Alvarez v. SEM-CHI RICE PRODUCTS CORP., 1D02-3507.
| Citation | 861 So.2d 513 |
| Decision Date | 12 December 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D02-3507.,1D02-3507. |
| Parties | Modesto ALVAREZ, Appellant, v. SEM-CHI RICE PRODUCTS CORP. and RSKCO, Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Marcos R. Gonzalez and Randall T. Porcher, West Palm Beach; Marjorie Gadarian Graham, Palm Beach Gardens, for Appellant.
Kevin R. Clark and Michael A. Edwards, Edwards and Clark, P.A., West Palm Beach, for Appellees.
Claimant Modesto Alvarez seeks the reversal of the judge of compensation claims' ("JCC") denial of his workers compensation benefits arising from an automobile accident. The JCC denied the claim, ruling that "claimant's accident was not in the course and scope of his employment" because the claimant was merely returning home from work and was not performing a work-related task. The claimant argues that at the time of the accident the claimant was on a special errand that had a business purpose. We agree with the claimant, and therefore reverse.
At the time of the accident, the claimant had been employed by Sem-Chi Rice Products Corporation for 17 years. His normal working hours were from 6:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. during weekdays and until noon on Saturdays. During the harvest season, he would frequently work on Sundays. He is seventy years old and has a sixth grade education.
On the day of the accident, the claimant arrived at work around 6:00 a.m. and was scheduled to finish working at around 5:00 p.m. The claimant testified that at approximately 2:30 p.m., he received a telephone call from Klaus Sengelmann, the vice president and general manager of Sem-Chi Rice. Mr. Sengelmann instructed the claimant to go to the Senglemann residence in Wellington in order to assemble a computer table for Mrs. Senglemann. The claimant testified that Mr. Senglemann told the claimant to inform his immediate supervisor that Mr. Sengelmann had instructed the claimant to go to the Sengelmann house. The claimant had to obtain permission to leave the plant from his immediate supervisor. The claimant testified that he informed his supervisor as instructed, and his supervisor testified that the claimant told him he was going to the Sengelmann house at Mr. Sengelmann's request. The claimant testified that he had been asked to do personal jobs for Mr. Sengelmann while on the clock on multiple occasions.
The claimant testified that on the day of the accident he left the Sem-Chi Rice plant in Belle Glade at 3:15 or 3:20 p.m. When he arrived at the Senglemann home, he and Mrs. Sengelmann opened up a box that contained a computer table. The claimant looked at the manual and instructions for assembly of the table. After reviewing the manual, the claimant concluded that there was not enough time remaining for him to assemble the table. Consequently, the claimant informed Mrs. Sengelmann that it would be better for him to take the table home with him, assemble it and then return it to her the next day. It was his intention to keep the table in his trunk overnight, take it to work the next morning, assemble it at work, and then return it to Mrs. Senglemann by 10:00 a.m.
The claimant estimated that he left the Sengelmann home around 4:35 p.m. and was in an automobile accident approximately five minutes later while on his way home. The claimant lost consciousness and was injured in the accident. After the claimant arrived home from the hospital at approximately 11:00 p.m. that night, he asked his son-in-law to take the computer table that was in his car to the plant the next day and deliver it to Carlos Castillo, a plant employee, for assembly and delivery to Mrs. Senglemann by 10:00 a.m. Carlos Castillo confirmed that on the day following the accident someone brought a computer table in a box to his office. Mr. Castillo informed Mr. Senglemann that the box had been sent to him. Mr. Castillo testified that Mr. Sengelmann said that he did not know what box Mr. Castillo was talking about and said it was possibly a table that his wife had given as a gift to the claimant.
When the claimant returned to work sixteen days following the accident, the box containing the computer table was in his office. The claimant asked Mr. Sengelmann what had happened to Mrs. Sengelmann's table because it had not yet been assembled. The claimant testified that Mr. Sengelmann stated that he had no idea what the claimant was talking about. There is disputed testimony over whether claimant was "on the clock" when the accident occurred.1 Mr. Sengelmann testified that he did not instruct the claimant to go to his house to put a table together for his wife, and contended that the computer table was a gift. The claimant does not own a computer.
The JCC ruled that the factual dispute regarding the reason for Appellant's visit to the Sengelmann home on the day of the accident was irrelevant:
We agree with the JCC that if the computer table was a gift, then the claimant was not in the course and scope of his employment. However, under the facts and circumstances of this case, we hold that if the computer table was not a gift, and Mr. Sengelmann requested the claimant to assemble the table at his personal residence, then the accident was compensable. Accordingly, we reverse.
"As a general rule, injuries sustained by an employee when going to or coming from his regular place of work are not considered to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment." George v. Woodville Lumber Co., 382 So.2d 802, 803 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). This rule "is grounded in the recognition that injuries suffered while going to or coming from work are essentially similar to other injuries suffered off duty away from the employer's premises and, like those injuries, are usually not work related." Eady v. Med. Pers. Pool, 377 So.2d 693, 695 (Fla.1979). The principle is commonly known as the "going and coming rule" and is codified in section 440.092(2), Florida Statutes (1999), which provides that an injury suffered while going to or coming from work is not a compensable work related injury "unless the employee was engaged in a special errand or mission for the employer."
The instant case falls within the dual purpose and special errand exceptions to the going and coming rule. In Tampa Airport Hilton Hotel v. Hawkins, 557 So.2d 953 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), the claimant was employed as a banquet waitress at the Tampa Airport Hilton Hotel. At the employer's request, she returned to the employer's premises to attend a staff meeting called by the employer. Id. at 954. After the meeting ended, while on her direct route home from the meeting, the claimant was involved in an automobile accident. Id. On appeal, this court affirmed the JCC's findings that the accident was compensable because the purpose of the trip during which the claimant was injured served a business purpose for the employer as well as the personal convenience of the claimant. Id. at 955.
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