Alvarez v. United States

Decision Date30 December 2021
Docket Number20-1533C
CourtU.S. Claims Court
PartiesCINDY ALVAREZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
KATHRYN C. DAVIS JUDGE

Plaintiffs 55 current and former employees at the Federal Correctional Institution (" FCI") Mendota in Mendota California, filed a Complaint seeking "declaratory judgment, backpay, and other relief" for allegedly uncompensated work they performed for the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons. Pls.' Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1. Before the Court is the Government's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' action under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims ("RCFC") for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Also before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Notice of Supplemental Authority.

For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges facts sufficient to survive the Government's Motion, but the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain any claims or requests for relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act ("DJA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Consequently, the Government's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The Court has considered Plaintiffs' Notice of Supplemental Authority, attaching recent decisions in analogous suits pending in this court, and thus GRANTS Plaintiffs' uncontested motion f or leave to file the same.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory and Regulatory Background

Under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 251 et seq., qualifying employers are required to compensate at one and one-half times the employees' regular rate all non-exempt employees who worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 29 U.S.C. § 207; see 5 C.F.R. § 551.501. Employers who fail to comply with this provision of the FLSA are liable to their effected employees and may be sued to recover the unpaid overtime wages. 29 U.S.C. § 216.

"Activities performed either before or after the regular work shift . . . are compensable under the portal-to-portal provisions of the [FLSA] if those activities are an integral and indispensable part of the principal activities for which covered work m en are employed and a re not specifically excluded . . . ." Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956). The Supreme Court has held that "any activity that is integral and indispensable to a principal activity is itself a principal activity" under th e FL SA . IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U . S. 21, 37 (2005) (in tern al quotation marks omitted). However, activities that are merely "preliminary to or postliminary to s a id principal activity or activities" are not compensable. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2).

Work that is de minimis also is not compensable. See Bobo v. United States, 136 F.3d 1465, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("When the matter in issue concerns only a few seconds or minutes of work beyond the scheduled working hours, such trifles may be disregarded.") (quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 692 (1946))). Regulations promulgated by the Office of Personnel Management provide that an employee's preparatory or concluding activities that exceed 10 minutes per workday are not de minimis so long as they are "closely related to an employee's principal activities" and are "indispensable to the performance of the principal activities." 5 C.F.R. § 551.412(a)(1).

B. Factual Background

FCI Mendota is a medium security prison housing over 900 inmates. ECF No. 1 ¶ 8. The prison is staffed 24 hours per day, 365 days per y ear by correctional officers, including Plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 9. As correctional officers, Plaintiffs allege that their "primary job duty is to maintain the safety and security" of the prison. Id. Plaintiffs execute this duty at assigned posts throughout FCI Mendota, most of which are staffed for 16 or 24 hours per day in eight-hour shifts. Id. ¶¶ 10- 12. Plaintiffs allege that there is no scheduled overlap between the shifts at 16-hour and 18-hour posts. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. Because they are required to be at their assigned post with all necessary equipment and information by the start of their scheduled shift, Plaintiffs allege that fulfilling their primary duties causes them to work beyond their shift times. Id.

Specifically, Plaintiffs assigned to the 16-hour and 24-hour posts allegedly work an additional 15-30 minutes per shift performing uncompensated pre- and post-shift activities. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. Plaintiffs contend that their work day begins by clearing a COVID-19 health screening and then a staff security screening for the purpose of assuring no contraband enters the prison. Id. ¶¶ 20-21. After the security screen in g, Plaintiffs "collect and don their duty belts, protectivevests, and other required equipment." Id. ¶ 20. Additionally, Plaintiffs assigned to a 16-hour post a re required to collect further equipment and paperwork from the Control Center. Id. ¶ 22. Finally, Plaintiffs are admitted through a sally port, flip an "accountability chit" signifying they are on duty, pass through a slider gate, and walk to their assigned posts. Id. ¶¶ 23-24.

While walking to their posts, Plaintiffs allegedly check in with a supervisor at the Lieutenants' office and discuss information from the previous tour. ¶ 24. As Plaintiffs continue to their posts, they observe and correct inmate behavior, respond to inmate questions, check for security breaches and contraband, and respond to any emergencies that arise. Id. Plaintiffs aver that failure to respond to emergencies will result in disciplinary action and possible termination. Id. ¶ 29. Once at their posts, Plaintiffs inspect, account for, and exchange equipment as well as information with the outgoing officer. Id. ¶ 26. In addition, since the pandemic started, Plaintiffs assigned to quarantine housing units also put on personal protective equipment before entering the housing unit and performing the exchange. Id. After their shifts, Plaintiffs again exchange information and equipment with the oncoming officer, check for security breaches and contraband on their way back to the Control Center, and then return their equipment. Id. ¶ 28. Because of the pandemic, outgoing officers must sanitize their equipment before returning it to the Control Center. Id. ¶ 28. Plaintiffs claim that they have been wrongfully uncompensated for the time they spend performing these activities. Id. ¶ 36.

C. Procedural Background

On November 5, 2020, Plaintiffs commenced this action. Plaintiffs claim that, under the FLSA, they should be paid overtime compensation for the pre- and post-shift activities they performed outside their regular eight-hour work schedule and/or 40-hour work week for a period beginning November 5, 2017. Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiffs seek declaratory judgment, an accounting of the compensation to which they are entitled, monetary damages for unpaid compensation, along with attorneys' fees and any other just relief. Id. at 14 (Prayer for Relief).

On March 5, 2021, the Government moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to R CFC 12(b)(6). Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 7, ECF No. 8. In its Motion, the Government argues that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id. at 10, 31. Specifically, the Government argues that the pre- and post-shift activities th at Plaintiffs seek compensation for are not principal activities and, therefore, do not require compensation. Id. at 13. It also argues that the Complaint lacks factual allegations regarding the amount of time it takes to perform each pre- and post-shift activity and, thus, fails to demonstrate that Plaintiffs' claims meet the FLSA's de minimis threshold. See, e.g., id. at 15, n.1.

In response, Plaintiffs maintain that they have alleged facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Plaintiffs contend that the Government's argument to the contrary is premised on the erroneous application of case law and a mischaracterization of the nature of Plaintiffs' duties. Pls.' Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 22, 27, ECF No. 9.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Government moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' action under RCFC 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.[1] A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted "is appropriate when the facts asserted by the claimant do not entitle him to a legal remedy." Lindsay v. United States, 295 F.3d 1252, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2002). It is well established that a Plaintiffs' Complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see Cary v. United States, 552 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2009). A "plausible" complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations" but only enough detail "to raise a right of relief" beyond mere speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. To state a claim for relief under the FLSA, plaintiffs must allege facts that support their allegation th at "they have worked in excess of their applicable workweek under the statute, and that they have not been compensated at least one and one-half times their regular rate for those hours." Fed. Air Marshals v. United States, 84 Fed.Cl. 585, 592 (2008); see Whalen v. United States, 80 Fed. C l. 685, 688 (2008) (denying the Government's motion to dismiss because "[p]laintiffs' allegations fit comfortably within this template" set by the FLSA).

When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "all well-pled factual allegations" should be assumed by the Court as true and "all reasonable inferences [should be made] in favor of the...

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