Alton Land Trust v. Town of Alton
| Decision Date | 12 October 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-1212,84-1212 |
| Parties | ALTON LAND TRUST and Cedar Mountain Development Corporation, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. TOWN OF ALTON, et al., Defendants, Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
David K. Pinsonneault, Nashua, N.H., with whom Winer, Pillsbury & Bennett, Nashua, N.H., was on brief, for plaintiffs, appellants.
Alan R. Kusinitz, Manchester, N.H., with whom Wiggin & Nourie, Manchester, N.H., Walter L. Mitchell, Nighswander, Martin, Kidder & Mitchell, Laconia, N.H., were on brief, for defendants, appellees.
Before CAMPBELL, Chief Judge, COWEN, * Senior Circuit Judge, and BOWNES, Circuit Judge.
Alton Land Trust ("Trust") and Cedar Mountain Development Corporation ("Cedar") bring this appeal from a decision of the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire granting a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) that the appellee Town of Alton ("Town") had filed. Appellants claim that the Town violated their rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments by unreasonably denying their applications for subdivision, and that they are therefore entitled to damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.
According to allegations in the complaint, the Trust had formerly owned a parcel of land in the town of Alton, New Hampshire, upon which Cedar held an option to purchase. Cedar intended to exercise its option and build condominiums on the tract, and pursuant to applicable local regulations, submitted subdivision and resubdivision plans to appellee Alton Planning Board ("Board") in February 1978. Appellants do not question the validity of the ordinance under which the applications were required to be submitted. Local opposition to Cedar's project developed during the summer of 1978. In September 1978, the Board declared a moratorium on Cedar's applications pending action by the town council on a proposed ordinance regulating development on steep slopes. Counsel for the Town later advised the Board that the moratorium was improper.
During the succeeding 13 months, Cedar allegedly faced a series of stumbling blocks placed by the Board in the path of its subdivision application, including the Board's failure to follow its own procedures, the imposition of additional requirements and requests for modifications and clarifications of Cedar's proposal, and the holding of meetings on Cedar's plan without notifying appellants. On October 4, 1979, the Board unanimously disapproved Cedar's proposal.
Appellants then appealed to the Belknap County Superior Court under N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. 36:34(v), which provides that a reviewing court "may reverse ... when the Court is persuaded by the balance of probabilities ... that [a planning board's] decision is unreasonable." The court-appointed master found that the Board's denial of Cedar's application was indeed unreasonable and ordered that it be reversed. However, the master also found that the Board had acted in good faith, attributing its treatment of Cedar's application to the newness and complexity of the problems it presented. The superior court approved the master's findings in April 1982, as did the New Hampshire Supreme Court in June 1982, on an appeal taken by appellees. But appellants' victory was to no avail, as the Trust lost its tract and Cedar lost its option by foreclosure in October 1982.
Appellants claim that the actions of appellees were unreasonable and arbitrary, depriving them of their property in violation of their fourteenth amendment right to procedural and substantive due process. Appellants further assert that appellees deprived them of their property without just compensation in violation of their rights under the taking clause of the fifth amendment. The district court ruled that appellants had not stated a cause of action on the facts alleged. We agree with the court's analysis and its conclusions.
Appellants were not denied due process. New Hampshire law provided them with the right to appeal to the courts from the Board's denial of a permit. When they appealed, their contentions were heard and, indeed, relief was ordered in their favor. It is true that judicial correction took time, but the passage of time is an inevitable part of procedural due process. Expense and collateral injury may...
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