Almira, Blaine, Colfax, Crystal Lake, Gilmore, Homestead, Inland, Joyfield and Weldon Townships v. Benzie County Tax Allocation Bd., Docket No. 31425
| Decision Date | 23 January 1978 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 31425 |
| Citation | 265 N.W.2d 39,80 Mich.App. 755 |
| Parties | TOWNSHIPS OF ALMIRA, BLAINE, COLFAX, CRYSTAL LAKE, GILMORE, HOMESTEAD, INLAND, JOYFIELD AND WELDON, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BENZIE COUNTY TAX ALLOCATION BOARD, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Bauckham, Reed, Lang & Schaefer by Richard D. Reed, Kalamazoo, for plaintiffs-appellants.
John D. Berlin, Pros. Atty., Beulah, for defendant-appellee.
Before J. H. GILLIS, P. J., and BASHARA and HEADING, * JJ.
Petitioners appeal an order of the Michigan Tax Tribunal affirming an allocation of property tax millage made by respondent pursuant to section 11 of the Property Tax Limitation Act. 1
After petitioners' initiation of review proceedings, the Tribunal issued an order setting a date for a "preliminary" hearing. That order stated that the purpose of the hearing was "to take testimony, to examine the basis of Petitioner's allegations and the nature of proofs pursuant to M.C.L.A. § 211.217; M.S.A. § 7.77, tending to show ' * * * a material mistake of fact, fraud or error of law' in the division of the net limitation tax rate and thereby to determine the need for further proceedings in this matter ". (Emphasis added.)
At the conclusion of the hearing before three members of the Tribunal a short recess was taken. When the Tribunal reconvened the presiding member announced the following determination:
Challenges to that decision are raised by petitioners on both procedural and substantive grounds. Petitioners argue that the Tribunal was without authority to decide the merits of the controversy by preliminary proceedings.
Section 32(d) of the Tax Tribunal Act 2 authorizes the Tribunal to promulgate rules of procedure. M.C.L.A. § 205.732(d); M.S.A. § 7.650(32)(d). However, that section also requires that the mode of promulgation be in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act of 1969. M.C.L.A. § 24.201 et seq.; M.S.A. § 3.560(101) et seq. That Act requires, by definition in section 5(6), that the rules promulgated be filed with the Secretary of State. M.C.L.A. § 24.205(6); M.S.A. § 3.560(105)(6). The procedure followed in this case was not by a rule so filed, but by an ad hoc procedure established in the Tribunal's order to the litigants. Accordingly, we must conclude that the method by which the Tribunal provided for preliminary proceedings in this case was in contravention of the Tax Tribunal Act.
Rules of procedure are intended to lend stability, order, and uniformity to a forum's proceedings. Therefore, the promulgation of rules of practice and procedure must itself conform to a uniform process so as to afford a degree of permanency to those rules. To permit a forum to alter its rules of practice by fiat would result in significant uncertainty for prospective litigants. They would be unable to ascertain the method by which to advocate their rights before the forum and left without standards by which they could anticipate the forum's decision process.
The instant case is illustrative of the foregoing. By denominating the proceedings as "preliminary", there was nothing in the administrative code of procedure to which reference could be made to guide the conduct of the hearing. See 1975 AACS, R 205.1101 et seq. In petitioners' opening statement, counsel indicated that sufficient evidence would be presented to establish a prima facie case of error in the respondent's determination. Reference was made in petitioners' closing argument to the preliminary nature of the hearing. Apparently, petitioners anticipated that in deciding whether further proceedings were warranted, the Tribunal would view the evidence in a light most favorable to their position. We are unable to discern from the record the standard of review ultimately used by the Tribunal.
Respondent maintains that whatever the nature of the proceedings, the rights of petitioners were not thereby prejudiced, since there was no curtailment of petitioners' ability to present evidence. We find this argument unpersuasive. It is not the extent of the allowable presentation that we deem to be material, but rather the extent of preparation that was indicated by the nature of the proceedings. The hearing was to be a preliminary proceeding. Petitioners' counsel had a right to expect that a full evidentiary presentation of his clients' position would not be anticipated by the Tribunal. Consequently, only an abbreviated evidentiary description of the case would be prepared, omitting possibly significant portions of testimony and exhibits that would be presented in a full hearing on the merits.
We must therefore conclude that the petitioners' right to a review of the respondent's decision by the Tribunal was prejudiced by the order for preliminary proceedings. This is not to deny that the Tribunal may promulgate rules for preliminary proceedings in the interest of forum efficiency. We require only that the promulgation of those rules be in conformity with the Administrative Procedures Act and adequately alert those practicing before the Tribunal as to the mode of conduct of such proceedings.
Petitioners also contend that the Tribunal's decision does not conform to the requirements of the Tax Tribunal Act, because it fails to state findings of fact and conclusions of law. We address this issue to guide the proceedings on remand.
Initially, we must note that the legislation creating the Tribunal mandates that its decisions be rendered only upon "participation of the entire tribunal". M.C.L.A. § 205.734; M.S.A. § 7.650(34). Here, a decision was rendered with participation by only three members of the seven-member Tribunal. It is also required by section 51 that the decisions include a concise statement of the findings of fact and conclusions of law. M.C.L.A. § 205.751; M.S.A. § 7.650(51). This requirement is described with greater particularity in section 85 3 of the Administrative Procedures Act. M.C.L.A. § 24.285; M.S.A. § 3.560(185). Tribunal hearings are made subject to that...
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