Alonso-Velez v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., Civil No. 09–1937 (DRD).

• Court: United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Puerto Rico
• Writing for the Court: DANIEL R. DOMÍNGUEZ
• Citation: 173 Soc.Sec.Rep.Serv. 375,796 F.Supp.2d 300
• Parties: Marie C. ALONSO–VELEZ, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
• Decision Date: 06 July 2011
• Docket Number: Civil No. 09–1937 (DRD).

173 Soc.Sec.Rep.Serv. 375
796 F.Supp.2d 300

Marie C. ALONSO–VELEZ, Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

Civil No. 09–1937 (DRD).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

July 6, 2011.

[796 F.Supp.2d 301]

Salvador Medina–De–La–Cruz, Salvador Medina De La Cruz Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Ginette L. Milanes, U.S. Attorney's Office, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.

ORDER DANIEL R. DOMÍNGUEZ, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees (Docket No. 15), dated December 7, 2010. Plaintiff requests fees in the amount of $1,780.27 pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412. The EAJA mandates that this Court award attorney's fees to a prevailing party in suit against an agency of the United States “unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412. See I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 158, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990)(internal quotations omitted). On December 8, 2010, the Commissioner opposed Plaintiff's request for fees (Docket No. 16).

On May 22, 2007, Plaintiff appeared before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) and argued that she was disabled from September 9, 2003 to the present, May 22, 2007 (“Time Period One”). The ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled and denied her claim. On July 17, 2009, the Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ's denial of benefits. Having exhausted her administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed a complaint in federal court on September 15, 2009 (Docket No. 1). On January 29, 2010, the Commissioner moved that the Court remand the instant action for further proceedings pursuant to sentence six of Section

[796 F.Supp.2d 302]

205(g) ¹ (Docket No. 5) and the Court granted the Commissioner's request On February 5, 2010 (Docket No. 8). On remand, Plaintiff amended her alleged disability onset date from September 9, 2003 to May 1, 2008 (May 1, 2008 to the present, “Time Period Two”).

Upon remand, a second ALJ informed Plaintiff that he had reached a “fully favorable” decision (Docket No. 12–1). Pursuant to that favorable decision, this Court entered judgment and dismissed the case on November 8, 2010 (Docket No. 14).

The following month, on December 7, 2010, Plaintiff filed the pending motion for attorney's fees under the EAJA (Docket No. 15). Therein, Plaintiff's counsel asserts that Plaintiff is a prevailing party and that the Commissioner's position was not substantially justified. Thus, Plaintiff requests $1,780.27 ² in attorney's fees based upon 12.48 hours of billable work.³ Further justifying counsel's fee, Plaintiff claims that the instant matter presented novel and complex issues because the claimant has a combination of impairments and proof of claimant's disability was difficult to establish.

On December 8, 2010, the Commissioner opposed Plaintiff's motion for fees (Docket No. 16). The Commissioner advances that Plaintiff is not a prevailing party because Plaintiff did not ultimately obtain any of the benefit sought when Plaintiff requested judicial review from this Court. Commissioner's argument boils down to the fact that because there is no overlap between the time period from which Plaintiff was denied benefits, Time Period One, and the time period in which Plaintiff was ultimately awarded benefits, Time Period Two, Plaintiff cannot be deemed a prevailing party. The Commissioner asserts that in a sentence six remand, to prevail, a claimant must obtain at least some of the Social Security benefits that Plaintiff sought when she brought suit in federal court. The Commissioner alleges that Plaintiff filed suit in federal court to overturn the Commissioner's decision that she was not disabled during Time Period One. However, on remand, Plaintiff changed her alleged on-set date to May 1, 2008, approximately one year after the first ALJ's May 22, 2007 decision. Hence, the Commissioner argues that Plaintiff is not a prevailing party as Plaintiff's adjudicated benefits from Time Period Two were not the same benefits she was originally denied and appealed from, Time Period One.

The Commissioner also alleges that its position was substantially justified because Plaintiff has conceded she was not disabled in Time Period One, the time period originally at issue before this Court.

In Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 113 S.Ct. 2625, 125 L.Ed.2d 239 (1993), the Supreme Court held that a social security plaintiff who obtained a remand reversing the Commissioner's decision

[796 F.Supp.2d 303]

under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) was the “prevailing party,” and as such was entitled to attorney fees and expenses under the EAJA. Here, however, the Court remanded the decision of the Commissioner under sentence six. The sentence six remand, by itself, did not then make Plaintiff a “prevailing party” for purposes of the EAJA. See, e.g., Marshall v. Commissioner of Social Security, 444 F.3d 837, 840–42 (6th Cir.2006); Sims v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir.2001). Rather, the sentence-six remand merely preserved Plaintiff's right to file a fee petition if she prevailed on remand. Marshall, 444 F.3d at 841–42. Stated another way, the result of the subsequent administrative proceedings is sufficient to confer “prevailing party” status upon a claimant. Jackson v. Chater, 99 F.3d 1086, 1097 (11th Cir.1996) (“Because [claimant] succeeded on remand, at least in part on sentence-six grounds, judgment must be entered in his favor by the district court, and [claimant] will be a prevailing party under that judgment.”). However, “[o]ne does not become a prevailing party merely because the Secretary's request for a remand is granted under sentence six. Instead, the party must actually succeed in receiving some substantial benefit that was sought in the original appeal because of the remand.” Squires–Allman v. Callahan, 117 F.3d 918, 919 n. 2 (5th Cir.1997). The Commissioner asserts that Plaintiff has not met this last qualification.

“[A]chieving prevailing party status requires a plaintiff to show that he succeeded on an important issue in the case, thereby gaining at least some of the benefit he sought in bringing suit.” Gay Officers Action League v. Puerto Rico, 247 F.3d 288, 293 (1st Cir.2001). Restated, “a plaintiff ‘prevails' when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the...