Am. Fed'n of State v. Hamtramck Hous. Comm'n.

• Decision Date: 18 November 2010
• Docket Number: Docket No. 293505.
• Citation: 290 Mich.App. 672,804 N.W.2d 120,160 Lab.Cas. P 61088
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
• Parties: AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, County & Municipal Employees, Council 25, AFL–CIOv.HAMTRAMCK HOUSING COMMISSION.

290 Mich.App. 672

804 N.W.2d 120

160 Lab.Cas. P 61,088

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, County & Municipal Employees, Council 25, AFL–CIO

v.HAMTRAMCK HOUSING COMMISSION.

Docket No. 293505.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Nov. 3, 2010, at Detroit.Decided Nov. 18, 2010, at 9:00 a.m.

Cassandra D. Harmon–Higgins and Miller Cohen, P.L.C. (by Bruce A. Miller and Ada A. Verloren), Detroit, for plaintiff.Plunkett Cooney (by Ernest R. Bazzana), Detroit, for defendant.Before: MURPHY, C.J., and METER and SHAPIRO, JJ.PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals as of right a circuit court order denying plaintiff's motion for summary disposition and dismissing its complaint for arbitration on the basis that plaintiff “waived the right to arbitrate the subject grievance because the delay in filing for arbitration was not reasonable....” We reverse and remand for the entry of an order compelling arbitration because the issue whether the grievance was not arbitrable because of laches was an issue for the arbitrator to decide, not the trial court.

We review de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition. Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 118, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). Although plaintiff was the party who moved for summary disposition, the trial court granted judgment in favor of defendant pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2) (“If it appears to the court that the opposing party, rather than the moving party, is entitled to judgment, the court may render judgment in favor of the opposing party.”). Whether a court or an arbitrator should decide whether laches and waiver preclude arbitration of a grievance is a question of law also subject to review de novo. See Gregory J. Schwartz & Co., Inc. v. Fagan, 255 Mich.App. 229, 231, 660 N.W.2d 103 (2003).

Procedural questions such as timeliness are generally left to the arbitrator. Brown v. Holton Pub. Sch., 397 Mich. 71, 73, 243 N.W.2d 255 (1976). “The duty to arbitrate grievances arises from [the] contractual agreement between an employer and its employees.” Ottawa Co. v. Jaklinski, 423 Mich. 1, 22, 377 N.W.2d 668 (1985) (opinion by Williams, C.J.). Where an employer and a union have contractually agreed to arbitration, in the absence of explicit contractual direction to the contrary, all doubts regarding the proper forum should be resolved in favor of arbitration:

[A]ny ambiguity concerning whether a specific issue falls within the scope of arbitration, such as whether a claim is timely, must be resolved in favor of submitting the question to the arbitrator for resolution. See AT & T Technologies, [ Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 650, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986)]. In other words, there is a presumption of arbitrability “ ‘unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.’ “ Id., quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. (On Remand), 363 U.S. 574, 582–583, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960).

[ Amtower v. William C. Roney & Co. (On Remand), 232 Mich.App. 226, 234–235, 590 N.W.2d 580 (1998).] ¹

The arbitration provision in the parties' collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) provides:

Any unresolved grievances which relate to the interpretation, application, or enforcement of any specific article or section of this contract, or any supplementary agreement or letters and memorandums of understanding appended to this contract, which have been fully processed through the last step of the grievance procedure, shall be submitted to arbitration in strict accordance with the following:

* * *

In any matter submitted to an arbitrator pursuant to this Agreement, the arbitrator shall strictly limit his/her decision to the interpretation, application or enforcement of this agreement and he/she shall be without power and authority to make any decision contrary to, or inconsistent with, or modifying or varying in any way, the terms of this Agreement.

The language of the provision clearly requires arbitration of unresolved grievances that have been processed through the grievance procedure. Moreover, there is nothing in the provision that explicitly excludes the issue of timeliness from the arbitrator. In light of the presumption in favor of arbitrability, and the fact that nothing in the language provides “positive assurance” that the arbitration clause does not cover the question of timeliness, we are bound to conclude that it is the arbitrator, not the trial court, that must decide the issue. Amtower, 232 Mich.App. at 235, 590 N.W.2d 580 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Furthermore, we conclude that allowing the arbitrator to determine the question of timeliness is consistent with the purpose of arbitration. Allowing procedural challenges to be heard by a court rather than by the arbitrator runs contrary to the presumption of arbitrability and would leave every arbitration subject to piecemeal litigation, a result contrary to a central purpose of arbitration. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 558, 84 S.Ct. 909, 11 L.Ed.2d 898 (1964), holding that reserving procedural issues for the courts would create “the difficult task of separating related issues” as well as “eliminate the prospect of a speedy arbitrated settlement of the dispute, to the disadvantage of the parties (who, in addition, will have to bear increased costs),” all of which are “contrary to the aims of national labor policy.”

Because we conclude that the determinations regarding timeliness and the application of the defense of laches must be made by the arbitrator, we need not decide whether the trial court erred in its analysis...