Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, Ark.

• Decision Date: 12 November 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-1825,97-1825
• Parties: 8 A.D. Cases 953, 13 NDLR P 203 Christopher B. ALSBROOK, Appellee, United States of America, Intervenor on Appeal, v. CITY OF MAUMELLE, ARKANSAS; Defendant. Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training; State of Arkansas; W.C. Brassell, also known as Dub Brassell, Individually and in his capacity as Chairman of the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards & Training; Bobby Hilderbrand, Individually and in his official capacity as a member of the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards & Training; Willard, Individually and in his official capacity as a member of the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards & Training; Elanor Anthony, Individually and in her official capacity as a member of the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards & Training; Bob Johnston, Individually and in his official capacity as a member of the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards & Training; David Muniz, Individually and in his official capacity as a member of the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards & Training; Gary Ashcroft, Individually and in his official capacity as a member of the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards & Training, Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 825

156 F.3d 825

8 A.D. Cases 953, 13 NDLR P 203

Christopher B. ALSBROOK, Appellee, United States of America, Intervenor on Appeal, v. CITY OF MAUMELLE, ARKANSAS; Defendant.

Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and

Training; State of Arkansas; W.C. Brassell, also known as

Dub Brassell, Individually and in his capacity as Chairman

of the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards &

Training; Bobby Hilderbrand, Individually and in his

official capacity as a member of the Arkansas Commission on

Law Enforcement Standards & Training; Willard, Individually

and in his official capacity as a member of the Arkansas

Commission on Law Enforcement Standards & Training; Elanor

Anthony, Individually and in her official capacity as a

member of the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement

Standards & Training; Bob Johnston, Individually and in his

official capacity as a member of the Arkansas Commission on

Law Enforcement Standards & Training; David Muniz,

Individually and in his official capacity as a member of the

Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards & Training;

Gary Ashcroft, Individually and in his official capacity as

a member of the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement

Standards & Training, Appellants.

No. 97-1825.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 21, 1997.

Decided Sept. 11, 1998.

Order Granting Rehearing En Banc Nov. 12, 1998.

Robert A. Newcomb, Little Rock, AR, argued, for appellee.

Jessica D. Silver, argued (Seth M. Galanter, on the brief), for Intervenor U.S. Dept. of Justice.

Gregory Crow, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, AR, argued (Kay J. Jackson Demailly, Asst. Atty. Gen., on the brief), for appellant.

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, ¹ Chief Judge, and McMILLIAN and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

Christopher Alsbrook brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of Arkansas, pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against his employer, the City of Maumelle, Arkansas (the City), as well as the State of Arkansas (the State), the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards & Training (ACLEST), and the commissioners of the ACLEST (the commissioners) in their individual and official capacities. The State, ACLEST, and the commissioners (collectively, appellants) moved for summary judgment asserting that Alsbrook's claims against them were barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity and that the commissioners were protected by qualified immunity from being sued in their individual capacities. The district court denied appellants' motion, Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, No. LR-C-96-8 (E.D.Ark. Mar. 24, 1997) (hereinafter "slip op."), and they appealed. For reversal, appellants argue that the district court erred in holding (1) that Congress, in enacting the ADA, properly exercised its constitutional authority under the commerce clause and the Fourteenth Amendment in abrogating the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity and (2) that the commissioners are not protected by qualified immunity from being sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 for violating the ADA. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a), the United States has intervened in this appeal to oppose appellants' Eleventh Amendment argument, in defense of the constitutionality of the ADA. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction in the district court was proper based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Appellants timely brought this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Fed. R.App. P. 4(a). Appellate jurisdiction is based upon the collateral order exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524-30, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949).

Background

The following summary of the factual background is largely based upon the district court's statement of uncontroverted facts. See slip op. at 1-2. Alsbrook has been employed by the Maumelle Department of Public Safety since January of 1993. In December of 1993, he completed the basic law enforcement officer training program and successfully met all requirements to be certified as a law enforcement officer in the State of Arkansas except that he has corrected vision in his right eye of 20/30. ² In order to be certified as a law enforcement officer in the State of Arkansas, an applicant must meet standards established by the ACLEST, including a requirement of 20/20 corrected or uncorrected vision in each eye. Alsbrook's vision in his right eye cannot be corrected to 20/20 due to a congenital condition called amblyopia. Alsbrook's doctor has written a letter stating the opinion that Alsbrook's amblyopia would not impair his ability to perform any activity or type of work. While attending the Arkansas Law Enforcement Training Academy, Alsbrook received an "expert" rating for his shooting with a handgun. He has received an "expert" target-shooting score each time he has tried to qualify as a law enforcement officer with the City. The City has admitted that Alsbrook "has, and can, perform all essential functions of a police officer." Id. at 2. After being denied ACLEST certification in September 1995, Alsbrook applied for a waiver of the 20/20 vision requirement, but that request was denied.

Alsbrook brought the present action in federal district court seeking damages and injunctive relief on grounds that the City, the State, the ACLEST, and the commissioners violated his rights under the ADA and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by refusing to certify him as a law enforcement officer because of his eyesight disability, or because they regard him as having a disability. In his complaint, Alsbrook alleges that the City informed him that he would be terminated because he lacks certification by the ACLEST. ³ Joint Appendix at 5.

Appellants moved for summary judgment claiming that the State, state agencies, and state officials in their official capacity, are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, that the commissioners may not be sued in their individual capacities for ADA violations, and that the commissioners are, in any case, entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied their motion. In so doing, the district court was cautious to point out that

[t]he narrow holding of this Order is simply that the defendants are not entitled to summary judgment, either in their official or individual capacities. At trial, the defendants may be able to demonstrate that the standards they set are reasonable and rationally related to necessary skills for law enforcement officers. On the record currently before the Court, the defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Slip op. at 9. Appellants timely appealed.

Discussion

Although a denial of summary judgment is ordinarily not considered a final judgment for purposes of permitting an appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, an exception is made where the moving party has sought dismissal on the basis of absolute or qualified immunity. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 524-30, 105 S.Ct. 2806. We review the district court's denial of summary judgment de novo. Rowe v. Lamb, 130 F.3d 812, 814 (8th Cir.1997); Burnham v. Ianni, 119 F.3d 668, 673 (8th Cir.1997) (en banc). The question before the district court, and this court on appeal, is whether the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Where the unresolved issues are primarily legal rather than factual, summary judgment is particularly appropriate. Crain v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 920 F.2d 1402, 1405-06 (8th Cir.1990).

Eleventh Amendment immunity

Appellants first argue that the district court erred in failing to grant them summary judgment on the basis of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. In rejecting appellants' Eleventh Amendment argument, the district court stated: "[t]he Court is unpersuaded by the State defendants' analysis of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Americans with Disabilities Act was passed under the auspices of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Commerce Clause. The reasoning of [Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (Seminole Tribe ),] is inapplicable to the ADA." Slip op. at 3.

Because the State has not waived its sovereign immunity and consented to suits against it pursuant to the ADA, Congress could not validly abrogate the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity unless (1) Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate that immunity and (2) Congress acted pursuant to a valid exercise of power. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55, 116 S.Ct. 1114 (striking as unconstitutional Congress's establishment of a private federal cause of action against the states under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act because Congress lacked power under the Indian Commerce Clause to unilaterally abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity). On appeal, appellants concede that Congress has unequivocally expressed within the ADA its intent to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. See 42 U.S.C. § 12202 ("A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter."). Appellants maintain, however, that Congress has not acted pursuant to a valid exercise of power under either the commerce clause or the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, appellants conclude, Congress exceeded its constitutional authority in creating a private federal cause of action against the states and state entities under the ADA. We disagree.

It is well-established that the...