Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest.

• Decision Date: 20 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–133.,12–133.
• Citation: 186 L.Ed.2d 417,133 S.Ct. 2304,570 U.S. 228
• Parties: AMERICAN EXPRESS CO., et al., Petitioners v. ITALIAN COLORS RESTAURANT et al.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

570 U.S. 228

133 S.Ct. 2304

186 L.Ed.2d 417

AMERICAN EXPRESS CO., et al., Petitioners

v.ITALIAN COLORS RESTAURANT et al.

No. 12–133.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Feb. 27, 2013.

Decided June 20, 2013.

Michael Kellogg, Washington, DC, for Petitioners.

Paul D. Clement, Washington, DC, for Respondents.

Malcolm L. Stewart, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the Respondents.

Louise M. Parent, Mark G. Califano, Bernadette Miragliotta, American Express Travel Related Services, Inc., New York, NY, Julia B. Strickland, Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Michael K. Kellogg, Counsel of Record, Derek T. Ho, Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel, P.L.L.C., Washington, DC, for Petitioners.

Deepak Gupta, Brian Wolfman, Gregory A. Beck, Jonathan E. Taylor, Gupta Beck PLLC, Washington, DC, Paul D. Clement, Counsel of Record, Michael H. McGinley, Bancroft PLLC, Washington, DC, for Respondents.

Justice SCALIAdelivered the opinion of the Court.

We consider whether a contractual waiver of class arbitration is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act when the plaintiff's cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery.

I

Respondents are merchants who accept American Express cards.Their agreement with petitioners—American Express and a wholly owned subsidiary—contains a clause that requires all disputes between the parties to be resolved by arbitration.The agreement also provides that "[t]here shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class action basis."In re American Express Merchants' Litigation,667 F.3d 204, 209(C.A.22012).

Respondents brought a class action against petitioners for violations of the federal antitrust laws.According to respondents, American Express used its monopoly power in the market for charge cards to force merchants to accept credit cards at rates approximately 30% higher than the fees for competing credit cards.¹This tying arrangement, respondents said, violated § 1 of the Sherman Act.They sought treble damages for the class under § 4 of the Clayton Act.

Petitioners moved to compel individual arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.In resisting the motion, respondents submitted a declaration from an economist who estimated that the cost of an expert analysis necessary to prove the antitrust claims would be "at least several hundred thousand dollars, and might exceed $1 million," while the maximum recovery for an individual plaintiff would be $12,850, or $38,549 when trebled.App. 93.The District Court granted the motion and dismissed the lawsuits.The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings.It held that because respondents had established that "they would incur prohibitive costs if compelled to arbitrate under the class action waiver," the waiver was unenforceable and the arbitration could not proceed.In re American Express Merchants' Litigation,554 F.3d 300, 315–316(C.A.22009).

We granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded for further consideration in light of Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp.,559 U.S. 662, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 176 L.Ed.2d 605(2010), which held that a party may not be compelled to submit to class arbitration absent an agreement to do so.American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,559 U.S. 1103, 130 S.Ct. 2401, 176 L.Ed.2d 920(2010).The Court of Appeals stood by its reversal, stating that its earlier ruling did not compel class arbitration.In re American Express Merchants' Litigation,634 F.3d 187, 200(C.A.22011).It then sua sponte reconsidered its ruling in light of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,563 U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 179 L.Ed.2d 742(2011), which held that the FAA pre-empted a state law barring enforcement of a class-arbitration waiver.Finding AT&T Mobility inapplicable because it addressed pre-emption, the Court of Appeals reversed for the third time.667 F.3d, at 213.It then denied rehearing en banc with five judges dissenting.In re American Express Merchants' Litigation,681 F.3d 139(C.A.22012).We granted certiorari, 568 U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 594, 184 L.Ed.2d 390(2012), to consider the question "[w]hether the Federal Arbitration Act permits courts ... to invalidate arbitration agreements on the ground that they do not permit class arbitration of a federal-law claim," Pet. for Cert. i.

II

Congress enacted the FAA in response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration.SeeAT&T Mobility, supra, at ––––, 131 S.Ct., at 1745.As relevant here, the Act provides:

"A written provision in any maritime transaction or contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."9 U.S.C. § 2.

This text reflects the overarching principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.SeeRent–A–Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,561 U.S. ––––, ––––, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 2776, 177 L.Ed.2d 403(2010).And consistent with that text, courts must "rigorously enforce" arbitration agreements according to their terms, Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd,470 U.S. 213, 221, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 84 L.Ed.2d 158(1985), including terms that "specify with whom[the parties] choose to arbitrate their disputes,"Stolt–Nielsen, supra, at 683, 130 S.Ct. 1758, and "the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted,"Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ ., 489 U.S. 468, 479, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 103 L.Ed.2d 488(1989).That holds true for claims that allege a violation of a federal statute, unless the FAA's mandate has been " ‘overridden by a contrary congressional command.’ "CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood,565 U.S. ––––, ––––, 132 S.Ct. 665, 668–669, 181 L.Ed.2d 586(2012)(quotingShearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon,482 U.S. 220, 226, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185(1987) ).

III

No contrary congressional command requires us to reject the waiver of class arbitration here.Respondents argue that requiring them to litigate their claims individually—as they contracted to do—would contravene the policies of the antitrust laws.But the antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim.Congress has taken some measures to facilitate the litigation of antitrust claims—for example, it enacted a multiplied-damages remedy.See15 U.S.C. § 15(treble damages).In enacting such measures, Congress has told us that it is willing to go, in certain respects, beyond the normal limits of law in advancing its goals of deterring and remedying unlawful trade practice.But to say that Congress must have intended whatever departures from those normal limits advance antitrust goals is simply irrational."[N]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs."Rodriguez v. United States,480 U.S. 522, 525–526, 107 S.Ct. 1391, 94 L.Ed.2d 533(1987)(per curiam ).

The antitrust laws do not "evinc[e] an intention to preclude a waiver" of class-action procedure.Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc.,473 U.S. 614, 628, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444(1985).The Sherman and Clayton Acts make no mention of class actions.In fact, they were enacted decades before the advent of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which was "designed to allow an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only."Califano v. Yamasaki,442 U.S. 682, 700–701, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176(1979).The parties here agreed to arbitrate pursuant to that "usual rule," and it would be remarkable for a court to erase that expectation.

Nor does congressional approval of Rule 23 establish an entitlement to class proceedings for the vindication of statutory rights.To begin with, it is likely that such an entitlement, invalidating private arbitration agreements denying class adjudication, would be an "abridg[ment]" or "modif[ication]" of a "substantive right" forbidden to the Rules, see28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).But there is no evidence of such an entitlement in any event.The Rule imposes stringent requirements for certification that in practice exclude most claims.And we have specifically rejected the assertion that one of those requirements (the class-notice requirement) must be dispensed with because the "prohibitively high cost" of compliance would "frustrate [plaintiff's] attempt to vindicate the policies underlying the antitrust" laws.Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,417 U.S. 156, 166–168, 175–176, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732(1974).One might respond, perhaps, that federal law secures a nonwaivable opportunity to vindicate federal policies by satisfying the procedural strictures of Rule 23 or invoking some other informal class mechanism in arbitration.But we have already rejected that proposition in AT&T Mobility,563 U.S., at ––––, 131 S.Ct., at 1748.

IV

Our finding of no "contrary congressional command" does not end the case.Respondents invoke a judge-made exception to the FAA which, they say, serves to harmonize competing federal policies by allowing courts to invalidate agreements that prevent the "effective vindication" of a federal statutory right.Enforcing the waiver of class arbitration bars effective vindication, respondents contend, because they have no economic incentive to pursue their antitrust claims individually in arbitration.

The "effective vindication" exception to which respondents allude originated as dictum in Mitsubishi Motors, where we expressed a willingness to invalidate, on "public policy" grounds, arbitration agreements that "operat [e] ... as a prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies."473 U.S., at 637, n. 19, 105 S.Ct. 3346(emphasis added).Dismissing concerns that the arbitral...