Almy v. Kickert Sch. Bus Line, Inc.
| Decision Date | 07 January 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 08-cv-2902 |
| Parties | ROBERT T. ALMY and CHRYSSE RICE, Plaintiffs, v. KICKERT SCHOOL BUS LINE, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se plaintiffs Robert Almy and Chrysse Rice (collectively "Plaintiffs") are school bus drivers who allege that their employer, Defendant Kickert School Bus Line, Inc., failed to pay them overtime wages for hours that they worked in excess of forty hours per week. Plaintiffs allege that this failure violated both the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. ("FLSA"), and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/1 et seq. ("IMWL"). Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant failed to pay them for all the time that they worked, in violation of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 115/1 et seq. ("IWPCA").
Earlier in the case, Defendant moved for summary judgment [55], and Plaintiffs (who at the time were represented by counsel and were part of a collective action, all the other members of which have settled their claims) cross-moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability on the FLSA and IMWL overtime claims [59]. Defendant argued that it should be granted summary judgment on the FLSA claim because the United States Secretary of Transportation ("the Secretary") has the power to establish qualifications and maximum hours ofservice for school bus drivers and therefore school bus drivers fall within the "motor carrier exemption" to the overtime provision contained in the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1). Defendant also argued that it should be granted summary judgment on the IWML claim by virtue of the similar motor carrier exemption set forth in 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/3(d)(7). Plaintiffs disputed the applicability of both exemptions.
The Court limited its consideration of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment to the potentially dispositive and purely legal issue of whether the Secretary has the power under 49 U.S.C. § 31502 to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service for school bus drivers. See [69], [77]. Looking to analogous and persuasive case law from the Second and Eleventh Circuits, the Court concluded that the Secretary has jurisdiction to regulate the qualifications and maximum hours of service of school bus drivers and that as a result the Plaintiffs could fall within the motor carrier exemptions to the FLSA and IMWL. The Court denied Defendant's motion for summary judgment, however, because the factual record was insufficiently developed for the Court to determine whether Plaintiffs did fall within the motor carrier exemptions. See [77 at 14-15]. The Court also denied Plaintiffs' cross-motion for partial summary judgment in light of its holding that the Secretary has jurisdiction to regulate the qualifications and maximum hours of service of school bus drivers.
After the Court's ruling, the case settled as to all Plaintiffs except Almy and Rice. The remaining parties have since conducted discovery on the issues bearing on the potential applicability to Plaintiffs of the motor carrier exemptions to the FLSA and IMWL. Defendant has once again moved for summary judgment on all counts. [183]. Plaintiffs oppose the motion but have not cross-moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff Almy has instead filed a motion for reconsideration or vacation of the Court's order denying summary judgment [190], whichDefendant opposes [195]. Plaintiffs jointly moved to strike Defendant's brief opposing Plaintiff Almy's motion for reconsideration for improper service [201]. Defendant responded to the motion to strike by sending Plaintiffs hard copies of its summary judgment materials and its response to the motion for reconsideration [203]. Plaintiffs subsequently moved for sanctions on the issue of improper service [208]. They have also sought leave to file a further response to Defendant's motion for summary judgment [204].
For the reasons stated below, the Court denies Plaintiffs' motion to strike [201]; denies Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions [208]; denies Plaintiff Almy's motion for reconsideration [190]; grants Plaintiffs' joint motion for leave to file a further response to the motion for summary judgment [204]; and grants Defendant's motion for summary judgment [183].
Because the Court ultimately is considering Defendant's motion for summary judgment, the Court construes all "facts and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party," Plaintiffs. Foley v. City of Lafayette, 359 F.3d 925, 928 (7th Cir. 2004). Generally, the Court takes all relevant facts from the parties' Local Rule ("L.R.") 56.1 statements. In this case, however, Plaintiffs have failed to file an L.R. 56.1 statement notwithstanding Defendant's compliance with L.R. 56.2, see [187 & 188], which is designed to apprise pro se litigants opposing summary judgment of their obligations under the relevant federal and local rules. Plaintiffs have instead submitted a lengthy "response in opposition" to Defendant's L.R. 56.1 statement in which they object to many of Defendant's factual assertions and make their own argumentative assertions that are for the most part unsupported by citations to admissible evidence. [198]. "A response to a statement of facts * * * is not the place for purely argumentative denials," Moede v. Pochter, 701 F. Supp. 2d 997, 999 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (quotationomitted), and courts are not required to "wade through improper denials and legal argument in search of a genuinely disputed fact." Bordelon v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 233 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 2000). Yet Defendant has not pressed the issue of Plaintiffs' lack of compliance with L.R. 56.1, and "the decision whether to apply [local] rule [56.1] strictly or to overlook any transgression is one left to the Court's discretion." Little v. Cox's Supermarkets, 71 F.3d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 1995). In light of Plaintiffs' pro se status1 and apparent efforts to comply with L.R. 56.1 by filing a lengthy (though improper) response to Defendant's L.R. 56.1 statement [198] and submitting affidavits and other evidence with their opposition brief [197], the Court is inclined to overlook this transgression.2 The Court will look to Defendant's L.R. 56.1 statement [185] and the materials submitted therewith [186], Plaintiffs' responsive materials to the extent that they are supported by citations to admissible evidence, [197], [198], and the parties' earlier factual stipulation [54]. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). The Court also notes that Plaintiffs have repeatedly reiterated that "[t]he facts are not in dispute." [196 at 1]; [198 at 1]; [199 at 1].
Defendant is an Illinois corporation engaged in business as a private carrier contracting with school districts to transport children to and from school and through charter contracts to and from other events on large passenger buses. [185 ¶ 1]. Defendant's bus terminal (and principal place of business) is located in Lynwood, Illinois, near the Illinois-Indiana border. [185 ¶ 2]. Defendant contracts with public school districts in both Illinois and Indiana. [185 ¶ 2]. Children transported to Indiana schools reside exclusively in Indiana, but Defendant has some contracts with private schools in Illinois whose students reside in Indiana. [185 ¶ 2]. Defendant possessesan interstate motor common carrier certificate and has been issued a "DOT number" by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. [185 ¶ 18].
Plaintiff Almy is a citizen of Indiana and Plaintiff Rice is a citizen of Illinois. Both Plaintiffs are employed by Defendant as school bus drivers. [54 ¶ 11]. Plaintiffs are required to maintain commercial driver's licenses with "P" (Passenger) and "S" (School Bus) endorsements, [54 ¶¶ 4, 6], and to undergo medical fitness and drug and alcohol testing. [54 ¶¶ 7-8]. Plaintiffs' regular driving routes required them to transport children across the Illinois-Indiana border on a daily basis. [54 ¶ 13]; [185 ¶¶ 23-24]. Both Plaintiffs also drove interstate charter routes on occasion. [54 ¶ 13]; [185 ¶ 24].
The parties have stipulated that "[p]rior to February 3, 2008, each plaintiff was paid his or her regular rate of pay for all compensated hours worked, including time worked over 40 hours in individual work weeks." [54 ¶ 2]. They have also stipulated that "[a]fter February 3, 2008, each plaintiff has been paid time and one-half his or her regular rate of pay for all compensated hours worked over 40 hours in individual work weeks." [54 ¶ 3].
Plaintiffs were at all relevant times members of the bargaining unit represented by Teamsters Local 142, which has been a party to collective bargaining agreements ("CBAs") with Defendant, including one that was in effect from July 1, 2005 to June 30, 2008 and one that was in effect from July 1, 2008 to June 30, 2011. [54 ¶ 1]. Under the 2005-2008 and 2008-2011 CBAs, Plaintiffs were guaranteed a minimum of two hours' pay for their morning routes, two hours' pay for their evening routes, and three hours' pay for charters, even if those routes took less time. [185 ¶¶ 32, 36]; [186-6 ¶ 11.5]; [186-10 ¶ 11.5]; Almy Dep. 44:2-12; Rice Dep. 41:1-12, 43:2-7. The CBAs further provided that drivers whose hours exceeded the guarantees "will receive payment for the amount of actual hours worked." [186-6 ¶ 11.5]; [186-10 ¶ 11.5].Plaintiffs assert that the driving time alone on their daily morning and evening routes always took longer than two hours. [197 Ex. A ¶ 11]; [197 Ex. B ¶ 5]. They contend that they were not paid for all of the actual time that they worked performing required tasks, such as gathering and completing paperwork, conducting "pre-trip" inspections of their buses, fueling and cleaning their buses, and reviewing schedules. See Almy Dep. 47:13-49:13; Rice Dep. 54:24-56:19; [185 ¶¶ 33-34]. They contend...
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