Am. Fed'n of State v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs for Bernalillo Cnty.
| Decision Date | 05 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | CV 19-001 MV/LF |
| Parties | AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, NEW MEXICO COUNCIL 18, LOCAL 2499, AFL-CIO, ERIC ALLEN, STEPHEN PERKINS, PATRICK GARCIA, and ALEXIS CAVIS, Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR BERNALILLO COUNTY, And RALPH PHILLIP GREER, GREGORY RICHARDSON, ERIN THOMAS aka ERIN RILEY, MANUEL GONZALES III, RUSSELL BROYLES & JOHN DYKES (all individuals in their individual capacities), Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim and for Qualified Immunity ("Defendants' Third Motion") [Doc. 46]. The Court, having considered the Motion, briefs, and relevant law, and being otherwise fully informed, finds that Defendants' Third Motion is not well-taken and will be denied.
Plaintiffs Eric Allen, Stephen Perkins, Patrick Garcia, and Alexa Cavis (the "Individual Plaintiffs") are current or former employees of Bernalillo County (the "County") who work or formerly worked at the Metropolitan Detention Center ("MDC"). Doc. 44. The Individual Plaintiffs are members of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, New Mexico Council 18, Local 2499, AFL-CIO ("AFSCME Local 2499" or the "Union"). Id.
On December 17, 2018, the Individual Plaintiffs and the Union filed in New Mexico state court their original Complaint for Violations of First Amendment Free-Speech and Associational Rights Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for Violations of the New Mexico Whistleblower Protection Act (the "Complaint") [Doc. 1-2]. On January 2, 2019, the County removed the action to this Court. Doc. 1. Thereafter, on January 15, 2019, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Individual Defendants with Prejudice and to Dismiss the Union for Lack of Standing and Memorandum in Support Thereof ("Defendants' First Motion") [Doc. 7], seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims set forth in Counts I and II against the individual Defendants for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and seeking dismissal of the Union as a Plaintiff in this action for lack of standing. On June 21, 2019, Defendants filed "Individually Named Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Based on Qualified Immunity" ("Defendant's Second Motion") [Doc. 35], again seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims set forth in Counts I and II against the individual Defendants for failure to state a violation of clearly established constitutional rights. Plaintiffs opposed both motions.
In a Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on February 28, 2020 ("February 2020 Opinion") [Doc. 43], the Court granted Defendants' First Motion, dismissing Counts I and II of the Complaint without prejudice to Plaintiffs' right to amend, and gave Plaintiffs the opportunity to file an amended complaint within 60 days of entry of the February Opinion. In light if its dismissal of Counts I and II pursuant to Defendant's First Motion, the Court found as moot Defendants' Second Motion.
In accordance with the Court's directive, on April 2, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint for Violations of First Amendment Free-Speech and Associational Rights Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for Violations of the New Mexico Whistleblower Act ("FAC"). Doc. 44. In the FAC, the Individual Plaintiffs and the Union bring two claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "Violations of Plaintiffs' First Amendment Right to Associate with the Union" (Count I) and "Violations of Plaintiffs' First Amendment Right of Speech on Matters of Public Concern" (Count II), against the following individuals: Ralph Fernandez (current Chief of MDC, formerly Assistant Chief of Security), Greg Rees (Chief of MDC from August 7, 2017 to November 2, 2018), Gregory Richardson (Deputy Chief of Operations at MDC), and Erin Thomas (Training Coordinator of MDC) (collectively, the "Individual MDC Defendants"). Plaintiffs also bring one additional claim, "Violations of the New Mexico Whistleblower Protection Act," (Count III) against the County. Id. In summary, Plaintiffs "seek legal redress for Defendants' concerted and ongoing campaign against employees who exercise their constitutional rights of free speech and association with a labor organization, and who blow the whistle on unlawful or improper acts of the County." Id.
On April 13, 2020, Defendants filed their Third Motion, seeking dismissal of all counts for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), and seeking dismissal of Counts I and II on the additional basis of qualified immunity. Doc. 46. Plaintiffs oppose the Third Motion in its entirety. Doc. 49.
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a Court may dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "The nature of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the allegations within the four corners of the complaint." Mobley v.McCormick, 40 F.3d 337, 340 (10th Cir. 1994). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, view those allegations in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1142 (2010).
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'" Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).
The Court in Iqbal identified "two working principles" in the context of a motion to dismiss. Id. First, Id. Accordingly, Rule 8 "does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions." Id. at 678-79. "Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id. at 679; see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (). Accordingly, "where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not shown - that the pleader is entitled torelief." Id. (citation omitted).
The Tenth Circuit has made clear that "context matters in notice pleading." Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1249 (10th Cir. 2008). Specifically, in Section 1983 cases, where, as here, "defendants often include the government agency and a number of government actors sued in their individual capacities," it is "particularly important . . . that the complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against him or her, as distinguished from collective allegations against the state." Id. at 1249-50 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, a complaint that "fails to isolate the allegedly unconstitutional acts of each defendant . . . does not provide adequate notice as to the nature of the claims against each," and is subject to dismissal. Id. at 1250.
In the instant case, the Individual MDC Defendants move to dismiss Counts I and II not only for failure to state a claim but also on the basis of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions "when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1164 (10th Cir. 2011). The Court employs a two-part test to analyze a qualified immunity defense. Id. Accordingly, "[i]n resolving a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity, a court must consider whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right, and whether the right at issuewas clearly established at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct." Id. The Court has "the freedom to decide 'which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.'" Lundstrom v. Romero, 616 F.3d 1108, 1118 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)).
"A constitutional right is clearly established when, at the time of the alleged violation, the contours of the right were sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that his [or her] actions violate that right." Lundstrom, 616 F.3d at 1118-19 (citation omitted). "This inquiry must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition." Fisher v. City of Las Cruces, 584 F.3d 888, 900 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Accordingly, a "plai...
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