Am. Fed'n of State v. Scott

• Decision Date: 13 June 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 11–21976–CIV.
• Citation: 949 F.Supp.2d 1239
• Parties: AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES (AFSCME) COUNCIL 79, Plaintiff, v. Rick SCOTT, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Florida, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

949 F.Supp.2d 1239

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES (AFSCME) COUNCIL 79, Plaintiff,

v.Rick SCOTT, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Florida, Defendant.

Case No. 11–21976–CIV.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

June 13, 2013.

Daren Alan Stabinski, Stabinski & Funt, Maria Kayanan, ACLU of Florida, Shalini Goel Agarwal, ACLU Foundation of Florida, Inc., Miami, FL, Peter G. Walsh, David W. Singer & Associates, P.A., Hollywood, FL, for Plaintiff.

Jason Vail, Attorney General Office, Jesse Michael Panuccio, Department of Economic Opportunity, Michael M. Sevi, Executive Office of the Governor, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER DENYING LAW OFFICE OF STABINSKI & FUNT, P.A.'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL AND STRIKING NOTICE AND CLAIM OF ATTORNEY'S CHARGING LIEN

EDWIN G. TORRES, United States Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Stabinski & Funt, P.A.'s (“Stabinski”) Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Plaintiff [D.E. 112] and Verified Notice and Claim of Attorney's Charging Lien, [D.E. 113], filed April 25 and 26, 2013. Plaintiff American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Council 79 (“AFSCME”) filed a Response in Opposition, [D.E. 117], on May 2, 2013 to which Stabinski replied on May 8, 2013. [D.E. 119]. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the Magistrate Rules of the Local Rules of the Southern District of Florida, this motion was referred to the undersigned by the Honorable Ursula Ungaro, United States District Judge, on May 15, 2013. [D.E. 120]. Thus, the matter is ripe for disposition.

Stabinski claims it represented AFSCME through attorney Peter Walsh from July 17, 2009 until January 24, 2013. [D.E. 113]. After Mr. Walsh ended his association with Stabinski, the firm filed this motion to withdraw as counsel and claim of attorney's charging lien. [D.E. 112 & 113]. AFSCME replied, claiming, inter alia, that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. [D.E. 114]. For the following reasons, we find that Stabinski's claim does not fall within the Court's supplemental jurisdiction as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1367. We do not consider the merits of the dispute between Mr. Walsh and Stabinski. Accordingly, the lien must be stricken, without prejudice to Stabinski pursuing any claims at law that he may before a Florida court of general jurisdiction. As we have found no agreement between AFSCME and the Stabinski firm, the Motion to Withdraw, [D.E. 112], is denied as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

A lengthy recitation of all the particular details of the dispute between AFSCME and Governor Scott is not necessary, given the Court's rulings herein. AFSCME entered into a retainer agreement in this case with the American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Inc. (“ACLU”), [D.E. 114–1], to represent it during its challenge of Executive Order Number 11–58, which created drug testing regimes for employees of state agencies. [D.E. 1 at 2]. The ACLU occasionally seeks the assistance of “cooperating attorneys” in certain matters. [D.E. 114–2]. In this matter, the ACLU, through its Legal Director Randall C. Marshall, entered into an agreement with Peter Walsh. [D.E. 114–2 at ¶ 3]. In his declaration, Director Marshall notes that customary practice requires an attorney to sign a retainer agreement which designates the individual as an “attorney of record” to represent ACLU's client. [D.E. 114–2 at ¶ 2]. If the director recruits a law firm, the director will “specifically include language to the effect that the client consents to the ACLU and/or law firm adding or utilizing additional counsel to assist in the representation covered by the agreement.” [D.E. 114–2 at ¶ 2]. In the retainer agreement between the ACLU and Mr. Walsh, no authority was given for Mr. Walsh or the ACLU to designate other attorneys as counsel. [D.E. 114–2 at ¶ 3]. The retainer listed the following as the “cooperating counsel:”

Peter Walsh

Law Office of Peter G. Walsh P.A.

757 NW 27th Ave

Miami, FL 33125–2012

(305) 643–3100

pwalsh@ stabinksi- funt. com

On filings in this matter, in place of “Law Office of Peter G. Walsh P.A.” Mr. Walsh included “Stabinski & Funt, PA,” but listed the same address, email, and telephone. E.g., D.E. 1. This signature block fit the format required by the retainer agreement. [D.E. 114–2]. However, Stabinski claims this signature block made Stabinski & Funt, P.A., counsel of record for the case. [D.E. 117].

Mr. Walsh was “of counsel” at Stabinski during the course of litigation, until January 24, 2013. [D.E. 113]. Between filing on May 31, 2011 [D.E. 1], and his departure, Mr. Walsh prepared motions at his office at the Stabinski firm. [D.E. 117]. Additionally, Stabinski advanced costs of litigation which, after reimbursement from the ACLU, has a balance of $7,472.88. [D.E. 83–5; 83–6; 117]. Director Marshall assures that, should plaintiff prevail, Stabinski will be reimbursed for costs that are recovered. [D.E. 114–2 at ¶ 7]. Stabinski also claims that Mr. Walsh kept track of his hours worked using Stabinski's computer system and AFSCME obtained benefits of the Stabinski firm name and staff support during the course of litigation. [D.E. 117].

II. ANALYSIS

The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. We possess only the power strictly authorized by the Constitution and statute. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). The court's jurisdiction cannot be expanded merely through judicial decree. Id. (citations omitted). Rather, one is to presume that a cause lies outside the jurisdiction of the Court and the party asserting jurisdiction must overcome this burden. Id.

There are narrow exceptions, however, to this general rule. One such exception, the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, “recognizes federal courts' jurisdiction over some matters (otherwise beyond their competence) that are incidental to other matters properly before them.” Id. at 378, 114 S.Ct. 1673. Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Kokkonen described this ancillary jurisdiction as a way “to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees.” Id. at 379–80, 114 S.Ct. 1673. The Court, however, emphasized that the doctrine's limits are quite narrow. “[N]o controversy can be regarded as dependent or ancillary unless it has direct relation to property or assets actually or constructively drawn into the court's possession or control by the principal suit.” Id. (quoting Fulton Nat'l Bank of Atlanta v. Hozier, 267 U.S. 276, 280, 45 S.Ct. 261, 69 L.Ed. 609 (1925)).

Ancillary jurisdiction “rests on the premise that a federal court acquires jurisdiction of a case or controversy in its entirety,” Jenkins v. Weinshienk, 670 F.2d 915, 918 (10th Cir.1982), and “may extend to claims having a factual and logical dependence on ‘the primary lawsuit.’ ” Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 355, 116 S.Ct. 862, 133 L.Ed.2d 817 (1996) (citations omitted). “The basis of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction is the practical need ‘to protect legal rights or effectively to resolve an entire, logically entwined lawsuit.’ ” Id. (quoting Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978)).

The supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, incorporated these concepts of ancillary jurisdiction (plus the related concept of “pendent” jurisdiction) into “supplemental” jurisdiction. The statute provides, “in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy....” Supplemental jurisdiction over the “same case or controversy,” therefore, represents the “constitutional limits of federal judicial power.” Owen Equip., 437 U.S. at 371, 98 S.Ct. 2396.

Under an accepted four-factor test for district courts to apply when determining whether to exercise ancillary jurisdiction, we must consider the following factors: (1) an ancillary matter should arise from the transaction that was the basis of the principal proceeding, during the course of the principal proceedings, or as an integral part of the main proceeding; (2) the federal court should be able to determine the matter without a substantial new fact-finding proceeding; (3) failing to determine the matter should not deprive a party of any important procedural or substantive right; and (4) the matter should be decided if necessary to protect the integrity of the principal proceeding or insure that its disposition is not frustrated. Bruton v. Carnival Corp., 916 F.Supp.2d 1262, 1263–64, 1266–67 (S.D.Fla.2012) (citing Jenkins, 670 F.2d at 918). Each factor of this test counsels against this Court's exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over Stabinski's claims.

A. This Matter Is Not An Integral Part of the Main Proceeding

Stabinski correctly recognizes that the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine is often utilized to adjudicate the resolution of disputes between a party to a federal lawsuit and that party's attorneys over the proper amount of fees due to the attorneys for work performed in the lawsuit. See, e.g., Gottlieb v. GC Financial Corp., 97 F.Supp.2d 1310 (S.D.Fla.1999); Zaklama v. Mount Sinai Medical Center, 906 F.2d 650 (11th Cir.1990) (both adjudicating post-judgment attorneys' fees disputes under Florida law charging liens); see also Rivera–Domenech v. Calvesbert Law Offices PSC, 402 F.3d 246, 250 (1st Cir.2005) (“Courts have rested the exercise of jurisdiction over [attorney-client] fee disputes related to proceedings before them on the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction.”); Garrick v. Weaver, 888 F.2d 687, 690 (10th Cir.1989) (quoting Jenkins, 670 F.2d at 918: “It is well established that ‘[d]eterminingthe legal fees a party to a lawsuit...