Althaus v. Evansville Courier Co.

Decision Date08 June 1993
Docket NumberNo. 82A01-9212-CV-400,82A01-9212-CV-400
Citation615 N.E.2d 441
Parties21 Media L. Rep. 1659 Charles R. ALTHAUS, In His Capacity as Coroner of Vanderburgh County, Indiana, Appellant-Defendant, v. The EVANSVILLE COURIER COMPANY, Appellee-Plaintiff.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Joseph H. Harrison, Jr., Bowers, Harrison, Kent & Miller, Evansville, for appellant-defendant.

Terry Noffsinger, Noffsinger, Price, Bradley & Shively, Evansville, for appellee-plaintiff.

BAKER, Judge.

Today we are asked to determine what information a coroner may and must disclose. Our examination arises from an interlocutory appeal brought by defendant-appellant Charles Althaus, in his capacity as Coroner of Vanderburgh County (the Coroner), challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, motion for summary judgment. Opposing the Coroner is The Evansville Courier Company (the Newspaper). After concluding that (1) its denial of the Coroner's motions involved a substantial question of law, and (2) the early resolution of the legal issues would promote a more orderly disposition of the case, the trial court certified for interlocutory appeal the following issue: 1

Whether IND.CODE 36-2-14-18 [the Coroner's Statute] sets forth a special rule applicable to coroners within this state which: (1) specifies the information which the coroner is required to make available (A) for public inspection, (B) to the next of kin, and (C) to insurance companies investigating a claim, despite the discretion previously given coroners and other public officials under IND.CODE 5-14-3-4(b) to completely withhold information under certain circumstances, and (2) limits a coroner's authority to make any information beyond that so specified available to anyone.

Record at 98.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The material facts in this case are undisputed. On February 24, 1992, an Evansville police officer, James Gibson, Jr., was found dead in his home. Later that day, the Coroner ordered a physician to conduct an autopsy on Gibson's body.

About two weeks later during a news conference, the Coroner declared Gibson committed suicide by overdosing on prescription drugs. Gibson's widow, however, disputed the accuracy of the Coroner's declaration during an ensuing press conference. On March 11, 1992, in an effort to aid its investigation of the developing controversy, the Newspaper served a document request upon the Coroner, asking for "[a]ny and all reports or documents, including autopsy reports and results of all toxicology tests, concerning the death of James Gibson, Jr.,...." Record at 41. The next day, the Coroner formally refused the Newspaper's document request.

Approximately one month later, on April 9, 1992, the Newspaper sued the Coroner to compel him to release a copy of Gibson's autopsy report. In response, the Coroner filed a motion to dismiss the Newspaper's complaint and, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied both motions and, in conjunction with its denials and at the parties' request, entered extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law. In relevant part, the trial court concluded:

3. Section 4 of the Access to Public Records Act allows the exception of "investigatory records of law enforcement agencies" from the [Access to Public Records] Act at the discretion of the public agency.

4. An "investigatory record" is defined as being "information compiled in the course of the investigation of a crime."

6. The Coroner has come forward with no evidence as required by the [Access to Public Records] Act which would link the records of James Gibson, Jr. to an investigation of a crime, nor has in camera review of the autopsy records revealed any such possible criminal investigations.

9. [O]n its face, [the Coroner's Statute] merely provides that despite the investigatory records exception, the Coroner must release, at a minimum, the information set forth in this statute. The statute in no manner limits the Coroner's discretion to provide other relevant or pertinent information.

10. Once the Coroner proves his record falls within one of the categories for exempted records ... and establishes the content of the record with adequate specificity, the party seeking access 11. The Coroner has yet to show this court that the autopsy report falls under the exempted record section as a record of a criminal investigation....

of the public record has the burden of proof to show the denial of access was arbitrary or capricious.

13. The court hereby finds that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether or not the record in question is an investigatory record compiled in the course of an investigation of a crime, and whether or not the denial of public access was arbitrary or capricious.

Record at 86-88. Thereafter, upon the Coroner's motion, the trial court certified this case for interlocutory appeal.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION
A. Standard of Review

The trial court entered special findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its denials of both the Coroners' motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment. In doing so, the trial court considered matters outside the pleadings, and thus, we treat the Coroner's motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. Ind.Trial Rule 12(C).

Specific findings and conclusions are not required by Ind.Trial Rule 56, but neither are they prohibited. P.M.S. v. Jakubowski (1992), Ind.App., 585 N.E.2d 1380, 1381 n. 1. Normally, the requested entry of specific findings and conclusions triggers the appellate standard of review contained in Ind.Trial Rule 52, which requires us to reverse the trial court's judgment only if the findings or conclusions are clearly erroneous. On the other hand, we will affirm a trial court's judgment on any legal theory supported by the record and this standard is not affected by the entry of specific findings and conclusions. Id. T.R. 52 applies only to those cases which proceed to trial, not those cases disposed of in summary proceedings. Although our review of the denial of summary judgment is aided when the trial court enters specific findings and conclusions, the trial court's entry does not affect our standard of review. Id.

B. Statutory Interpretation

This case presents a pure question of statutory interpretation and thus, in construing the three statutes involved herein, we are governed by some familiar rules. There is a strong presumption that the legislature did not enact a useless provision. Hinshaw v. Board of Commissioners of Jay County (1993), Ind., 611 N.E.2d 637, 638. We also presume that in enacting a particular piece of legislation, the legislature is aware of existing statutes covering the same subject. Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Commission v. Osco Drug (1982), Ind.App., 431 N.E.2d 823, 833. When we consider two or more statutes relating to the same general subject matter, we read the statutes in pari materia, and we try to construe them together so as to produce a harmonious system. Id. In this respect, when we consider two or more statutes on the same subject, we attempt to give effect to both; if, however, the statutes are repugnant in any of their provisions, then the more recent statute will control and operate to repeal the former to the extent of the repugnancy. Id. Similarly, where one statute covers a particular subject in general terms and another statute covers the same subject in a more detailed or specific manner, then we will first attempt to harmonize the statutes, but if the statutes are irreconcilably conflicting, the more detailed statute prevails as to the subject it covers. Id. With the above rules of statutory interpretation in mind, we now consider the relevant statutory scheme.

1. The Indiana Access to Public Records Act

The Indiana Access to Public Records Act (the Sunshine Law), 2 codified at IND.CODE 5-14-3-1 et seq., allows any person to inspect and copy the records of any public agency. Subject to certain exceptions It is the public policy of the state that all persons are entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of those who represent them as public officials and employees. This chapter shall be liberally construed to implement this policy and place the burden of proof for the nondisclosure of a public record on the public agency that would deny access to the record and not on the person seeking to inspect and copy the record.

the Sunshine Law provides in part:

The Sunshine Law clearly indicates that the public is to have access to the public records of the government officials who represent the citizenry. Because county coroners are elected government officials, IND.CODE 36-2-14-2, the general rule is that a coroner's official records are subject to public disclosure pursuant to the Sunshine Law.

In 1989, the Indiana Legislature limited the impact of the Sunshine Law as it pertains to coroners. It enacted IND.CODE 36-2-14-18 (the Coroner's Statute), which specifically addressed the subject of which information, exactly, a coroner must disclose and which it has the discretion to withhold. The Coroner's Statute provides:

(a) Notwithstanding IC 5-14-3-4(b)(1) (the Investigatory Records exception, infra ), when a coroner investigates a death, the office of the coroner is required to make available for public inspection and copying the following:

(1) The name, age, address, sex, and race of the deceased.

(2) The address where the dead body was found, or if there is no address the location where the dead body was found and, if different, the address where the death occurred, or if there is no address the location where the death occurred.

(3) The name of the agency to which the death was reported and the name of the person reporting the death.

(4) The name of any public official or governmental employee present at the scene of the death and the name of the person...

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