioner also pursued post-conviction relief in the form of petitions for writ of habeas corpus. On February 11, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Tulare County Superior Court. (Lodged Doc. 12.) It was denied in a reasoned decision on March 18, 2010. (Lodged Doc. 13.) On May 7, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California Court of Appeal. (Lodged Doc. 14.) The petition was denied. (Lodged Doc. 15.) On November 24, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court. (Lodged Doc. 16.) The petition was denied on May 18, 2011. (Lodged Doc. 17.)

Petitioner then sought another round of post-conviction relief. On March 1, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Tulare County Superior Court. (Lodged Doc. 18.) It was denied in a reasoned decision on March 3, 2011. (Lodged Doc. 19.) On October 20, 2011, Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Tulare County Superior Court. (Lodged Doc. 20.) It was denied in a reasoned decision on October 28, 2011. (Lodged Doc. 21.) On November 30, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California Court of Appeal. (Lodged Doc. 22.) The petition was denied on May 18, 2012. (Lodged Doc. 23.) On December 29, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court. (Lodged Doc. 24.) The petition was denied on April 18, 2012. (Lodged Doc. 24.)

Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition on May 14, 2012. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) In his petition, Petitioner presents four claims, alleging (1) that his attorney was ineffective and improperly advised him to accept the guilty plea, (2) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly conduct an investigation, (3) that Petitioner wasphysically coerced into making his confession, and (4) that the witnesses identification of Petitioner was the result of a physically coerced confession. (Id.)

Respondent filed an answer to the petition on October 12, 2012, and Petitioner filed a traverse on April 18, 2013. (Answer & Traverse, ECF Nos. 22, 34.)

II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
On February 22, 2008, a City of Tulare police officer, investigating a report of a stabbing near a high school, met with Pedro A. (Pedro), who had suffered a knife wound in his left side, and Vincente R. (Vincente). Vincente told the officer the following: He, Pedro, and three other persons, all of whom were "affiliated" with the "Sureno" gang, were walking near the school when a group of "Nortenos," including appellant, approached. Vincente and his companions tried to run away, but appellant caught up with them, at which point Pedro and appellant "engaged in a physical fight." During the fight, appellant "pulled out a knife and stabbed [Pedro] in the side."
Other officers saw appellant at a nearby fast food restaurant and detained him. "Several witnesses positively identified [appellant] as the subject who stabbed [Pedro]." Appellant initially denied any involvement, but "when told he was caught on video tape[,] [he] eventually admitted stabbing the victim."

People v. Almeida, 2010 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5061, 4-5 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. July 2, 2010).

III. GOVERNING LAW
A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Tulare County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d); 2254(a). Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction over the action.

B. Legal Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions.

Under AEDPA, an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a state court may be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 375 n. 7 (2000). Federal habeas corpus relief is available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings if the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

1. Contrary to or an Unreasonable Application of Federal Law

A state court decision is "contrary to" federal law if it "applies a rule that contradicts governing law set forth in reme Court cases" or "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from" a Supreme Court case, yet reaches a different result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06. "AEDPA does not require state and federal courts to wait for some nearly identical factual pattern before a legal rule must be applied. . . . The statue recognizes . . . that even a general standard may be applied in an unreasonable manner" Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The "clearly established Federal law" requirement "does not demand more than a 'principle' or 'general standard.'" Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 839 (2009). For a state decision to be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under §2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court's prior decisions must provide a governing legal principle (or principles) to the issue before the state court. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003). A state court decision will involve an "unreasonable application of" federal law only if it is "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 75-76, quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10; Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002). In Harrington v. Richter, the Court further stresses that "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law." 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011), (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 410) (emphasis in original). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Id. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 653, 664 (2004)). Further, "[t]he more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reading outcomes in case-by-case determinations." Id.; Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1864 (2010). "It is not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this Court." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 (2009), quoted by Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786.

2. Review of State Decisions

"Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the claim rest on the same grounds." See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). This is referred to as the "look through" presumption. Id. at 804; Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2006). Determining whether a state court's decision resulted from an unreasonable legal or factual conclusion, "does not require that there be an opinion from the state court explaining the state court's reasoning." Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85. "Where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief." Id. ("This Court now...

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