Almon v. Ryan
| Decision Date | 15 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-12-00704-TUC-BGM,CV-12-00704-TUC-BGM |
| Parties | Russell Hayden Almon, Petitioner, v. Charles L. Ryan, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Currently pending before the Court is Petitioner Russell Hayden Almon's pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Non-Death Penalty) ("Petition") (Doc. 1). Respondents have filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Answer") (Doc. 17). Petitioner did not file a reply. The Petition is ripe for adjudication.
The Arizona Court of Appeals stated the basic facts1 as follows:
Russell Almon was placed on lifetime probation in 1999 following a plea ofno contest to a charge of child molestation. In 2010, the state filed a petition to revoke his probation, asserting Almon had violated A.R.S. § 13-2310(A), fraudulent scheme and artifice, by providing the probation office with falsified records indicating he had completed required community service hours that he had not completed. The petition also asserted Almon had not been at home when his probation schedule required him to be. After a violation hearing, the trial court found Almon had violated his probation, revoked his probation, and sentenced him to a five-year prison term.
Answer (Doc. 17), Ct. App. Mem. Decision 12/9/2011 at 1-2.
On August 17, 2011, counsel for Petitioner filed an Anders2 brief with the Arizona Court of Appeals.3 Answer (Doc. 17), Appellant's Opening Br. 8/17/2011 (Exh. "T"). Subsequently, Petitioner filed a pro se supplemental appellate brief. Answer (Doc. 17), Appellant's Suppl. Br. 11/2/2011 (Exh. "W"). Petitioner alleged a single claim, asserting that based on the "totality of the circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion in finding that appellant intentionally committed fraudulent schemes and artifices[.]" Answer (Doc. 17), Exh. "W" at 6. Petitioner cites Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995), and argues that "the facts underlying the claim of actual innocence would be sufficient to establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found the defendant guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Id., Exh. "W" at 8.
On December 9, 2011, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed "the trial court's determination that Almon violated the terms of his probation, its revocation of his probation, and the sentence imposed." See Answer (Doc. 17), Ariz. Ct. App. Mem. Decision 12/9/2011 (Exh. "X"). As an initial matter the appellate court stated that "[t]o the extent [Petitioner] suggests the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's finding that he violated § 13-2310, he essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do." Id., Exh. "X" at 3 (citing State v. Lee, 189 Ariz. 590, 603, 944 P.2d 1204, 1217 (1997)). Regarding Petitioner's claim of "actual innocence," the court relied on Rule 27.8(b)(3), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and State v. Russell, 226 Ariz. 416, ¶¶ 10-12, 249 P.3d 1116, 1118 (Ct. App. 2011), finding "the law is clear that, when alleging a person has violated his or her probation, the state need prove those allegations only by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt." Id., Exh. "X" at 3.
Petitioner did not seek review of this decision with the Arizona Supreme Court. Petition (Doc. 1) at 7; Answer (Doc. 17), Ariz. Supreme Ct. Order 3/13/2012 (Exh. "Z").
On September 18, 2012, Petitioner filed his Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Non-Death Penalty) (Doc. 1). Petitioner claims four (4) grounds for relief. First, Petitioner alleges that the "[c]riminal burden of proof unproven showing conspiracy[.]" Petition (Doc. 1) at 6. Petitioner further alleges that the Government "engineered" the circumstances leading to the criminal charges and subsequent parole revocation, and that it "induced" and "entrapped" him. Id. at 17-18. Second, Petitioner alleges that the Government presented insufficient evidence to support the probation violation charged in this case. Id. at 7. Petitioner goeson to attack the plea agreement(s) in his original cause of action. Id. at 19-21. Third, Petitioner claims that his "sentence is illegal and improper[.]" Id. at 8. Petitioner asserts that the statute that he was prosecuted under for the probation violation did not match the plea agreement presented at the revocation hearing, thereby "leaving the entire process defective[.]" Petition (Doc. 1) at 22. Fourth, Petitioner alleges "[p]rosecutorial misconduct causing unknowing complicity of the grand jury as to presented evidence by Mr. Garcia the Government agent[.]" Id. at 9. On May 28, 2013, Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 17). Petitioner did not file a reply.
The federal courts shall "entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus by a person in state custody:
shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim - (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011). Correcting errors of state law is not the province of federal habeas corpus relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Ultimately, "[t]he statute's design is to 'further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism.'" Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 945, 127 S.Ct. 2842, 2854, 168 L.Ed.2d 662 (2007) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003)). Furthermore, this standard is difficult to meetand highly deferential "for evaluating state-court rulings, [and] which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 110 Stat. 1214, mandates the standards for federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The "AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court." Burt v. Titlow, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 10, 16, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013). Federal courts reviewing a petition for habeas corpus must "presume the correctness of state courts' factual findings unless applicants rebut this presumption with 'clear and convincing evidence.'" Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-74, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 1940, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). Moreover, on habeas review, the federal courts must consider whether the state court's determination was unreasonable, not merely incorrect. Id., 550 U.S. at 473, 127 S.Ct. at 1939; Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 2013). Such a determination is unreasonable where a state court properly identifies the governing legal principles delineated by the Supreme Court, but when the court applies the principles to the facts before it, arrives at a different result. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); see also Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 905 (9th Cir. 2004). "AEDPA requires 'a state prisoner [to] show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error . . . beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.'" Burt, 134 S.Ct. at 10 (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103, 131 S.Ct. at 786-87) (alterations in original).
Prior to application for a writ of habeas corpus, a person in state custody must exhaust all of the remedies available in the State courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). This "provides a simple and clear instruction to potential litigants: before you bring any claims to federal court, be sure that you first have taken each one to state court." Rose v. Lundy,455 U.S. 509, 520, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1204, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). As such, the exhaustion doctrine gives the State "the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights." Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 L.Ed. 2d 64 (2004) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, "[t]he exhaustion doctrine is principally designed to protect the state courts' role in the enforcement of federal law and prevent disruption of state judicial proceedings." Rose, 455 U.S. at 518, 102 S.Ct. at 1203 (internal citations omitted). This upholds the doctrine of comity which "teaches that one court should defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon the matter." Id. (quoting Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204, 70 S.Ct. 587, 590, 94 L.Ed. 761 (1950)).
Section 2254(c) provides that claims "shall not be deemed . . . exhausted" so long as the applicant "has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure the question presented." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). "[O]nce the federal claim has been fairly presented to the state courts, the exhaustion...
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