Alter v. Cnty. of San Diego
| Docket Number | Case No.: 21-cv-01709-LL-KSC |
| Decision Date | 18 October 2022 |
| Citation | 635 F.Supp.3d 1048 |
| Parties | Alan ALTER, BY AND THROUGH his brother and guardian ad litem, Mark ALTER, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO and Does 1-10, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
Joseph Mark McMullen, Law Offices of Joseph M. McMullen, San Diego, CA, Michael R. Marrinan, Law Offices of Michael R. Marrinan, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff.
Matthew Patrick O'Sullivan, Ronald Lenert, County of San Diego Office of County Counsel, San Diego, CA, Sarah H. Lanham, Pyle Sims Duncan & Stevenson, San Diego, CA, for Defendant County of San Diego.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Pending before the Court is Defendant County of San Diego's ("County") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Alan Alter's ("Alter") Complaint. ECF No. 13. The Motion has been fully briefed and is suitable for submission without oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is DENIED.
On September 30, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against the County of San Diego alleging two causes of action. ECF No. 1. The first cause of action is "Municipal Liability - Unlawful Policies and Practices (42 U.S.C § 1983)" and the second cause of action is "Professional Negligence." Id. On October 25, 2021, the Honorable Gonzalo P. Curiel granted Plaintiff's Ex Parte Petition for Appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem for Plaintiff in this action. ECF No. 6. Plaintiff's brother, Mark Alter, was appointed to serve as his guardian ad litem in this action. Id. On January 12, 2022, this case was transferred from Judge Curiel to the undersigned District Judge. ECF No. 9. On July 8, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. ECF No. 13. On July 29, 2022, Plaintiff filed an Opposition, and on August 5, 2022, Defendant filed a Reply in support of the Motion to Dismiss. ECF Nos. 14, 15.
Plaintiff alleges that:
[He] spent approximately 20 years involuntarily confined as a 'mentally disordered offender,' also known as an 'MDO,' as a result of mistakes made by the County of San Diego, through its public defender offices. Although Alter suffers from significant mental illness, he never should have been classified for 'MDO' status. Specifically, Alter was convicted of a crime that did not qualify under the controlling statutory framework for involuntary MDO commitment. In other words, if his appointed counsel had reviewed the statutory list of qualifying offenses (and raised that with the court), Alter would have been released in early 2000 - at the conclusion of his parole. Alternatively, if one of Alter's attorneys had raised this issue at any of his MDO hearings over the ensuing eighteen years, Alter would have been released years before he was released, on January 7, 2021.
Plaintiff further alleges that:
[He] is a 71 year-old Viet Nam Veteran who has a severe mental illness that dates back to 1975 when he was discharged from the Marine Corps after serving in combat in Viet Nam . . . In 1987, Alter pleaded guilty to one count of a felony violation of Penal Code section 452, subdivision (c), which is the crime of recklessly causing a fire of structure or forest land. He was placed on probation, violated probation, and, in 1996, was sentenced to two years in state prison. With credit for time already served, he was soon eligible for parole. At the end of his prison term, Alter was erroneously committed to Atascadero State Hospital, as a 'mentally disordered offender' ("MDO") under Penal Code section 2962. As a result, he served his parole in a locked facility, Atascadero State Hospital.
Id. ¶¶ 10, 11.
On January 13, 2000, a "hospital extension hearing" was held after the District Attorney filed a petition under Penal Code § 2970 to extend Plaintiff's involuntary commitment for one year past the termination of his parole. Id. ¶ 13. At the hearing, Plaintiff was represented by a deputy public defender employed by Defendant County. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the court was not informed that he was not eligible for extended involuntary commitment under the MDO statute. Id. Consequently, Plaintiff's commitment was extended for one year. Id. Thereafter, Plaintiff received annual "hospital extension hearings" from 2000-2018 on whether to extend his involuntary commitment for another year, pursuant to the MDO statute. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiff alleges that "Alter's assigned public defenders1 did not review the relevant statute, and thus were unaware that Alter's criminal offense did not make him eligible for involuntary commitment under the MDO statute," and as a result, Plaintiff spent approximately twenty years erroneously confined in a locked state hospital. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that it was not until 2018 that a newly-assigned alternate public defender realized that Plaintiff's criminal conviction did not make him eligible for involuntary commitment under the MDO statute. Id. ¶ 16. Accordingly, Plaintiff's attorney filed a motion to dismiss the 2018 MDO extension petition, which was denied on January 4, 2019. Id. After the Office of the Alternate Public Defender conflicted off the case, on July 19, 2019, the court appointed a criminal defense attorney in private practice to represent Plaintiff at his upcoming MDO hearing. Id.
On October 1, 2020, Plaintiff's new attorney filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus asserting ineffective assistance of counsel by the County's attorneys. Id. ¶ 17. Thereafter, on November 16, 2020, the Superior Court issued an Order to Show Cause finding that the habeas petition established a prima facie case for relief because Plaintiff's conviction did not qualify for MDO status or involuntary confinement. Id. Instead of filing a response, on January 7, 2021, the District Attorney moved to dismiss the pending petitions for extension of Plaintiff's involuntary commitment. Id. After the court granted the motion, Plaintiff was released from custody. Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the defense that the complaint "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted," generally referred to as a motion to dismiss. The Court evaluates whether a complaint states a cognizable legal theory and sufficient facts pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Although Rule 8 "does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' " it does require "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" is insufficient. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.' " Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955).
"When ruling on the motion to dismiss, the court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint, documents relied upon but not attached to the complaint when authenticity is not contested, and matters of which the court takes judicial notice." Joseph v. Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 495 F. Supp. 3d 953, 958 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (citing Lee v. L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001)), aff'd, 857 Fed.Appx. 297 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 142 S. Ct. 2711, 212 L.Ed.2d 780 (2022). In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts "accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Nonetheless, courts do not "accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)). The Court also need not accept as true allegations that contradict matter properly subject to judicial notice or allegations contradicting the exhibits attached to the complaint. Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988.
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). A claim is facially plausible when the facts pleaded "allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). That is not to say that the claim must be probable, but there must be "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Additionally, a court "will dismiss any claim that, even when construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, fails to plead sufficiently all required elements of a cause of action." Student Loan Mktg. Ass'n v. Hanes, 181 F.R.D. 629, 634 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
When a motion to dismiss is granted, "leave to amend should be granted 'unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.' " DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) ). The Court may deny leave to amend where an amendment would be futile. DeSoto, 957 F.2d at 658 (citation omitted).
Defendants argue that "Plaintiff's...
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