Almendarez v. Barrett-Fisher Co.

• Decision Date: 17 June 1985
• Docket Number: BARRETT-FISHER,No. 84-1785,84-1785
• Citation: 762 F.2d 1275
• Parties: 102 Lab.Cas. P 34,679 Benita ALMENDAREZ, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.COMPANY, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Summary Calendar.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1275

762 F.2d 1275

102 Lab.Cas. P 34,679

Benita ALMENDAREZ, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BARRETT-FISHER COMPANY, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 84-1785

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 17, 1985.

Texas Rural Legal Aid, William H. Beardall, Hereford, Tex., Texas Rural Legal Aid, Weslaco, Tex., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Smith & Davis, Donald L. Davis, Hereford, Tex., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before RUBIN, RANDALL, and TATE, Circuit Judges.

TATE, Circuit Judge:

The plaintiffs, a certified class of vegetable packing workers, appeal from the judgment dismissing their action for declaratory and injunctive relief and for damages based on alleged violations of the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act (hereafter "the Act"), 7 U.S.C. Secs. 2041 et seq. ¹ After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment against the plaintiffs on the ground that neither defendant was a "farm labor contractor" as defined in Sec. 3(b)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2042(b)(2). It did not rule on the defendants' alternative contention that, even if they are farm labor contractors, they may claim an exemption pursuant to Secs. 3(b)(2) & (3) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2042(b)(2)-(3).

As explained more fully below, the district court misconstrued the Act in holding that the defendant packing shed operators could not be farm labor contractors. The error resulted from the district court's excluding the plaintiff employees from coverage by the Act through an improper literal application of the Act's definition of the term "migrant workers." See 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2042(g). Status as a "farm labor contractor" hinges upon hiring "migrant workers." 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2042(b). The Act read as a whole, the manifest legislative purpose and history of the Act, a 1974 amendment broadening the definition of "agricultural employment," and prior judicial and administrative interpretation of the Act as amended in 1974 convince us that packing shed workers are "migrant workers" and that packing shed operators are therefore "farm labor contractors" governed by the Act unless entitled to a statutory exemption. Accordingly, we reverse.

I.

The parties do not dispute the district court's findings of fact. Neither do they dispute other relevant facts reflected in the record evidence. The findings of fact and the record evidence show the following.

Farmers grow onions and potatoes in the vicinity of Hereford, Texas. After harvest the onions and potatoes must be washed, graded, packed, and shipped to wholesale and retail buyers. For this purpose, many of the farmers use the services of the Barrett-Fisher Company.

The Barrett-Fisher Company operates a so-called packing shed in this Texas area for six to eight weeks during the summer months. After packing, Barrett-Fisher ships the vegetables to buyers, collects the purchase price, holds out its agreed packing fee, and returns the balance of the proceeds to the farmers. Until sale to the buyers, the farmers have title and bear the risk of loss due to price changes or property loss or damage. In 1980, as in all years between 1978 and 1982, Barrett-Fisher registered with the United States Department of Labor as a farm labor contractor.

Barrett-Fisher employs the defendant Ramiro Ramos each annual packing season. Ramos, who lives the remainder of the year in New Mexico, determines the number of workers needed in Barrett-Fisher's packing shed operations, hires them, arranges to have them come to the Hereford area, and thereafter determines the workers' job assignments, wages, and housing. Ramos' compensation is based on the weight of the vegetables packed by the plaintiffs. Ramos registered as a farm labor contractor each year from 1977 through at least 1983.

The plaintiffs are a class of vegetable packing workers who worked in 1980 at the Barrett-Fisher packing shed. Ramos recruited and supervised them. The named plaintiffs came to the Hereford area from South Texas, as did others in the plaintiff class.

In 1980, shortly after the end of the packing season, the named plaintiffs sued the defendants Barrett-Fisher and Ramos. The complaint alleged wage and hour violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 206. The parties reached a monetary settlement of this claim before trial, and it is not a part of this appeal.

The plaintiffs also alleged violations of the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act. 7 U.S.C. Secs. 2041 et seq. The alleged violations of the Act's requirements included (a) failure to maintain required payroll records, (b) failure to provide the plaintiffs the required wage receipts, and (c) failure to disclose to the plaintiffs, as required, certain terms and conditions of employment and terms of furnished housing. The plaintiffs sought relief in the form of a declaration that the defendants violated the Act, an injunction against future violations, and an award to each class member of actual damages or statutory liquidated damages, see 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2050a.

II.

After a bench trial, the district court held that the defendants were not farm labor contractors within the intendment of the Act. It observed that a farm labor contractor is statutorily defined as any person

who, for a fee, either for himself or on behalf of another person, recruits, solicits, hires, furnishes, or transports migrant workers ... for agricultural employment.

7 U.S.C. Sec. 2042(b) (emphasis added). The district court then acknowledged that packing shed operators furnish "agricultural employment," as the Act was amended in 1974 expressly to define that term to include packing shed operators:

The term "agricultural employment" means employment in any service or activity included within the provisions of section 203(f) of Title 29 [Fair Labor Standards Act], or section 3121(g) of Title 26 [Federal Insurance Contributions Act] and the handling, planting, drying, packing, packaging, processing, freezing, or grading prior to its delivery for storage of any agricultural or horticultural commodity in its unmanufactured state.

7 U.S.C. Sec. 2042(d) (emphasis added). The court nevertheless concluded that the plaintiffs, packing shed workers, were not "migrant workers" because the Act defines a migrant worker as

an individual whose primary employment is in agriculture as defined in section 203(f) of Title 29, or who performs agricultural labor, as defined in section 3121(g) of Title 26, on a seasonal or other temporary basis.

7 U.S.C. Sec. 2042(g) (emphasis added). The parties agree that packing shed employees, for purposes of the statutes thus referenced by Sec. 2042(g), are not employed "in agriculture" or performing "agricultural labor." See Marshall v. Gulf & Western Industries, 552 F.2d 124 (5th Cir.1977).

At issue, then, is whether, for purposes of Sec. 2042(g) itself, packing shed employees do not have "employment ... in agriculture" and are not performing "agricultural labor," even though packing shed operator-employers clearly are engaged in "agricultural employment" for purposes of Sec. 2042(d). The district court recognized the incongruity of holding that the employer was by the statute covered as engaged in agricultural employment, but that his employees were not in agricultural employment and thereby not covered. However, the court felt that this incongruous result was one required by the plain language of the statutory definition of migrant workers.

We conclude, for reasons to be stated, that this literal application of a single subsection of Sec. 2042 was erroneous. It creates an absurd inconsistency within the text of Sec. 2042, which must be read as a whole for the purpose of statutory construction, and it leads to a construction of the Act sharply at odds with its clear purpose and legislative history.

III.

In construing a statute, the ultimate goal is to discern and enforce Congress' intent. The ordinary meaning of the language in a statute is the best indicator of that intent. "Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must be regarded as conclusive." Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980); James v. United States, 760 F.2d 590, 593 (5th Cir.1985) (en banc).

Literal application of apparently-clear statutory language may, however, be inappropriate if the literal application would conflict with the directive of other statutory language. Chemical Manufacturers Association v. Natural Resources Defense Council, --- U.S. ----, ----, 105 S.Ct. 1102, 1108-10, 84 L.Ed.2d 90 (1985); Interstate Commerce Commission v. American Trucking Association, Inc., --- U.S. ----, ----, 104 S.Ct. 2458, 2463-64, 81 L.Ed.2d 282 (1984); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, 398 U.S. 235, 250, 90 S.Ct. 1583, 1592, 26 L.Ed.2d 199 (1970). Literal application of statutory language is, further, inappropriate if it would lead to untenable distinctions or unreasonable results, or to internal inconsistencies in the statute. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 71, 102 S.Ct. 1534, 1538-39, 71 L.Ed.2d 748 (1982); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2527, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981). And literal statutory construction is inappropriate if it would produce a result in conflict with the legislative purpose clearly manifested in an entire statute or statutory scheme or with clear legislative history. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201, 99 S.Ct. 2721, 2726, 61 L.Ed.2d 480 (1979); Quarles v. St. Clair, 711 F.2d 691, 698 (5th Cir.1983).

Concerning the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act specifically, we have held:

Interpretation of the statute is guided by the rules of statutory construction, the plain meaning of the statute's terms, previous court interpretations, the interpretation of the Secretary of Labor as the administrative...