Am. Civil Rights Union v. Tax Assessor–Collector Cindy Martinez–Rivera

• Citation: 166 F.Supp.3d 779
• Decision Date: 30 March 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. DR–14–CV–0026–AM/CW
• Parties: American Civil Rights Union, Plaintiff, v. Tax Assessor–Collector Cindy Martinez–Rivera, Defendant.
• Court: United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. Western District of Texas

166 F.Supp.3d 779

American Civil Rights Union, Plaintiff,

v.Tax Assessor–Collector Cindy Martinez–Rivera, Defendant.

Civil Action No. DR–14–CV–0026–AM/CW

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, Del Rio Division.

Signed March 30, 2015

ORDER

ALIA MOSES, United States District Judge

Pending before the Court are the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 13) and the Plaintiffs Opposed Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint (Mot. to Amend, ECF No. 32). On March 6, 2015, the Honorable Collis White, United States Magistrate Judge, filed a Report and Recommendation (Report, ECF No. 34) in which he recommends that both motions be denied. The Defendant timely filed Objections (Objections, ECF No. 36) and the Plaintiff responded (Response, ECF No. 38). For the reasons stated below, this Report and Recommendation will be ADOPTED. Accordingly, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and the Plaintiff's Opposed Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint are DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 27, 2014, Plaintiff American Civil Rights Union (“Plaintiff” or “ACRU”) filed suit against Defendant Tax Assessor–Collector Cindy Martinez–Rivera (“Defendant”) in her official capacity. (Complaint, ECF No. 1.) The Complaint alleges that the Defendant violated the National Voter Registration Act (“NVRA”), 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501 –20511,¹ by failing to make a reasonable effort to conduct voter list maintenance programs.²

ACRU is a nonprofit corporation, “which promotes election integrity, compliance with federal election laws, government transparency and constitutional government.” (Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 2, para. 4.) Pursuant to this goal, ACRU filed the instant Complaint in its individual and corporate capacities, and on behalf of its members who are registered to vote in the State of Texas. (Id. ) The Complaint names the Tax Assessor–Collector as defendant because, under ACRU's interpretation of the NVRA and Texas Election law, she is the official responsible for ensuring that Zavala County complies with the list-maintenance provisions of the NVRA. (Id. at 2–4, paras. 5–9.)

According to the Complaint, the voter rolls for Zavala County have more registered voters than there are citizens in the County who are eligible to vote. (Id. at 4, para. 10.) The Complaint supports this claim by comparing two figures: the number of Zavala County citizens eligible to vote in 2010—8,205 people—and the number of people actually registered to vote in Zavala County in March of 2014—8,623 people.³ (Id. ) The Plaintiff argues that these figures demonstrate an “implausible” registration rate of 105%. (Id. ) According to the Plaintiffs calculations, Zavala County has failed to maintain accurate voter rolls since at least 2008, when the County's registration rate was 102%. (Id. at 5, para. 10.)

The Plaintiffs efforts to improve Zavala County's registration rate began in September 2013, when ACRU sent the Zavala County Clerk a letter stating that the County's registration rolls have too many registered voters and requesting additional information. (Id. at 5–6, paras. 12–15.) Thereafter, the Plaintiff engaged in “numerous discussions” with the Defendant, and members of ACRU visited the Defendant's offices. (Id. at 6, para. 16.) When Zavala County's registration rate failed to improve, the Plaintiff brought suit, alleging that the Defendant's failure “to make a reasonable effort to conduct voter list maintenance programs in elections for federal office” violates Section 8⁴ of the NVRA. (See id. at 8, paras. 24–28.) The Plaintiff contends that this violation has caused it harm by: (1) undermining the confidence that ACRU and its members, including those registered to vote in Texas, place in the integrity and legitimacy of the electoral process; (2) creating the risk of vote dilution; and (3) causing ACRU to engage in a months-long process to help bring Zavala County into compliance with the NVRA. (Id. at 5, para. 12; 6, para. 16; 8–9, paras. 26–27.) The Complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys' fees and costs. (Id. at 9–10, paras. 1–4.)

On June 4, 2014, the Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, which presents two grounds for dismissing the Complaint. (Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 13.) First, the Defendant claims that the Complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) because the Plaintiff can demonstrate neither organizational nor associational standing under Article III. (Id. at 6–10.) Second, the Defendant urges the Court to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) because: (1) ACRU did not fulfill the NVRA's notice requirement before filing suit and (2) the Complaint fails to allege specific acts by the Defendant that amount to a violation of the NVRA. (Id. at 10–11, 12–15.) The Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition. (Resp. to Mot., ECF No. 14.)

On February 18, 2015, the Plaintiff filed an Opposed Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint. (Mot. to Amend, ECF No. 32.) The Plaintiff sought to amend its original complaint in order to (1) add a member of ACRU who is registered to vote in Texas as a plaintiff and (2) conform the pleadings to a stipulation of dismissal of Count Two of the original complaint. (Id. )

On February 23, 2015, Judge White filed a Report and Recommendation that recommended denying both the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint. (Report, ECF No. 34.) The Defendant timely filed Objections to the Report (Objections, ECF No. 36) to which the Plaintiff responded (Response, ECF No. 38).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

Where no party objects to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the Court need not conduct a de novo review. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In such cases, the Court need merely review the report and recommendation to ensure that it is neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law. United States v. Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir.1989). However, when a party objects to the findings or conclusions made in a report and recommendation, the Court is required to make a de novo determination of the portions of the report to which an objection was made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). This review calls upon the Court to independently examine the record and assess the applicable law. The Court is not required to conduct a de novo review when the objections are frivolous, conclusive, or general in nature. Battle v. United States Parole Comm'n., 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir.1987). In the case at bar, Judge White's Report recommended that the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss be denied. The Defendant objected to five of the Report's conclusions: (1) ACRU established that it has organizational standing; (2) the Tax Assessor–Collector is the proper defendant; (3) ACRU may use United States census data to demonstrate that the Defendant violated the NVRA; (4) ACRU adequately stated a claim for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ; and (5) ACRU alleged sufficient notice, as required under the NVRA. (Objections, ECF No. 36.) The Court will review these conclusions de novo. However, neither party objected to the conclusion that ACRU does not have associational standing or the recommendation that the Plaintiff's Motion to for Leave to Amend the Complaint be denied. Therefore, the Court will review those portions of the Report for clear error. Lastly, the Report provides a clear explanation of the NVRA and the pertinent portions of the Texas Election Code. (Report, ECF No. 34 at 797–98.) For the sake of brevity, that portion of the Report will not be reproduced in this Order, but incorporated into this Order by reference.

B. Motion to Dismiss

1. Article III Standing

Constitutional standing is an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, Cobb v. Cent. States, Sw. & Se. Areas Pension Fund, 461 F.3d 632, 635 (5th Cir.2006), which must be resolved as a threshold matter because “when [jurisdiction] ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause,” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (citation omitted).⁵ As the party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate standing “with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). At the pleading stage, a court looks to the complaint in which the plaintiff must make general factual allegations that indicate that standing is plausible. Id. (“[O]n a motion to dismiss we ‘presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.’ ” (citation omitted)); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). To determine whether the plaintiff has met this burden, the court may consider “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir.2001) (citation omitted).

An organization can demonstrate standing in two ways: associational standing and organizational standing. In the instant case, ACRU alleged both associational and organizational standing.

An organization that establishes associational standing can bring suit on behalf of its members even in the absence of injury to itself. Hunt v. Wash. St. Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 342, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977). To do so, the organization must demonstrate that: (1) “its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right;” (2) “the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and” (3) “neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires...