Alvarado v. Table Mountain Rancheria

Decision Date29 November 2007
Docket NumberNo. 06-15351.,06-15351.
Citation509 F.3d 1008
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
PartiesPearl ALVARADO; Elishia Arenas; Mario Arenas, Jr.; Danny Daniels; Kathleen Davis; Chreyl Duran; Jeanine Gonzales; Diane Grigsby; Wayne Grigsby; Paula Gutierrez; Chad Elliott Lewis; Cheryl Lewis; Clifford Lewis; Donald Lewis; Jerry Lee Lewis; Kathy Lynnette Lewis; Kevin Lewis; Larry Paul Lewis, Jr.; Lisa Lewis; Louella Lewis; Regina Lewis; Trina Lewis-Davis; Carl Mekealian; Connie Mekealian; Jennifer Mekealian; Lori Mekealian; Mike Mekealian; Yvonne Mekealian; Alex Montgomery; Cliff Montgomery; Francine Montgomery; Vincent Moreno; Valentina Oliver; Darren Sorondo, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. TABLE MOUNTAIN RANCHERIA, doing business as Table Mountain Rancheria Association; Lewis Barnes; William Walker; Aaron Jones; Carolyn Walker; Twila Burrough; Leanne Walker Grant; Craig Martinez; Robbie Castro; Ray Barnes; Vern Castro; Dirk Kempthorne,<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL> in his official capacity as the Secretary of the Dept. of Interior; United States of America, Defendants-Appellees.

Brian C. Leighton, Clovis, CA, for the appellants.

Paula M. Yost, Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal, San Francisco, CA; Timothy S. Jones, Sagaser, Franson & Jones, Fresno, CA; Sue Ellen Wooldridge, Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., Katherine J. Barton, (argued), David B. Glazer and Elizabeth A. Peterson, Department of Justice Environment & Natural Resources Division, Washington, D.C., for the appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California; Marilyn H. Patel, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-05-00093-MHP.

Before: ARTHUR L. ALARCÓN, DAVID R. THOMPSON, and RICHARD C. TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.

ALARCÓN, Circuit Judge:

Appellants appeal from the district court's order dismissing their complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Appellants are individuals who unsuccessfully petitioned the Table Mountain Tribal Council for admission to the Table Mountain Rancheria, an Indian tribe. Their complaint sought an order compelling the Table Mountain Rancheria to admit them as members. The district court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Appellants' claims because this case was indistinguishable from those in which tribal immunity precludes federal court jurisdiction over tribal membership disputes. In so holding, the district court rejected Appellants' attempts to establish subject matter jurisdiction.

Appellants contend that this case is distinguishable from those in which tribal immunity precludes jurisdiction. They claim that immunity does not apply because their claims do not involve tribal membership disputes. Instead, they purport to assert a collateral attack on the judgment in Table Mountain Rancheria Association et al. v. James Watt, Secretary of the Interior, No. C-80-4595-MHP. Also, they argue that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction by virtue of its ancillary authority to enforce the Watt settlement agreement, and that the tribal Appellees' immunity is waived because of their participation in Watt. In passing, Appellants assert that the district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346.

We have appellate jurisdiction over this timely appeal from the district court's final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm the judgment of dismissal. The district court properly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to order Appellees to admit Appellants as members of the Table Mountain Rancheria. We do not reach the issue of whether tribal immunity defeats Appellants' claims. Appellants' subject matter arguments suffer from a more fundamental flaw: Appellants have failed to establish that the district court has subject matter jurisdiction over their causes of action even if the Table Mountain Rancheria is not immune from suit.

I

In or around 1916, the United States purchased a parcel of land in Fresno County, California from private individuals, and thereafter held the land in trust for the Table Mountain Band of Indians. The land became known as the Table Mountain Rancheria ("TMR"), and was considered an Indian Reservation and "Indian Country" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1151.1 Rancheria residents were recognized as Indians for purposes of federal law.

On August 18, 1958, Congress enacted the California Rancheria Act, Pub.L. No. 85-671, 72 Stat. 619 (1958). The Rancheria Act, inter alia, authorized an exchange of title to Rancheria assets, and a promise that the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") would continue to provide essential benefits, such as irrigation and educational programs to Rancheria residents, if, in return, the TMR voluntarily relinquished its trust status, and the TMR's residents forfeited their Indian status.

A proposed plan for distribution of Rancheria land, drafted pursuant to the Rancheria Act, divided the Rancheria into parcels, most of which were to be conveyed to individual Rancheria residents. The remaining parcels were earmarked for the Rancheria water system, and were to be conveyed to a legal entity formed solely to receive the remaining parcels. Sometime after July 31, 1959, the proposed plan was approved. As a result, the Rancheria assets were distributed to the Table Mountain Rancheria Association ("TMRA")2 and individual residents. In addition, the Rancheria lost its trust status, and its residents lost their Indian status.

In 1980, the TMRA, several individuals who had forfeited their Indian status in return for Rancheria assets, along with several dependent members of their families, filed a putative class action, entitled Table Mountain Rancheria Association et al. v. James Watt, Secretary of the Interior, et al., No. C-80-4595-MHP ("Watt"), in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The Watt complaint named Clarence Jones, Lester Burrough, E.B. Barnes, Lewis Barnes, and William Walker as plaintiffs,3 and the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the United States, as defendants.

The named plaintiffs in the Watt action sought to certify two classes:

persons named in the distribution plan as distributees of [TMR] assets ..., or the[ir] Indian heir(s), assign(s), executor(s), administrator(s), or successor(s) in interest ... who, by reason of having been named as distributees ... were ... considered by the [federal] government ... to have lost their status as Indians under [federal law];

...

all Indian persons, other than distributees, who were named in the [TMR] distribution plan as dependents of distributees, and who, for that reason, were ... deemed by the United States ... to have lost their status as Indians under [federal law].

On April 11, 1983, the district court certified both classes.

The Watt plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to inform the Rancheria residents who approved the distribution plan of "the obligations of the United States under the Rancheria Act, the relative advantages and disadvantages of accepting termination, the options available to them under the Rancheria Act and the legal consequences of exercising those options." The Watt complaint further alleged that the Watt defendants "caus[ed] plaintiff dependents to be ineligible to receive federal services provided exclusively to Indians, and to enjoy other federal rights available to Indians, including such rights as having land held in trust for them." (Emphasis added).

The Watt complaint sought rescission of the distribution plan and a declaration "that the purported termination of the [plaintiffs'] Indian status ... and the trust ... status of the lands of the Table Mountain Rancheria ... is void ... and that plaintiff distributees [and dependents] have been and remain eligible to participate in all federal programs and benefits provided to Indians because of their status as Indians." (Emphasis added).

On March 28, 1983, the Watt parties stipulated to a settlement and judgment. The stipulation provided that the named plaintiffs

represent the class of persons certified as consisting of all persons named in the distribution plan of the Table Mountain Rancheria as distributees of the assets of said Rancheria, or the Indian heir(s), assign(s), executor(s), administrator(s), or successor(s) in interest thereof who, by reason of having participated in the distribution of the assets of said Rancheria at any time have been considered by the government of the United States or any other governmental entity to have lost their status as Indians under the laws of the United States.

(Emphasis added). The stipulation also required the Secretary of the Interior to list the Table Mountain Band of Indians as an Indian tribal entity under 25 C.F.R. Part 83.6(b), and permit any class member or successor who received title to an asset because of the 1959 distribution to "elect to restore any such interest [to] federal trust status" by conveying it to the United States for the benefit of the tribe. The Watt settlement further stated that "[t]he status of the named individual plaintiffs and class members as Indians under the laws of the United States is confirmed." The settlement provided that plaintiffs would dismiss their damages claims against the Secretary of the Interior and the United States.

The district court approved the stipulated settlement on June 16, 1983. The Watt court retained jurisdiction to enforce the judgment for one year after its date of entry.

On December 14, 1983, the Secretary of the Interior published a notice in the Federal Register, pursuant to 25 C.F.R. § 83.6(b), designating the TMR as a federally recognized "Indian tribal entity" eligible to receive services from the BIA. Indian Tribal Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 48 Fed.Reg. 56,862-02, 56,866 (Dec. 14, 1983)....

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