Alston v. Cnty. of Sacramento
| Decision Date | 18 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:18-cv-02420-TLN-CKD (PS),2:18-cv-02420-TLN-CKD (PS) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | ERIC ANTHONY ALSTON, JR., Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, ET AL., Defendants. |
Pro se plaintiff, Eric A. Alston, Jr., commenced this civil rights action on September 4, 2018 against the County of Sacramento, Sheriff Scott Jones, Captain Eric Buehler, Sergeant Connor Milligan, the administrator of the county jail, and six sheriff's deputies. (ECF No. 1.) The complaint asserted twelve causes of action. The court dismissed all causes of action except three, and all defendants except one, for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 20.) The one remaining defendant, Deputy Kenneth Lloyd, now moves for summary judgment on plaintiff's three remaining claims: (1) a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the use of excessive force, (2) a state law claim under California's Bane Act, and (3) a state law claim for battery. (ECF No. 69.) For the reasons below, the court recommends granting defendant's motion in full.
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Eric A. Alston, Jr. was arrested by the Sacramento Sheriff's Department on November 21, 2017 on charges of felony spousal abuse. (ECF No. 72 at 10 ¶ 1.) He was held overnight at the Sacramento Main Jail and released on November 22, 2017. Id. ¶ 2. The charges against him were eventually dropped. Id. at 11 ¶ 2.
At the time of his arrest, Alston was wearing a walking boot on his right foot due to a prior ankle surgery. Id. ¶ 3. Despite the boot, Alston was able to walk down the stairs of his apartment and to the arresting officer's vehicle without assistance. Id. ¶ 4. While entering the arresting officer's vehicle, Alston fell. See id. ¶ 5. The arresting officer transported Alston to Kaiser South Hospital to be medically cleared before booking. Id. at 12 ¶ 6. Alston was evaluated for complaints of pain in his right hand and right knee. Id. ¶ 7. X-rays of his right hand and knee showed no acute fracture or dislocation. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. Alston was cleared for incarceration, according to defendant, and he was transported to the Sacramento County Main Jail. Id. ¶ 10.
Upon arriving at the Sacramento County Main Jail, the deputies attempted to transfer Alston from the garage to the arrest report room. (ECF No. 69-3 at 50.) Deputy Lloyd was working as a booking deputy that evening, and he was asked to bring a wheelchair out to the garage and assist the arresting officers with moving Alston, who was approximately six-feet tall and weighed roughly 300 pounds. (ECF No. 72 at 14 ¶ 14.) When the deputies attempted to transfer Alston, however, Alston "deliberately" slid out of the wheelchair, according to Deputy Lloyd and Sergeant Milligan. Id. Sergeant Milligan, who had been informed that Alston was being uncooperative and came to witness the booking, ordered the deputies to return Alston to the wheelchair and to tilt the chair back, to prevent Alston from intentionally sliding onto the floor again, and roll it to the arrest report room. (ECF No. 69-3 at 50.)
Alston was wheeled backwards in the wheelchair into the building and parked near the entrance of the medical screening room to wait his turn to be medically cleared for custody. (ECF No. 72 at 17 ¶ 20.) In accordance with the Sheriff's Department policy, Alston remained in handcuffs until it was his turn to be medically screened. Id. at 18 ¶ 22. When it was Alston'sturn to be screened, Deputy Trummel and Deputy Lloyd prepared to transport Alston via wheelchair into the medical screening room. Id. at 19 ¶ 25. What happened next between Deputy Lloyd and Alston is the core of the current dispute.
In his operative complaint, Alston provides the following version of events:
They bring me a Wheelchair, take me into the booking area and without provocation Defendant Lloyd choke slams me out my wheelchair while I'm handcuffed to the ground . . . and I ask him why did he do that while I'm on the ground, than [sic] I look at Defendant Milligan and ask him what that was for, but he doesn't answer back, and at this point I inform officials that I need my knee brace and I'm hurt multiple times moreover multiple deputies are there but do not intervene . . . .
(ECF No. 1 ¶ 27.) Alston claims that Lloyd's conduct amounted to a use of excessive force and a battery.
Deputy Lloyd denies that he touched Alston's neck and claims that he merely lifted Alston's right leg up by his pant leg while Alston was still seated, because Alston's walking boot was obstructing the wheelchair's movement. (ECF No. 69-3 at 95 ¶ 16.) He contends that Alston deliberately slid out of the chair and onto the ground when he lifted Alston's leg. Id.
The incident in question was captured by security cameras in the area, which Lloyd has submitted with his motion for summary judgment. Lloyd alleges that the video footage conclusively disproves Alston's version of events.
Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there "is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party asserting that a fact cannot be disputed must support the assertion by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
Summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an elementessential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id.
If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence of a genuine factual dispute, the nonmoving party may not rely upon the allegations or denials of his pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, or admissible discovery materials, in support of his contention that the dispute exists, or show that the materials cited by the movant do not establish the absence of a genuine dispute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The nonmoving party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).
In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the nonmoving party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to 'pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 ().
In resolving the summary judgment motion, the evidence of the nonmoving party is to be believed. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the nonmovingparty's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985). aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the nonmoving party Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).
Defendant Lloyd moves for summary judgment on the three causes of action asserted against him: (1) a claim under section 1983 for using excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) a claim under California's Bane Act for using excessive force in violation of the California Constitution Art. 1, 7, 13, and the California Civil Code section 43; and (3) a civil battery claim under California common law. (ECF No. 69.) Defendant argues that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Deputy Lloyd used excessive force, and that he is entitled to qualified immunity in any event. The court will discuss each of plaintiff's causes of action in turn.
The Civil Rights Act provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of [state law] ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution ... shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, to prevail on a valid claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must...
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