Alonso v. State, 3D00-995.
Decision Date | 17 July 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 3D00-995.,3D00-995. |
Parties | Arturo ALONSO, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Lisa Walsh, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Thomas C. Mielke, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., JORGENSON and COPE, JJ.
COPE J.
Arturo Alonso appeals his conviction for sexual battery. We reverse for a new trial.
Defendant-appellant Alonso and the victim, M.L., met for a date and went back to M.L.'s apartment. The defendant testified that they had consensual sexual intercourse and M.L. testified that there was no consent. She ran out of the apartment wrapped in a towel and went next door where she told two teenaged children that she had been raped and asked them to call the police.
At trial, the State moved to close the courtroom during the testimony of M.L. and the two teenagers under authority of section 918.16, Florida Statutes (1999).1 That statute provides:
(emphasis added).
The defendant objected that clearing the courtroom would violate his constitutional right to a public trial. Under the statute, the defendant's immediate family would be allowed to remain in the courtroom. However, the defendant's only immediate family in this country was his wife, from whom he was separated. His parents reside in Cuba and could not attend the trial, and there was no other immediate family.
The defendant objected to the exclusion of the defendant's cousin,2 Tony Garcia, who was a father figure to him. Mr. Garcia had spoken with defense counsel numerous times about the case and had attended every court hearing on the case. The defense objected to exclusion of the defendant's minister, the defendant's girlfriend with whom he had lived for a year, and several other friends.
The trial court concluded that it was obligated to follow the statute as written. The court ruled that under the statute, the only family member who was allowed to remain in the courtroom was the defendant's estranged wife. The remaining relatives and friends were excluded. Prior to excluding them, the trial judge explained:
As the statute provides, the court personnel, counsel, and the court reporter remained during the testimony.3 Law school interns who had worked on the case were also allowed to be present.
The courtroom was closed in this fashion only for the testimony of the victim and the two teenaged witnesses. Thereafter the courtroom was reopened to the public.
The defendant was convicted of one count of sexual battery with great force, and acquitted of another sexual battery count. The defendant has appealed.
It has been held that the automatic application of a statute of this general type violates the United States Constitution. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982).
In order to implement the statute in a constitutional way, it is necessary to apply a four-part constitutional test when closure of the courtroom is requested. As the Second District Court of Appeal has explained:
review dismissed, 782 So.2d 868 (Fla.2001).
The trial court itself expressed doubts about whether the courtroom should be closed under the circumstances of this case. In the absence of the necessary findings justifying the closure, we must order a new trial. On the facts of this case, we see no viable argument for closing the courtroom during the testimony of the teenaged witnesses, who were fourteen and twelve at the time of trial. They were not victims. They simply recounted what happened when the victim came to their apartment, including what the victim told them. We see no overriding interest served by closing the hearing during their testimony.
The analysis with respect to the victim must be addressed on remand.
Since there must be a new trial, we comment on two other issues raised by the defendant.
First, the jury was given the standard jury instruction on sexual battery. The defendant contends that there should have been a special instruction on the issue of consent. We decline to reach this issue because it was never presented in the trial court and has been raised for the first time on appeal. The defendant may present a proposed jury instruction for consideration by the trial court on remand.
Second, the defendant made a motion for judgment of acquittal in the trial court, arguing that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the charge of sexual battery with great force. § 794.011(3), Fla. Stat. (1997).4 Insofar as pertinent here, that crime occurs where the defendant commits sexual battery and "uses actual physical force likely to cause serious personal injury...." Id. "`Serious personal injury' means great bodily harm or pain, permanent disability, or...
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...2009), on the ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of the Third District Court of Appeal, Alonso v. State, 821 So.2d 423 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002).1 We have jurisdiction. Seeart. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we approve the decision of the Fo......
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...of acquittal, the trial court is required to "construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the State." See Alonso v. State, 821 So.2d 423, 427 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). Moreover, the motion is properly denied if, after viewing the evidence in such a light, "a rational trier of fact could ......
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...did not violate defendant’s right to public trial. Kovaleski v. State, 103 So. 3d 859 (Fla. 2012) disapproving Alonso v. State , 821 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) Counsel fails to preserve an error in the court’s order requiring that the courtroom be cleared of defendant’s family during the......