Alston v. Parker

• Decision Date: 05 April 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-2683.,03-2683.
• Citation: 363 F.3d 229
• Parties: Gary Marshall ALSTON v. William PARKER; Jack Singer (N.J.(Newark) D.C. No. 95-cv-06158) Gary Marshall Alston v. Carroll Simmon; Lynda Navratil (N.J.(Newark) D.C. No. 95-cv-06159) Gary Marshall Alston, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

363 F.3d 229

Gary Marshall ALSTON v. William PARKER; Jack Singer (N.J.(Newark) D.C. No. 95-cv-06158)

Gary Marshall Alston v. Carroll Simmon; Lynda Navratil (N.J.(Newark) D.C. No. 95-cv-06159) Gary Marshall Alston, Appellant.

No. 03-2683.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued January 15, 2004.

April 5, 2004.

Joseph B. Young [Argued], New Jersey Protection & Advocacy, Inc., Trenton, for Appellant.

Joanne Leone, Maria Desautelle [Argued], Office of the Attorney General of NJ, Division of Law, Trenton, for Appellees.

Before SLOVITER, RENDELL and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.

At the end of Gary Marshall Alston's 17-year sentence in a New Jersey prison, he was involuntarily committed to Greystone Park Psychiatric Hospital. While there, Alston sued various Greystone employees in a pro se § 1983 complaint, raising several challenges with respect to his prison sentence and his psychiatric commitment. Before the merits of Alston's claims could be tested, the District Court granted a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The Court concluded that Alston's pleading did not meet the factual specificity requirement for civil rights complaints and dismissed his complaint. Because we hold that the District Court subjected Alston's complaint to a heightened pleading standard no longer applicable in such civil rights cases, we will reverse.

I.

Challenging his transfer to Greystone, Alston filed two pro se complaints under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on December 4, 1995. In those complaints, which were later consolidated, Alston sought over $63 million in damages from four Greystone employees, who he contended had violated his rights. The employees included William Parker, Jack Singer, and Lynda Navratil (collectively, "Defendants").¹ The complaints, the pertinent text of which we set forth in the margin, are not models of clarity.² Yet, their thrust is clear enough: Alston questioned the basis of his transfer to Greystone and requested the appointment of counsel to help advance his case.

The District Court referred the matter to a Magistrate Judge, who granted Alston's application for counsel on March 19, 1996. The threshold requirement for the appointment of counsel to indigent plaintiffs is the arguable legal and factual merit of a complaint. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147 (3d Cir.1993). The Magistrate Judge recognized two claims in Alston's complaint: 1) a claim that his 17-year term in prison caused him such harm that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment; and 2) that his involuntary commitment, as Alston put it "without victim without evidence," violated due process. With respect to the latter claim, the Magistrate Judge cited Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980), in which the Supreme Court articulated the minimum procedural protections that must be afforded to a prisoner who is transferred to a psychiatric institution. Such procedures include fair notice and a hearing at which evidence may be presented. This Vitek claim is at the heart of Alston's complaint. The Magistrate Judge recognized the legal sufficiency of these claims, but noted at the same time the paucity of factual development. Nevertheless, after considering other factors, including his doubt that Alston could adequately present his case without assistance, he ordered counsel to be appointed.

Four years later, in August of 2000, the District Court finally appointed counsel for Alston.³ By that time, Alston had been released from Greystone and his whereabouts were unknown. Eventually, his counsel successfully located him and entered into a representation agreement on November 7, 2000. One month later, on December 6, 2000, Alston's counsel filed a status update with the District Court. Counsel informed the District Court that it was attempting to locate, and serve Alston's pro se complaint on, the Defendants. A similar status update was filed on February 21, 2001. Notwithstanding these updates, on March 20, 2001, the District Court dismissed the case for lack of prosecution.

Subsequently, Alston's counsel successfully served the complaint on three out of the four named defendants and petitioned the District Court to reconsider its dismissal. On January 29, 2002, the District Court reinstated the case upon Alston's motion and vacated its earlier dismissal order. The Defendants responded by filing a 12(b)(6) motion, invoking various defenses, such as defects in the pleading, witness immunity, qualified immunity, and sovereign immunity.

The District Court determined that Alston's complaint was fatally defective, and on that basis, granted the motion to dismiss. Citing Darr v. Wolfe, 767 F.2d 79, 80 (3d Cir.1985), the Court observed that it was "well settled" that civil rights complaints must be pled with factual specificity. Concluding that Alston's complaint was unsubstantiated and did not specifically set forth how each defendant infringed Alston's rights, the District Court found that Alston had not met the pleading requirements necessary to pursue a § 1983 action. The District Court further held that Alston had sufficient notice of this pleading defect, referring to the Magistrate Judge's admonition in 1996 that the allegations lacked factual support.⁴ Accordingly, the District Court entered an order granting the Defendants' 12(b)(6) motion and dismissing the complaint. The order did not specify whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice, but pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b), we treat the dismissal as an "adjudication upon the merits." Subsequently, the District Court rejected Alston's motion for reargument and reconsideration. Alston appeals both the orders dismissing his complaint and denying reconsideration.

II.

Alston's principal contention on appeal is that he should have been permitted to have discovery so as to comply with the fact-pleading standard imposed by the District Court. This Court has long recognized the importance of discovery in the successful prosecution of civil rights complaints. See Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 666 (3d Cir.1988) ("[I]n civil rights cases `much of the evidence can be developed only through discovery' of materials held by defendant officials." (quoting Frazier v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 785 F.2d 65, 68 (3d Cir.1986))). We acknowledge Alston's need for discovery to present his case, which we discuss more fully below. But, the lack of discovery was not the real barrier blocking Alston's path to relief. Rather, it was the stringent pleading standard presupposed by the parties and the District Court. Our discussion therefore begins by examining the District Court's requirement of factual specificity, which is in conflict with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)'s simplified notice pleading standard. We will then consider Alston's contention that the District Court should have presented an opportunity to amend the complaint before dismissing it with prejudice. Lastly, we will comment on the right to discovery in actions such as this.

A.

Jurisdiction was proper in the trial court based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Our review is predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We have plenary review of the District Court's grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir.1996). In considering this appeal from a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, we accept all allegations as true and attribute all reasonable inferences in favor of Alston. Thus, we will affirm the District Court's dismissal only if it appears that Alston could prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief. Id. at 65. We review the District Court's denial of reconsideration for abuse of discretion. Max's Seafood Café ex rel. Lou Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir.1999).

B.

The District Court tested Alston's complaint against a pleading requirement for civil rights cases based on our opinion in Darr v. Wolfe. The District Court observed that it was "well settled" that Third Circuit law requires civil rights plaintiffs to plead with particularity.⁵ We disagree.

Alston's § 1983 complaint should have been considered not under a heightened pleading requirement, but under the more liberal standards of notice pleading. Although once enforced in several circuits, including ours, a fact-pleading requirement for civil rights complaints has been rejected by the Supreme Court in no uncertain terms. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993). In Leatherman, the Court instructed that Rule 9's standard for averments of fraud and mistake should not be imported to the notice pleading standard of Rule 8, which requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. More recently, in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002), the Court reaffirmed its holding in Leatherman and stated that "Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited exceptions." Our Court of Appeals has recognized the Supreme Court's abrogation of a heightened pleading requirement for § 1983 actions. See Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 297 (3d Cir.2002) ("[T]he Court [has] explained that courts should narrowly interpret statutory language to avoid heightened pleadings standards."); Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 149 (3d Cir.1998) (observing that nothing more is required of § 1983 cases than the notice pleading requirement of Rule 8).

While our ruling in Darr, 767 F.2d at 80, is one of several decisions in which this Court imposed a higher bar for § 1983 pleadings, see, e.g., Frazier, 785 F.2d at 67; Ross v. Meagan, 638 F.2d 646, 650 (3d Cir.1981); Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 922 (3d Cir.1976), none of which have been expressly overruled, these...