Alonso v. McAllister Towing of Charleston, Inc., C.A. No. 2:08-cv-2241-PMD.

• Decision Date: 20 January 2009
• Docket Number: C.A. No. 2:08-cv-2241-PMD.
• Citation: 595 F.Supp.2d 645
• Parties: Robert C. ALONSO, Jr., Plaintiff, v. McALLISTER TOWING OF CHARLESTON, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

595 F.Supp.2d 645

Robert C. ALONSO, Jr., Plaintiff, v. McALLISTER TOWING OF CHARLESTON, INC., Defendant.

C.A. No. 2:08-cv-2241-PMD.

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Charleston Division.

January 20, 2009.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Charles Henry Raley, Jr., Raley and Raley, Savannah, GA, for Plaintiff.

Douglas Manning Muller, Moore and Van Allen, Charleston, SC, Kenneth A. Margolis, Lisa E. Dayan, Kauff McClain and McGuire, New York, NY, for Defendant.

ORDER

PATRICK MICHAEL DUFFY, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant McAllister Towing of Charleston, Inc.'s Motion for Partial Dismissal of Plaintiff Robert C. Alonso, Jr.'s First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to Amend his Complaint. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Partial Dismissal is granted, and Plaintiff's Motion to Amend is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Robert C. Alonso, Jr. ("Plaintiff"), a resident and citizen of Savannah, Georgia, had been employed for over fourteen years by Defendant McAllister Towing of Charleston, Inc. ("Defendant"), a marine towing company headquartered in North Charleston, South Carolina, as a tug captain. The previous eight years of his employment had been in the Charleston, South Carolina, area. At the time of the incident in question, he had been a tug captain of the tug McAllister Boys for about five months.

On the afternoon of May 21, 2008, Steve Kicklighter ("Kicklighter"), Vice-President and General Manager of Defendant ordered Plaintiff to travel to Boston, Massachusetts to act as captain of the tug Michaela McAllister, which Defendant operated in that area. The previous captain of the tug had taken leave of his duties due to a family emergency. Plaintiff's duties as captain of the Michaela McAllister would be to operate the ship from Boston to Albany, New York. Plaintiff objected to this assignment on the grounds that he lacked the experience and familiarity with that region and route to pilot the ship, and that to do so would have in his estimation violated federal regulations. Later that afternoon, he was again ordered to travel to Boston to take up this post, and was informed that if he did not, it would cost Defendant over $100,000 to find someone else to perform the task. Plaintiff once again refused to do so. At this point, Kicklighter informed Plaintiff that his position was terminated due to his refusal to accept a job assignment.

On June 24, 2008, Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint in this court, which has jurisdiction over this case as a maritime matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1333, and as a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant wrongly terminated him, and raises three grounds for relief: (1) wrongful discharge in violation of the Seaman's Protection Act (46 U.S.C. § 2114); (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress.

On July 15, 2008, Defendant filed a Motion for Partial Dismissal of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, asserting that Plaintiffs second and third causes of action failed as a matter of law. Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition to this Motion on August 4, to which Defendant filed a Reply on August 11. On November 3, 2008, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend his Complaint to add a cause of action for civil conspiracy and to add McAllister Towing & Transportation Co., Inc., Defendant's parent company, as a defendant in his action. Defendant filed a Response in Opposition to this Motion on November 18, 2008, to which Plaintiff filed a Reply on November 25.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

I. Motion to Dismiss

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion should be granted only if, after accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claims that entitles him to relief. See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir.1999). The complaint should not be dismissed unless it is certain that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any legal theory that might plausibly be suggested by the facts alleged. See Mylan Labs. Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir.1993). Further, "[u]nder the liberal rules of federal pleading, a complaint should survive a motion to dismiss if it sets out facts sufficient for the court to infer that all the required elements of the cause of action are present." Wolman v. Tose, 467 F.2d 29, 33 n. 5 (4th Cir.1972).

II. Motion to Amend

Motions to amend a pleading are governed by Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of the Civil Procedure. Rule 15(a) provides that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Upholding the letter and the spirit of this rule, "leave to amend a pleading should be denied only when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the amendment would be futile." Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 242 (4th Cir.1999) (quoting Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 509 (4th Cir.1986)) (emphasis in original); see also Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Tech., AG, 304 F.Supp.2d 812, 819 (E.D.Va.2004) ("Courts generally favor the `resolution of cases on their merits' ... [t]hus the substantive merits of a proposed claim [or defense] are typically best left for later resolution, e.g., motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, ..., or for resolution at trial.") (quoting Davis v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 615 F.2d 606, 613 (4th Cir.1980)). A delay in bringing a proposed amendment is generally insufficient reason to deny a party leave to amend. Edwards, 178 F.3d at 242.

A court may deny a party's motion to amend if allowing the amendment would be futile. See In re PEC Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 418 F.3d 379 (4th Cir.2005) ("Leave to amend need not be given when amendment would be futile."). For a motion to amend to be denied for futility, the amendment must be "clearly insufficient or frivolous on its face." Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d at 510-11; see also Rambus, 304 F.Supp.2d at 819; Robinson v. GEO Licensing Co., L.L.C., 173 F.Supp.2d 419, 423 (D.Md.2001).

DISCUSSION

I. Motion for Partial Dismissal

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs second (intentional infliction of emotional distress) and third (negligent infliction of emotional distress) causes of action. Defendant asserts that even accepting Plaintiffs factual allegations as true, his claims fail as a matter of law.

In order to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (also called outrage) under South Carolina law:

[T]he plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant intentionally or recklessly inflicted severe emotional distress or was certain or substantially certain that such distress would result from his or her conduct; (2) the conduct was so extreme and atrocious as to exceed all possible bounds of decency and must be regarded as outrageous and utterly intolerable in civilized society; (3) the actions of the defendant caused the plaintiffs emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Initially, the court determines whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery, and only if reasonable persons might differ should the question be one for the jury.

Lynch v. Toys "R" Us-Delaware, Inc., 375 S.C. 604, 620-21, 654 S.E.2d 541, 550 (Ct. App.2007) (citing Strickland v. Madden, 323 S.C. 63, 68, 448 S.E.2d 581, 584 (Ct. App.1994)).

Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress fails as a matter of law for several reasons. The court first notes that Plaintiffs allegations fail to establish a claim under the second prong of Lynch—while firing an employee who refused to accept a job assignment because he did not believe himself to be properly qualified is objectionable, it can hardly be said to be "so extreme and atrocious as to exceed all possible bounds of decency and must be regarded as outrageous and utterly intolerable in civilized society." Id. Furthermore, Plaintiffs claim also fails the fourth prong of Lynch—there is no doubt that having one's employment terminated is a stressful experience, but it can hardly be said to be an act that is "so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it." Id. "In fact, it is established under South Carolina law that wrongful discharge of an employee, no matter how unfair or reprehensible does not by itself constitute behavior so extreme and outrageous as to support a claim for outrage." Toth v. Square D Co., 712 F.Supp. 1231, 1238 (D.S.C.1989) (citing Corder v. Champion Road Mach. Int'l Corp., 283 S.C. 520, 324 S.E.2d 79 (Ct.App.1984)). Defendant claims that under this clearly established rule of South Carolina law, Plaintiffs claim is devoid of merit.

However, Plaintiff claims that this court should not necessarily be bound by doctrines of South Carolina common law, since this is an admiralty case and there is a federal interest in maintaining a uniform body of federal admiralty law. However, the case Plaintiff relies upon in support of this proposition is a case in which the Fourth Circuit reversed the ruling of a district court which applied West Virginia law to an admiralty case concerning a wrongful termination claim. Meaige v. Hartley Marine Corp., 925 F.2d 700 (4th Cir.1991). The basis of that court's decision was the fact that there is an act of Congress, the Seaman's Protection Act, which explicitly governs wrongful termination claims in admiralty cases, and therefore supersedes state common law. That court explicitly stated however, that it "recognizes that admiralty law sometimes looks to state law for the rule of decision ... when there is no admiralty rule on point and when doing so would not undermine uniformity." Id. at 702....