Alvarez v. Williams

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: Justice LAVIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
• Citation: Alvarez v. Williams, 23 N.E.3d 544 (Ill. App. 2014)
• Decision Date: 10 December 2014
• Docket Number: No. 1–13–3443.,1–13–3443.
• Parties: Anita ALVAREZ, in Her Capacity as Cook County State's Attorney, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Kenneth J. WILLIAMS, in His Capacity as Thornton Township High School District 205 School Board President, Defendant–Appellant.

23 N.E.3d 544

Anita ALVAREZ, in Her Capacity as Cook County State's Attorney, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Kenneth J. WILLIAMS, in His Capacity as Thornton Township High School District 205 School Board President, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 1–13–3443.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

Dec. 10, 2014.

Andrew Finko, of Andrew Finko, P.C., of Chicago, for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Daniel F. Gallagher, Kent S. Ray, and Sisavanh B. Baker, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for appellee.

OPINION

Justice LAVIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 This interlocutory appeal arises from the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff Anita Alvarez, in her capacity as Cook County State's Attorney, in a quo warranto action, pursuant to section 18–101 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/18–101 (West 2012) ), against defendant Kenneth J. Williams. On appeal, defendant first contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because he is statutorily qualified to seek and hold public office under the Illinois Election Code (10 ILCS 5/1–1 et seq. (West 2012)) and School Code (105 ILCS 5/1–1 et seq. (West 2012)). Defendant also contends his due process rights were violated because the term “infamous crime” is vague, and therefore, violates the due process clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend.XIV). In addition, defendant contends that section 29–15 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/29–15 (West 2012) ) violates his equal protection rights under the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend.XIV) because there is a disparity in the eligibility requirements for convicted felons seeking to hold constitutional and legislatively created offices. Furthermore, defendant contends that his equal protections rights were violated by plaintiff's selective prosecution of defendant. Finally, defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting discovery. We affirm.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In April 2009, defendant was elected to the Board of Education for Thornton Township High School District 205 (Board) and was subsequently reelected in April 2012, attaining the position of Board president. Prior to defendant's reelection to the Board, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant alleging that a prior conviction (a 1985 Indiana felony forgery conviction on an accountability theory for which he served five years) constituted an infamous crime under section 29–15 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/29–15 (West 2012) ), rendering him ineligible to hold the office of a school board member. See Ind.Code Ann. § § 35–41–2–4, 35–43–5–2 (West 1984). The parties filed cross-motions on the pleadings. After briefing and argument, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's motion for default judgment and defendant's motion to dismiss. Defendant then filed his answer and affirmative defensives, drawing plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Defendant thereafter filed his response to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, along with his counsel's Rule 191(b) affidavit (Ill.S.Ct. R. 191(b) (eff. Jan. 4, 2013)), regarding anticipated evidence that would have been obtained through party discovery. Defendant also filed a cross-motion for summary judgment including two volumes of exhibits highlighting documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act (5 ILCS 140/1.1 et seq. (West 2012)). In October 2013, the trial court allowed oral argument on both motions for summary judgment and ruled in plaintiff's favor. The court determined that defendant's conviction was applicable in Illinois and he was statutorily ineligible to hold the office of a school board member under the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/1–1 et seq. (West 2012)) and School Code (105 ILCS 5/1–1 et seq. (West 2012)). Consequently, the trial court denied defendant's emergency motion to stay enforcement of the court's order. We note that approximately four months later, after the trial court issued its final ruling and defendant filed this appeal, the State of Indiana granted defendant an expungement of his criminal conviction. See Ind.Code Ann. § 35–38–9–10 (West 2012).

¶ 4 ANALYSIS

¶ 5 Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because he is statutorily qualified to seek and hold public office under the Illinois Election Code (10 ILCS 5/1–1 et seq. (West 2012)) and School Code (105 ILCS 5/1–1 et seq. (West 2012)). Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, admissions, depositions and affidavits demonstrate there is no genuine issue as to any material fact so that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ioerger v. Halverson Construction Co., 232 Ill.2d 196, 201, 327 Ill.Dec. 524, 902 N.E.2d 645 (2008) ; 735 ILCS 5/2–1005 (West 2012). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must consider such items strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of its opponent. Williams v. Manchester, 228 Ill.2d 404, 417, 320 Ill.Dec. 784, 888 N.E.2d 1 (2008). We review the trial court's order granting summary judgment de novo. Weather–Tite, Inc. v. University of St. Francis, 233 Ill.2d 385, 389, 330 Ill.Dec. 808, 909 N.E.2d 830 (2009).

¶ 6 The School Code provides that “[a]ll school elections shall be governed by the general election law of the State.” 105 ILCS 5/9–1 (West 2012). Section 1–1 of the Election Code states that it “is the general election law of Illinois and any reference in any other Act to ‘the general election law’ or ‘the general election law of this State’ is a reference to this Act, as now or hereafter amended.” 10 ILCS 5/1–1 (West 2012). Thus, the Election Code governs the election of school board members and must be read in harmony with the School Code.

¶ 7 Under the School Code, a person is eligible to serve as an elected member of a board of education if: (1) he or she is a United States citizen; (2) is over the age of 18; (3) has been a resident in the district for at least one year immediately preceding the election; (4) is a registered voter; (5) is not a trustee; and (6) is not a child sex offender as defined by the Illinois Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/1–1 et seq. (West 2012)).

105 ILCS 5/10–10 (West 2012). In addition, various provisions in the Election Code and School Code prohibit convicted felons from holding an elective office. Under section 25–2(5) (10 ILCS 5/25–2(5) (West 2012)) of the Election Code, an elective office becomes vacant upon the incumbent's conviction for an “infamous crime.” See also 105 ILCS 5/10–11(5) (West 2012) (elective offices under the School Code become vacant upon conviction of an “ infamous crime”). Consequently, section 29–15 of the Election Code states:

“Any person convicted of an infamous crime as such term is defined in Section 124–1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, as amended, shall thereafter be prohibited from holding any office of honor, trust, or profit, unless such person is again restored to such rights by the terms of a pardon for the offense or otherwise according to law.” 10 ILCS 5/29–15 (West 2012).

¶ 8 Under section 124–1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code of Criminal Procedure), an infamous crime was defined as:

“the offenses of arson, bigamy, bribery, burglary, deviate sexual assault, forgery, incest or aggravated incest, indecent liberties with a child, kidnaping or aggravated kidnaping, murder, perjury, rape, robbery, sale of narcotic drugs, subornation of perjury, and theft if the punishment imposed is imprisonment in the penitentiary.” (Emphasis added.) Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, ¶ 124–1 (repealed by Pub. Act 84–1047, § 2 (eff. July 1, 1986)).

¶ 9 We must first construe the applicable statutes in order to determine whether defendant is entitled to continue in his office as a matter of statutory right. A reviewing court's primary objective in performing statutory construction is to give effect to the legislature's intent. In re Application of the County Treasurer & ex officio County Collector, 2013 IL App (1st) 130103, ¶ 9, 376 Ill.Dec. 905, 1 N.E.3d 617. The best indication of legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. Reviewing courts should consider a statute in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject it addresses and the legislature's apparent objective in enacting it, and avoiding constructions that would render any term meaningless or superfluous. Fisher v. Waldrop, 221 Ill.2d 102, 112, 302 Ill.Dec. 542, 849 N.E.2d 334 (2006). Furthermore, reviewing courts have a duty to construe a statute in a manner that upholds its validity and constitutionality. Id.

¶ 10 When read in their entirety, the provisions of the Election Code and School Code at issue establish an intent by the legislature to prevent individuals convicted of infamous crimes from holding offices of honor, trust and profit without an official pardon or restoration of rights. Although defendant contends that the repeal of section 124–1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure renders section 29–15 of the Election Code immaterial, we disagree. According to the principles of statutory construction, it is well-settled that statutes which adopt by specific reference provisions of other statutes are not affected by a subsequent amendment or repeal of the incorporated statute. See Town of Libertyville v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 187 Ill.App.3d 84, 90, 135 Ill.Dec. 115, 543 N.E.2d 350 (1989). Thus, the repeal of section 124–1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not change the classifications for an “infamous crime” in section 29–15 of the Election Code. Furthermore, “[a] felony is infamous when it is inconsistent with commonly accepted principles of honesty and decency, or involves moral turpitude,” and defendant's conviction of forgery certainly offends this principle. People ex rel. City of Kankakee v....