Alves v. Murphy

• Decision Date: 14 January 2008
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2005-11090-RBC.
• Citation: 530 F.Supp.2d 381
• Parties: Christopher ALVES, Plaintiff, v. Robert MURPHY, etc., John Rull, etc., Stephen Corrigan, etc., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

530 F.Supp.2d 381

Christopher ALVES, Plaintiff, v. Robert MURPHY, etc., John Rull, etc., Stephen Corrigan, etc., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2005-11090-RBC.¹

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

January 14, 2008.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Brian P. Mansfield, Bridgewater, MA, Kevin W. Mulvey, Mulvey Sneider & Freyman LLP, Chestnut Hill, MA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (#19)

COLLINGS, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff, Christopher Alves ("Alves"), is currently civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person ("SDP") at the Massachusetts Treatment Center ("MTC") under Mass. Gen. L. ch. 123A. In this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Alves alleges that the defendants, officials at the MTC, placed him at risk of harm by failing to adhere to certain mandatory procedures prior to implementing a doublebunking policy. He also alleges that the defendants have violated equal protection principles by granting-privileges to certain residents at the MTC, but not to others.

On October 25, 2006, the defendants, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), filed their DOC [Department of Corrections] Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their First Affirmative Defense—Failure to State a Claim. (# 19) On December 7, 2006, Alves filed his Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to DOC Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their First Affirmative Defense—Failure to State a Claim. (# 25) The matter is therefore poised for resolution.

II. Facts

Alves is an involuntarily civilly-committed resident at the MTC. (Verified Complaint # 3 ¶ 6) The defendant Robert Murphy ("Murphy") is the Superintendent of the MTC. (# 3 ¶ 7) The defendant John Rull ("Rull") is a Shift Commander with the rank of Captain at the MTC. (# 3 ¶ 8) The defendant Stephen Corrigan, M.A., L.M.H.C. ("Corrigan") is an employee of Forensic Health Services, and was contracted by the MTC to provide treatment specific to sex offenders to civilly committed residents. (# 3 ¶ 9) Because of overcrowding at the MTC, the defendants were forced to implement a double-bunking policy; the policy resulted in the placement of residents deemed "sexually dangerous" with fellow residents. (# 3 ¶ 22) The protocols regarding double-bunking call for the MTC first to attempt to relieve overcrowding by reassignment of housing, and then for the MTC to conduct security and clinical assessments of each resident's compatibility and suitability for double-bunking. (# 3 ¶ 25 & Exh. 1 at 2)

In or around February, 2004, defendants Rull and Corrigan conducted an interview with Alves to assess his compatibility for double-bunking. (# 3 ¶ 27) The defendants inquired whether Alves would consider double-bunking with another resident, John MacIntyre ("MacIntyre"). (# 3 ¶ 28) MacIntyre had originally been convicted of raping an adolescent male, and had recently escaped from the Treatment Center's Community Access House. (# 3 ¶ 29) Alves told Rull and Corrigan "that he did not feel comfortable being double-bunked with resident MacIntyre because he [MacIntyre] had just recently escaped from the Treatment Center." (# 3 ¶ 30) Alves requested to be housed with one of two other residents. (# 3 ¶ 30) Contrary to Alves' wishes, the defendants decided to doublebunk Alves with MacIntyre; defendants said the alternative was to place Alves in the MTC Minimum Privilege Unit pending an Observation of Behavior Report, which Alves did not opt to do. (# 3 ¶ 31)

In May, 2004, Alves informed Rull' that "for several nights he would awake to find resident MacIntyre [sic] lifting up his bed sheets looking at him and felt that resident MacIntyre was putting medication in his food." (# 3 ¶ 32) The defendants "immediately thereafter" (# 3 ¶ 33) moved Alves to a single room temporarily and then a short time later, "reassigned another roommate in a housing unit separate from resident MacIntyre." (# 3 ¶ 33)

III. Applicable Law

A. Motion to Dismiss Standard

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) requires the Court to "assume the truth of all well-plead facts and give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences therefrom." Ruiz v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 496 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2007). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must establish 'a plausible entitlement to relief.'" Alvarado Aguilera v. Negron, 509 F.3d 50, 51 (1st Cir.2007) (quoting Bell AU. Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1967, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). In other words, the complaint must allege facts that give rise to "a reasonable expectation" of relief, Bell Atlantic, 127 S.Ct. at 1965, and the claims in the complaint must be specific enough to cross the line "from conceivable to plausible," id. at 1974. Despite this "plaintiff-friendly vantage," Ruiz, 496 F.3d at 4, a court is not obliged "to credit bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, and opprobrious epithets," id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). Thus; courts have no duty "`to conjure up unpleaded facts' that might turn a frivolous claim ... into a substantial one.'" Bell Atlantic, 127 S.Ct. at 1969 (quoting O'Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546, n. 3 (1st Cir.1976), cert. denied subnom. O'Brien v. Jordan, 431 U.S. 914, 97 S.Ct. 2173, 53 L.Ed.2d 223 (1977)).

B. Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that 1) the challenged conduct is attributable to a person acting under color of state law, and 2) the conduct must have denied the plaintiff a right secured by the United States Constitution or a federal law. Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056, 1061 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 819, 118 S.Ct. 71, 139 L.Ed.2d 32 (1997). The analysis here focuses on the second element, viz., whether Alves has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right.

First, to the extent that Alves alleges that the MTC's failure to follow its own procedures regarding double-bunking² constitutes a constitutional violation, Alves fails as a matter of law to state a claim. See Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 989 (1st Cir.) ("It is established beyond peradventure that a state actor's failure to observe a duty imposed by state law, standing alone, is not a sufficient foundation on which to erect a section 1983 claim."), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 987, 116 S.Ct. 515, 133 L.Ed.2d 423 (1995); see also Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265, 121 S.Ct. 727, 148 L.Ed.2d 734 (2001) (stating that "[i]t is for the [state] courts to determine whether the Center is operating in accordance with state law and provide a remedy"). Similarly, the MTC's decision to double-bunk the plaintiff, simpliciter, does not present a constitutional infraction. Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (there is no "`one man, one cell' principle lurking in the Due Process Clause").³ Indeed, as the complaint alleges, the MTC plan, itself the subject of years of litigation, see King v. Greenblatt, 53 F.Supp.2d 117 (D.Mass. 1999) (detailing history of litigation), contemplates that at times of overcrowding, double-bunking cannot be avoided. (See # 3 Exh. 1 at 2)

On the other hand, the gravamen of the complaint is that the defendants knew or should have known that bunking Alves with MacIntyre, a resident who had been convicted of raping an adolescent male, would put Alves at risk of harm, Alves' complaint can thus be read as attempting to state a claim based on his right to reasonably safe conditions of confinement. In particular, for involuntarily committed patients such as Alves, the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees "the right to personal security," Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982), and the right to conditions of reasonable safety, id. at 324, 102 S.Ct. 2452.⁴ See also Cameron v. Tomes, 990 F.2d 14, 18 (1st Cir.1993) ("It is settled that those who are confined by the state, for whatever reason, are entitled under the Constitution to food, clothing, medical care, and reasonable efforts to secure physical safety."). The Court turns to an analysis of such a claim.

The right to safe conditions is "not absolute," Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320, 102 S.Ct. 2452, and any analysis of a substantive due process claim in this context must take into account that "an institution cannot protect its residents from all danger of violence if it is to permit them to have any freedom of movement. The question then is not simply whether a liberty interest has been infringed but whether the extent or nature of the . . . lack of absolute safety is such as to violate due process," id. Here, essentially, the plaintiff alleges that, due to overcrowding, the defendants were forced to double-bunk him. Alves complains that he was bunked with a roommate with whom he was incompatible, and that the defendants should have been aware of the risk of harm that would befall the plaintiff because MacIntyre had been convicted of raping an adolescent boy, and Alves "projects adolescent mannerisms and characteristics." (# 3 ¶ 37) Alves alleges a due process violation because the defendants failed to prevent the harm to which Alves was exposed, that is, MacIntyre peering at Alves while he slept, and Alves' perceived fear that his cellmate had put something in his food.

The Court concludes that Alves has failed to state a due process violation because "the extent or nature of the ... lack of absolute safety," Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320, 102 S.Ct. 2452, in this case is simply not of constitutional magnitude: Alves alleges an isolated incident in which he was not seriously injured. The allegations themselves establish that once Alves alerted the defendants to his roommate's behavior, the defendants immediately transferred Alves to another housing unit. Thus, according to the complaint itself, the harm itself—the "extent or nature . . . of the lack...