Am. Bible Soc v. Am. Tract Soc

• Decision Date: 02 October 1901
• Citation: 62 N.J.E. 219,50 A. 67
• Parties: AMERICAN BIBLE SOC v. AMERICAN TRACT SOC. et al.
• Court: New Jersey Court of Chancery

50 A. 67

62 N.J.E. 219

AMERICAN BIBLE SOC

v. AMERICAN TRACT SOC. et al.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

Oct. 2, 1901.

Original bill for construction of the will of Aaron S. Day by the American Bible Society against the American Tract Society and others. Decree rendered.

Chauncey G. Parker, for complainant.

Egbert J. Tamblyn, for defendants Nelson Reeve and others.

STEVENS, V. C. Aaron S. Day died on March 1, 1854. He left a will by which he devised to his wife, during widowhood, his real estate. On her decease, or as soon as she should cease to be his widow, he gave the residue of his estate to certain charitable societies, and among others to the American Home Missionary Society and to the American & Foreign Christian Union. These societies were unincorporated at the death of testator, but became so between his death and the death of his widow in March, 1897. The only question argued was whether an unincorporated society is capable of taking a devise of real estate. That a bequest of personal estate to such a society is good is beyond dispute. Hadden v. Dandy, 51 N. J. Eq. 155, 26 Atl. 464, 32 L. R. A. 625, affirmed in Same v. Society, 51 N. J. Eq. 330, 30 Atl. 429. It is contended, however, that a devise of realty differs from a bequest of personalty—First, because in the case of a devise there is no person in whom the legal title may vest: and, second, because in the case of land the statute of frauds requires that all declarations and creations of trust or confidence shall be manifested and proved by some writing signed by the party, or by his last will in writing. The first point seems to be without substance, for the reason that, assuming the devise to be in other respects valid, the legal title, if it cannot vest in the society, descends to the heir at law charged with the charitable use. The second point seems to be also untenable. It is true that in the case at bar there is in the will itself no specification of the use to which the land devised shall be applied. Its language is: "The residue of my estate * * * shall be disposed of as follows; that is to say, to * * * The American Home Missionary Society I give," etc.; "* * * to the American & Foreign Christian Union, I give," etc. But by necessary implication a gift to the society is a gift in trust for its proper objects. Had the gift been in terms a gift in trust for those objects (not specifying them), it would have come directly within the authority of De Camp v. Dobbins, 29 N. J. Eq. 36, on appeal, 31 N. J. Eq. 671; for there extrinsic proof was received of what those objects were, with a view of showing that they were charitable. The gift was "to promote the religious interests of the [North Reformed Dutch] Church, and to aid the missionary, educational, and benevolent enterprises to which the said church is in the habit of contributing," and the extrinsic proof was that all its benevolent enterprises were charitable. On this proof, the gift was sustained. In Thomson's Ex'rs v. Norris, 20 N. J. Eq. 489, it was held that a bequest to promote benevolent enterprises was void as being too broad. In Livesey v. Jones, 55 N. J. Eq. 204, 35 Atl. 1064, and Chadwick v. Livesey, 56 N. J. Eq. 453, 41 Atl. 1115, it was held that a bequest (inter alia) to promote the social welfare of the people was also void. If, therefore, the bequest in De Camp v. Dobbins had stood on the words of the will alone, it would have failed. But the chief justice in the court of...