Alpha Beta, Inc. v. Superior Court (Nahm)

Citation189 Cal.App.3d 520,721 P.2d 41,225 Cal.Rptr. 551
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals
Decision Date25 April 1986
PartiesPreviously published at 189 Cal.App.3d 520 189 Cal.App.3d 520, 106 Lab.Cas. P 55,749 ALPHA BETA, INC. et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California for the County of Alameda, Respondent, Rita NAHM, Real Party in Interest. A025458.

Henry F. Telfeian, Patrick W. Jordan, McLaughlin & Irvin, San Francisco, for petitioners.

No appearance for respondent.

Steven R. Cavalli, Gwilliam & Ivary, Oakland, for real party in interest.

KING, Associate Justice.

Rita Nahm was employed by Alpha Beta, Inc., from May 1980 through February 1982, and throughout that period was subject to a collective bargaining agreement between Local 870, Retail Clerks Union AFL-CIO, and Alpha Beta. Several months after her employment terminated Nahm sued Alpha Beta and its supervisory employees Cole and Coppin, in respondent superior court, for damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants moved for summary judgment upon the theory that Nahm's tort action in respondent court was preempted by federal labor law. Respondent court denied defendants' motion; defendants petitioned this court for a writ of prohibition or mandate; we summarily denied the petition. The Supreme Court granted hearing and retransferred the matter to us with directions to issue an alternative writ, referring to Beers v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co. (9th Cir.1983) 703 F.2d 425. We issued the alternative writ, heard oral argument, and concluded that respondent court's order was correct. In an opinion filed October 16, 1984, we vacated the alternative writ and denied the peremptory writ. The California Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court, 472 U.S. 1004, 105 S.Ct. 2696, 86 L.Ed.2d 713, granted certiorari and remanded the case with directions that we reconsider our opinion in light of Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985) 471 U.S. 202, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206. We have given the matter due consideration; for the reasons expressed in footnote 1, infra, we have concluded that Lueck does not affect our result. Accordingly, we reissue our original opinion denying the peremptory writ.

Nahm's complaint in respondent court alleged in pertinent part that "[a]t all times herein mentioned, defendant... COLE was the assistant store manager of the above mentioned Alpha Beta store. At all times herein mentioned, defendant ... COPPIN was the manager of the bakery of the above mentioned Alpha Beta store. Commencing in approximately September of 1981, defendants above named and each of them, participated in episodes and encounters designed to harass, humiliate and upset plaintiff by, among other things, making rude and humiliating comments to and about plaintiff in front of customers and co-employees; decreasing her number of working hours below those of other employees who had less or the same seniority as plaintiff; degrading her job performance in front of others; causing plaintiff to perform the job duties of others; asking plaintiff to stay on and work overtime and then verbally abusing and chastising her for doing so; making false statements in documents in plaintiff's personnel file to make it look as if plaintiff was being insubordinate to superiors; discriminating against plaintiff in favor of other employees; using foul and abusive language directed at plaintiff; refusing to honor plaintiff's request to be transferred to another store." The complaint further alleges that each defendant acted in all relevant respects as the agent of each other defendant, and that the described conduct was "outrageous" and caused Nahm emotional injury for which she is entitled to both compensatory and punitive damages.

There is no indication in the record before us that Nahm's allegations are in any way related to the termination of her employment.

Defendants moved for summary judgment on the sole ground "that the Complaint herein fails to state a cause of action against defendants in that it is preempted by federal law." In support of their motion defendants placed before the court the collective bargaining agreement, calling attention to its provision for processing "grievances" by voluntary adjustment or arbitration. The collective bargaining agreement defines a "grievance" as "a dispute, difference of opinion between the parties, and grievance of employees involving or arising out of the meaning, interpretation, application or alleged violation of this Agreement, including the arbitrability of all such matters." By the declaration of Alpha Beta's director of industrial relations defendants asserted that "[e]ach and every one of these incidents could have been the subject of a grievance and processed through the grievance and arbitration procedure contained in ... the collective bargaining agreement." Thus, defendants argued, "plaintiff's complaint is preempted by federal law in that the allegations therein constitute a single claim for breach of a collective bargaining agreement, the exclusive remedy for which is the grievance and arbitration provision contained in said agreement."

Nahm filed only legal argument in opposition. Respondent court denied defendants' motion. This writ petition followed. The only issue before this court is whether defendants' uncontradicted showing is sufficient to demonstrate as a matter of law that Nahm's claim cannot be maintained in a California trial court at this time. (Cf. LaRosa v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 741, 744-745, 176 Cal.Rptr. 224.)

Defendants identify two "questions presented for review":

"1. Does federal law preempt a state tort claim based on allegations identical to grievable events under a collective bargaining agreement?

"2. Can a state tort claim be maintained where in adjudicating the complaint the trial court will necessarily be required to interpret and apply a collective bargaining agreement?"

As stated and argued by defendants, these questions compound elements of two doctrines: Federal preemption (cf. San Diego Unions v. Garmon (1959) 359 U.S. 236, 242, 243, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775; Sarro v. Retail Store Employees Union (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 206, 214-216, 202 Cal.Rptr. 102) and exhaustion of contractual arbitration procedures (Johnson v. Hydraulic Research & Mfg. Co. (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 675, 679, 139 Cal.Rptr. 136; cf. Labor Management Relations Act § 203(d) (29 U.S.C. § 173, subd. (d)); Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co. (1960) 363 U.S. 564, 568, 805 S.Ct. 1343, 1346, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403).

We conclude that defendants' reliance on the rhetoric of federal preemption decisions is misplaced.

Defendants cite several cases decided under the Railway Labor Act (RLA) (45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.). But to the extent that this action is affected at all by federal labor law, it is subject not to the RLA but rather to the general provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) (29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq.).

The RLA expressly provides for administrative determination of disputes "growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions...." (45 U.S.C. § 153, subd. First (i).) It is now well established that these procedures are compulsory, and exclusive of judicial proceedings, in any dispute subject to the RLA. (Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. (1972) 406 U.S. 320, 322-326, 92 S.Ct. 1562, 1564-1566, 32 L.Ed.2d 95; Magnuson v. Burlington Northern, Inc. (9th Cir.1978) 576 F.2d 1367, 1369-1370, cert. den. 439 U.S. 930, 99 S.Ct. 318, 58 L.Ed.2d 323.) "[T]he compulsory character of the administrative remedy provided by the Railway Labor Act for disputes such as that between petitioner and respondent stems not from any contractual undertaking between the parties but from the Act itself...." (Andrews v Louisville & Nashville R. Co., supra, 406 U.S. at p. 323, 92 S.Ct. at p. 1565.) Our attention has been directed by our Supreme Court to Beers v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., supra, (9th Cir.1983) 703 F.2d 425 which we had rejected as inapplicable to this case when we summarily denied defendants' petition. Beers, employed under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement subject to the RLA, was discharged for alleged insubordination arising out of union activities. His state-court action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and violations of his rights under the RLA was removed to federal district court where summary judgment for defendants was granted on the ground that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's finding that the controversy was "a minor dispute within the exclusive province of the grievance mechanisms of the Railway Labor Act" (703 F.2d at p. 429), relying on Magnuson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., supra, which in turn followed Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., supra.

The NLRA and LMRA contain no provision directly comparable to "the exclusive ... grievance mechanisms" of the RLA. Section 203(d) of the LMRA (29 U.S.C. § 173, subd. (d)) does provide that "[f]inal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement," and the declaration that arbitration of grievances is "the very heart of the system of industrial self-government" (Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co. (1960) 363 U.S. 574, 581, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1352, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409) has been often reaffirmed. But "the difference between the impact of the NLRA and the RLA has significance. The focus of the NLRA is on specific conduct that Congress has deemed subject to either prohibition or protection, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158. Often ... it is the objective of certain conduct, rather than the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3 cases
  • Desherlia v. Alpha Beta Co., 87-6045
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • April 29, 1988
    ...independent, and nonnegotiable standard of behavior.4 In her brief, DeSherlia relies solely on Alpha Beta, Inc. v. Superior Court (Nahm), 180 Cal.App.3d 324, 225 Cal.Rptr. 551, review granted, 189 Cal.App.3d 520, 228 Cal.Rptr. 160, 721 P.2d 41 (1986), transferred, 198 Cal.App.3d 1390, 244 C......
  • Alpha Beta, Inc. v. Superior Court (Nahm)
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • April 30, 1987
    ...Respondent; NAHM, Real Party in Interest. S.F. 25039. Supreme Court of California, In Bank. April 30, 1987. Prior report: Cal.App., 225 Cal.Rptr. 551. The above-entitled cause is transferred to the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, for reconsideration in light of DeT......
  • Alpha Beta, Inc. v. Superior Court of County of Alameda (Nahm)
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • July 24, 1986
    ...OF ALAMEDA, Respondent; Rita NAHM, Real Party in Interest. Supreme Court of California, In Bank. July 24, 1986. Prior report: Cal.App., 225 Cal.Rptr. 551. Petition for review BIRD, C.J., and MOSK, BROUSSARD, GRODIN, LUCAS and PANELLI, JJ., concur. ...

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT