Alvarado v. Hickman, 00-56770.

Citation316 F.3d 841
Decision Date18 December 2002
Docket NumberNo. 00-56770.,00-56770.
PartiesMichael ALVARADO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. R.Q. HICKMAN, Warden, Acting Warden of Mule Creek State Prison, Respondent-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Tara K. Allen, Malibu, CA, for the petitioner-appellant.

Deborah J. Chuang, Deputy Attorney General, Los Angeles, CA, for the respondent-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; Virginia A. Phillips, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-00-00326-VAP/E.

Before: SCHROEDER, Chief Judge, CUDAHY,* and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge.

Michael Alvarado was convicted of second degree murder and attempted robbery and is currently serving a 15-year to life sentence in California state prison. Alvarado's conviction was obtained primarily based on statements he made during a two-hour interrogation that occurred when he was 17 years old. Alvarado now seeks a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was deprived of his Fifth Amendment rights in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The district court denied Alvarado's request for relief. Our review of this case is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which permits us to grant a federal writ of habeas corpus only if the underlying state court decision is either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

In Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224 (1948), the Supreme Court established the legal principle that juvenile defendants are, in general, more susceptible to police coercion than adults; as such, due process demands that a defendant's juvenile status be taken into consideration when determining the proper procedural safeguards that attach to a custodial interrogation. Id. at 599-601, 68 S.Ct. 302. During the last half century, the Court has consistently reaffirmed this principle. See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 693, 113 S.Ct. 1745, 123 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 8 L.Ed.2d 325 (1962). To date, the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of how a defendant's juvenile status modifies an "in custody" determination for the purposes of Miranda. However, Haley and its progeny are highly instructive precedents to the case now before us. If a juvenile is more susceptible to police coercion during a custodial interrogation, then the same juvenile is also more susceptible to the impression that he is, in fact, in custody in the first instance.

In this case, the California Court of Appeal identified the correct legal standard for making an "in custody" determination. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995) (stating that an "in custody" determination requires an inquiry into whether "a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave").1 But the California Court of Appeal (and the district court upon habeas review) failed to address how Alvarado's juvenile status, including the involvement of his parents at the behest of the police, affected the "in custody" determination. Relevant Supreme Court precedents lead us to conclude that Alvarado's youth and inexperience with the police are simply too important to be ignored. Moreover, on the facts of this case, proper consideration of this additional factor compels a different outcome, even under the highly deferential standard of review mandated by the AEDPA. We therefore REVERSE the judgment of the district court.

I.

The underlying facts of this case are not in dispute. On the night of September 22, 1995, a murder occurred at a shopping mall in Santa Fe Springs, California. Approximately one month later, Sheriff's Detective Cheryl Comstock contacted the defendant's mother at her place of employment and informed her that police officials "needed" to speak to her son, Michael Alvarado. Alvarado's mother told Comstock that Michael's father would bring him to the Sheriff's station so he could be interviewed. Both Alvarado's mother and father accompanied their son to the Sheriff's station. However, they were refused permission to be present during the interview. When these events occurred, Alvarado was 17 years old, had no criminal history and had never been questioned by the police.

The interview, which was conducted exclusively by Comstock, lasted approximately two hours. During that time, Alvarado was not given a statement to sign indicating in any manner that he was participating voluntarily in the interview, nor was he advised of his Miranda rights. Alvarado initially offered an account of his activities on the night of the murder that did not include reference to the shooting or to the hiding of a gun (the most incriminating aspects of his subsequent statements). Comstock then expressed disbelief at Alvarado's version of events and informed him that she, in fact, had witnesses who said "quite the opposite." Shortly thereafter, Alvarado began to divulge details of the murder and of his role in hiding the murder weapon. Well into the course of the interview, and after Alvarado had started talking about the shooting and the hiding of the gun, Comstock made comments implying that Alvarado would be going home at the end of the interview. Alvarado's statements during the interview were admitted into evidence at trial. Alvarado later took the witness stand in his own defense.

Alvarado was convicted of second degree murder and attempted robbery in a jury trial. His conviction was subsequently affirmed by the California Court of Appeal on September 13, 1999. In both the trial court and on appeal, Alvarado raised his age as a relevant factor in the Miranda analysis. Unfortunately, the decision of the California Court of Appeal did not specifically discuss whether Alvarado's juvenile status altered the Miranda analysis. Instead, the court concluded that "a reasonable person under the circumstances in which Alvarado was questioned would have felt free to leave. The interrogation was not custodial and no Miranda warnings were required." Soto, No. 97DA2213, slip op. at 18. From the face of the opinion, it does not appear that Alvarado's age and inexperience with the police were included as part of the "in custody" analysis. In October 1999, Alvarado filed a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court, which was denied on December 15, 1999.

On March 6, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in the district court. On July 5, 2000, a magistrate judge issued a report recommending that the district court dismiss the petition with prejudice. Applying a totality of circumstances standard for determining whether Alvarado was in custody, the magistrate judge concluded that a reasonable person during the interrogation would have felt free to leave; therefore, Alvarado was not "in custody" during the interview.

On August 8, 2000, the district court adopted the magistrate's report and recommendation and denied Alvarado's petition. The district court also denied Alvarado's request for a certificate of appealability. On December 6, 2000, this court granted Alvarado's certificate of appealability with respect to one issue: "whether statements made by defendant were erroneously admitted by the trial court in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)."

II.

A denial of a writ of habeas corpus presents a question of law that is reviewed de novo, though factual findings will be reviewed for clear error. See Hartman v. Summers, 120 F.3d 157, 160-61 (9th Cir.1997); Perez v. Marshall, 119 F.3d 1422, 1425-26 (9th Cir.1997). A determination whether an individual is "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda warnings "is really a mixed question of law and fact, which is subject to de novo review by appellate courts"; however, the "state trial court's answers to the `scene-and action-setting questions' (i.e., the underlying factual questions) still are entitled to a presumption of correctness." Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 972 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Thompson, 516 U.S. at 111-12), 116 S.Ct. 457).

This case is, of course, a collateral appeal filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2253, 2254. Several years ago, the AEDPA modified these statutory sections and made more deferential the standard of review to be applied by a federal court in examining the claims of a prisoner under judgment of a state court. In this circuit, review of a habeas petition under the AEDPA requires a two-stage inquiry. The first question is "whether the state court erred at all." Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 578 (9th Cir.2000) (citing Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1155 (9th Cir.2000)). If the answer is yes, then we apply the AEDPA standard of review, which inquires whether the state court's "error" was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as defined in the precedents of the U.S. Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Van Tran, 212 F.3d at 1155 ("Requiring federal courts to first determine whether the state court's decision was erroneous, prior to considering whether it was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of controlling law under AEDPA, promotes clarity in our own constitutional jurisprudence and also provides guidance for state courts, which can look to our decisions for their persuasive value."). We now address in order the two stages of this...

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