Almonte v. Kurl

• Decision Date: 26 June 2012
• Docket Number: No. 2010–315–Appeal.,2010–315–Appeal.
• Citation: 46 A.3d 1
• Parties: Sherry ALMONTE et al. v. Rita S. KURL, M.D. et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

46 A.3d 1

Sherry ALMONTE et al.

v.Rita S. KURL, M.D. et al.

No. 2010–315–Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 26, 2012.

David J. Oliveira, Esq., Providence, for Plaintiffs.

Michael G. Sarli, Esq., Providence, for Defendants.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice ROBINSON, for the Court.

This appeal arises from a wrongful death action brought pursuant to G.L.1956 chapter 7 of title 10; ¹ the plaintiffs set forth allegations of medical negligence in their complaint. That civil suit and the eventual trial occurred in the wake of the tragic suicide of Peter Almonte on September 5, 2000, approximately thirty-six hours after he was discharged from a hospital emergency room. The case was tried to a jury in February of 2009 in the Superior Court for Providence County.

After a full trial and after instructions having been provided by the trial justice, the jury deliberated and then returned a verdict of no negligence on the part of one of the defendants, Rita S. Kurl, M.D.² After that verdict was rendered, plaintiffs ³ moved for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 ⁴ of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure,⁵ and defendants renewed their previously made motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. ⁶ The trial justice rejected the jury's finding as to the absence of negligence; however, she granted defendants' Rule 50 motion because she concluded that plaintiffs had failed to establish causation by a preponderance of the evidence. She accordingly denied plaintiffs' motion for a new trial.

On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the trial justice erred (1) in granting defendants' Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law; (2) in refusing to give jury instructions with respect to the doctrine of spoliation; (3) in refusing plaintiffs' request for an evidentiary presumption on the issue of causation; and (4) in denying plaintiffs' Rule 59 motion for a new trial.

IFacts and Travel

AGeneral Laws 1956 § 40.1–5–7

The instant case involves the application of G.L.1956 § 40.1–5–7. That section provides in pertinent part as follows:

“(a) Applicants. (1) Any physician, who after examining a person, has reason to believe that the person is in need of immediate care and treatment, and is one whose continued unsupervised presence in the community would create an imminent likelihood of serious harm by reason of mental disability, may apply at a facility for the emergency certification of the person thereto. The medical director, or any other physician employed by the proposed facility for certification may apply under this subsection if no other physician is available and he or she certifies this fact. * * * Application shall in all cases be made to the facility which in the judgment of the applicant at the time of application would impose the least restraint on the liberty of the person consistent with affording him or her the care and treatment necessary and appropriate to his or her condition.

“ * * *

“(b) Applications. An application for certification hereunder shall be in writing and filed with the facility to which admission is sought. The application shall be executed within five (5) days prior to the date of filing and shall state that it is based upon a personal observation of the prospective patient by the applicant within the five (5) day period. * * * Whenever practicable, prior to transporting or arranging for the transporting of a prospective patient to a facility, the applicant shall telephone or otherwise communicate with the facility to describe the circumstances and known clinical history to determine whether it is the proper facility to receive the person, and to give notice of any restraint to be used or to determine whether restraint is necessary.

“(c) Confirmation; discharge; transfer. Within one hour after reception at a facility, the person regarding whom an application has been filed under this section shall be seen by a physician. As soon as possible, but in no event later than twenty-four (24) hours after reception, a preliminary examination and evaluation of the person by a psychiatrist or a physician under his or her supervision shall begin. The psychiatrist shall not be an applicant hereunder. The preliminary examination and evaluation shall be completed within seventy-two (72) hours from its inceptionby the psychiatrist. If the psychiatrist determines that the patient is not a candidate for emergency certification, he or she shall be discharged. If the psychiatrist(s) determines that the person who is the subject of the application is in need of immediate care and treatment and is one whose continued unsupervised presence in the community would create an imminent likelihood of serious harm by reason of mental disability, he or she shall confirm the admission for care and treatment under this section of the person to the facility, provided the facility is one which would impose the least restraint on the liberty of the person consistent with affording him or her the care and treatment necessary and appropriate to his or her condition and that no suitable alternatives to certification are available. If at any time the official in charge of a facility or his or her designee determines that the person is not in need of immediate care and treatment, or is not one whose continued unsupervised presence in the community would create an imminent likelihood of serious harm by reason of mental disability, or suitable alternatives to certification are available, he or she shall immediately discharge the person. In addition, the official may arrange to transfer the person to an appropriate facility, if the facility to which he or she has been certified is not one which imposes the least restraint on the liberty of the person consistent with affording him or her the care and treatment necessary and appropriate to his or her condition.

“(d) Custody. Upon the request of an applicant under this section, to be confirmed in writing, it shall be the duty of any peace officer of this state or of any governmental subdivision thereof to whom request has been made, to take into custody and transport the person to the facility designated, the person to be expeditiously presented for admission thereto.

“ * * *

“(f) Notification of rights. No person shall be certified to a facility under the provisions of this section unless appropriate opportunity is given to apply for voluntary admission under the provisions of § 40.1–5–6 and unless he or she, or a parent, guardian or next of kin, has been informed, in writing, on a form provided by the department, by the official in charge of the facility: (1) that he or she has a right to the voluntary admission; (2) that a person cannot be certified until all available alternatives to certification have been investigated and determined to be unsuitable; and (3) that the period of hospitalization or treatment in a facility cannot exceed ten (10) days under this section, except as provided in subsection (g) of this section.

“(g) Period of treatment. A person shall be discharged no later than ten (10) days measured from the date of his or her admission under this section, unless an application for a civil court certification has been filed and set down for a hearing under the provisions of § 40.1–5–8, or the person remains as a voluntary patient pursuant to § 40.1–5–6.” (Emphasis added.)

BThe Plaintiffs' Complaint

On September 4, 2003, plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Superior Court against defendants, Rita S. Kurl, M.D., and St. Joseph Hospital.⁷ In their complaint, plaintiffs stated that they were the family of Peter Almonte, who committed suicide on September 5, 2000. The plaintiff Sherry Almonte was the decedent's wife; and Nicole, Michael,⁸ and Michelle were their children and are also plaintiffs in this case. The plaintiffs alleged that, on or about September 4, 2000, Mr. Almonte had experienced a severe psychological episode, which resulted in a confrontation at his home and “his expression of a wish to die.” The plaintiffs further alleged that, as a result, officers of the Cranston Police Department brought Mr. Almonte to Our Lady of Fatima Hospital, a unit of St. Joseph Health Services of Rhode Island, Inc. (hereinafter Fatima Hospital), so that he might undergo a psychological evaluation. According to plaintiffs' complaint, after approximately one hour and forty minutes, “the hospital personnel decided to honor [Mr. Almonte's] demand to be discharged, by discharging him into the care of Cranston Police Officers.”

In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Almonte's treating physician (Dr. Rita S. Kurl, one of the defendants) breached the duty that she owed to him pursuant to the physician/patient relationship. They further contended that, as a “direct and approximate [ sic ] result” of Dr. Kurl's breach of that duty, Mr. Almonte suffered “severe personal injuries resulting in his death” and also resulting in damages to plaintiffs. Accordingly, plaintiffs brought wrongful death actions pursuant to chapter 7 of title 10 against Dr. Kurl and St. Joseph Hospital. The claims brought against St. Joseph Hospital, which was Dr. Kurl's employer, were premised on a respondeat superior theory.

CThe Testimony at Trial⁹

1. The Testimony of the Responders

The trial in the Superior Court began on February 9, 2009. At that trial, Lieutenant Vincent McAteer of the Cranston Police Department testified that, on September 3, 2000, he received a call reporting “a suicidal male,” and he accordingly responded to the call. Lieutenant McAteer stated that he was notified by the dispatcher that Mr. Almonte had expressed that he wanted to kill himself and that he had left his house; the lieutenant and other officers then searched the area around the Stone Hill School for approximately one hour before being advised that Mr. Almonte had returned to his residence. They then...