Alston v. Robinson, Civ. No. K-89-1866

• Decision Date: 31 March 1992
• Docket Number: K-89-2415.,Civ. No. K-89-1866
• Citation: 791 F. Supp. 569
• Parties: John ALSTON, et al. v. Bishop L. ROBINSON, Secretary, etc., et al. BARTHOLOMEY, et al. v. Bishop L. ROBINSON, Secretary, etc., et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

791 F. Supp. 569

John ALSTON, et al. v. Bishop L. ROBINSON, Secretary, etc., et al.

BARTHOLOMEY, et al. v. Bishop L. ROBINSON, Secretary, etc., et al.

Civ. Nos. K-89-1866, K-89-2415.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

March 31, 1992.

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Witold J. Walczak, Pittsburgh, Pa., and Emily M. Rody, Baltimore, Md., for plaintiffs.

J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. of Maryland, and Lawrence H. Norton, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Maryland, for defendants in Civ. No. K-89-1866.

J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. of Maryland, and Maureen M. Dove, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Maryland, for defendants in Civ. No. 89-2415.

FRANK A. KAUFMAN, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiffs in the within actions are inmates at Patuxent Institution (Patuxent), a Maryland prison facility, who challenge the constitutionality of the December 1, 1988 suspension of Patuxent's work release and leave programs, the revocation of certain Patuxent inmates' work release statuses and/or the application to some of those inmates of certain March 20, 1989 amendments to Patuxent's enabling legislation.

Plaintiffs in Alston v. Robinson were all participants in Patuxent's work release program prior to December 1, 1988.¹ They sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983², and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, seeking declaratory, injunctive³ and monetary relief⁴ against the Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services and officials at Patuxent.⁵ Plaintiffs contend that the procedures employed by state officials to suspend their work release statuses and to determine whether to reinstate plaintiffs violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and that the decisions not to reinstate plaintiffs' work release statuses⁶ were arbitrary and capricious, also in violation of the Due Process Clause. Plaintiffs further claim that the decisions of certain of defendants to suspend and not to reinstate plaintiffs' work release statuses, and the 1989 Maryland law, Act of Mar. 20, 1989, ch. 6, 1989 Md.Laws 1218, which conferred upon the Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services sole authority to determine plaintiffs' reinstatement, violate the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution.⁷

Plaintiffs in Bartholomey v. Robinson⁸ were inmates who were, on or before March 20, 1989, either "eligible" for treatment at Patuxent, or physically present at Patuxent while being evaluated or awaiting evaluation for eligibility at Patuxent. Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, the Bartholomey plaintiffs seek to enjoin⁹ and have declared violative of the ex post facto clause the retroactive application of certain provisions of the 1989 amendments to Patuxent's enabling statute which plaintiffs claim make more difficult the securing of parole, work release and leaves of absence than was the case at the time of their offenses or their admission to Patuxent.¹⁰ Plaintiffs in Bartholomey claim that the retrospective application of the following 1989 amendments¹¹ to Article 31B of the Maryland Code is ex post facto and therefore unconstitutional: (1) § 6(c)(2) which requires that seven members of the Board of Review approve all decisions granting parole, work release or leaves of absence; (2) § 11(b)(2) which states that the Board of Review "may," rather than "shall," grant parole upon its determination of certain factors; (3) §§ 11(c) and 10(b), which provide that the Board of Review shall give victims notice of the possible parole, work release or leave of absence of their offender and a reasonable opportunity to comment upon that possible furlough before the Board decides to grant such liberty; and (4) the state's policy of authorizing and/or requiring, under Article 41, § 4-104(c) and Act of Mar. 20, 1989, ch. 6, 1989 Md.Laws 1218, the Secretary to review and approve all of the Board's decisions to grant work release or leave.¹²

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Bartholomey action was commenced on August 23, 1989. Thereafter, the parties in Bartholomey filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the basis of stipulated facts and agreed that there are no genuine issues of material fact remaining. On June 23, 1989, plaintiffs in Alston filed their complaint and moved for a preliminary injunction reinstating them into the Patuxent work release program and restoring to them all of the privileges which they enjoyed prior to December 1, 1988. This Court, on October 11, 1989, determined to hold that motion sub curia. Defendants in Alston filed a motion for summary judgment on August 2, 1989, and then a supplemental motion for summary judgment on August 23, 1989, after plaintiffs amended their complaint on August 14, 1989.

In September and October of 1989, twenty-three of the original twenty-eight Alston plaintiffs filed timely individual Appeals and Petitions for Reversal of Administrative Agency Action, pursuant to Maryland's Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Md. State Gov't Code Ann., § 10-215, et seq., in the Circuit Court for Howard County, Maryland. In that state court action, certain of the Alston plaintiffs questioned Secretary Robinson's decision not to reinstate them into Patuxent's work release program, on the grounds that that decision was based upon factors related to retribution and general deterrence, in violation of the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution, and Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and also was arbitrary and capricious and an ultra vires act, in violation of Maryland law.

Secretary Robinson, moving to dismiss those appeals to the Howard County Circuit Court, asserted that Maryland's Administrative Procedure Act did not confer subject matter jurisdiction on that state court to consider those appeals because the reinstatement proceedings before the Secretary were not "contested cases" within the meaning of § 10-201 of the Act.¹³ On December 6, 1989, the twenty-three plaintiffs, whose Howard County cases had been consolidated and styled, Holmes v. Robinson, in opposing the Secretary's motion to dismiss, maintained that their action was a "contested case" over which the state court had jurisdiction because "Patuxent's regulations and the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Maryland Constitutions all require that the determination to revoke or continue work release be made after a hearing."¹⁴ In their opposition to the Secretary's motion to dismiss, the Holmes appellants contended that under the due process clauses of both the United States and Maryland Constitutions, "Patuxent's regulations, work release agreements signed by Appellants and the Institution, past practices and explicit institutional policy pronouncements created a protected `liberty interest' in remaining on work release ... which could not be taken away without procedural protections, including a hearing."¹⁵

On February 7, 1990, the Circuit Court for Howard County granted the Secretary's motion to dismiss in a summary Order concluding that Maryland's Administrative Procedure Act did not confer jurisdiction on that court to review the Secretary's reinstatement decisions. On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, the twenty-three Alston plaintiffs argued that both Patuxent's regulations and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution required an agency hearing to be held before their work release status could be revoked and that their appeal, therefore, concerned a "contested case."

On August 30, 1990, in Holmes v. Robinson, 84 Md.App. 144, 578 A.2d 294 (1990), the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the Circuit Court's decision, holding that neither Maryland statutory law nor the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution entitled appellants to a hearing regarding the reinstatement of their work release status, and that the Secretary's reviews of appellants' work release statuses were not "contested cases" over which the state court had jurisdiction. In reaching those conclusions, the Court of Special Appeals specifically held that appellants' work release status was not a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. The Court of Appeals denied appellants' quest for certiorari review on January 4, 1991. Holmes v. Robinson, 321 Md. 501, 583 A.2d 275 (1991).

Focusing upon the pending state administrative agency proceedings, namely Secretary Robinson's review of the reinstatement of the Alston plaintiffs, defendants asked this Court on August 29, 1989, to abstain on Younger v. Harris¹⁶ grounds. Plaintiffs opposed such abstention. However, on December 20, 1989, this Court, with the agreement of counsel on both sides, ordered the Alston action in this Court stayed until final resolution of the claims asserted in Holmes.¹⁷ In so doing, this Court indicated that it preferred to permit state law to develop and be finalized within the state executive, administrative and judicial departments because those state law developments (1) might otherwise occur subsequent to a decision of this Court and thereby necessitate a remand to this Court by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit or the Supreme Court of the United States; (2) might obviate the need for one or more federal constitutional issue rulings by this Court; or (3) might narrow any federal constitutional issues remaining for this Court's adjudication.¹⁸ After the Court of Appeals of Maryland denied appellants' petition for a writ of certiorari on January 4, 1991, defendants in Alston, asserting the bar of that decision and without waiving their previously stated grounds for summary judgment, moved on March 8, 1991, for summary judgment as to all of the claims of the Alston plaintiffs which are based upon a constitutionally protected liberty interest in work release arising from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States...