Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty. & Municipal Emps., Council 31 v. Ill. Labor Relations Bd.
| Decision Date | 08 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 1–13–2455.,1–13–2455. |
| Citation | 16 N.E.3d 72 |
| Parties | AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 31, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, State Panel, the State of Illinois, and the Treasurer of the State of Illinois, Respondents. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Cornfield & Feldman, LLP, of Chicago (Jacob Pomeranz, of counsel), for petitioner.
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Carolyn E. Shapiro, Solicitor General, and Sharon A. Purcell, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel), and Brown, Hay & Stephens, LLP, of Springfield (Lorilea Buerkett, Special Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for respondents.
delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
¶ 1 Petitioner, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (Union), is the union that represented a State of Illinois employee in the position of “Information Systems Analyst II” (ISA II) who was excluded from the collective-bargaining unit when the respondent, Illinois Labor Relations Board (Board), granted a petition filed by the respondent, Treasurer of the State of Illinois (Treasurer), seeking to exclude any incumbent in that position from Union membership because it is a “confidential employee” position within the meaning of section 3(c) of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (5 ILCS 315/3(c)
(West 2012)) (Act). The issue before this court is whether the Board erred in finding that the ISA II position qualifies as a “confidential employee” position under the Act. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the Board's decision was clearly erroneous and accordingly reverse.
¶ 3 This is a direct appeal by the Union to the appellate court from the Board's final decision. Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to section 9(i) of the Act (5 ILCS 315/9(i)
(West 2012)), which states that “[a]ny person aggrieved by any such order [of the Board] * * * may apply for and obtain judicial review * * * except that such review shall be afforded directly in the Appellate Court.” Consistent with the Administrative Review Law, “[a]ny direct appeal to the Appellate Court shall be filed within 35 days from the date that a copy of the decision sought to be reviewed was served upon the party affected by the decision.” 5 ILCS 315/9(i) (West 2012); 115 ILCS 5/16(a) (West 2012). The Board's final decision is dated July 13, 2013. The Union's petition for appellate review, filed on August 6, 2013, was timely and complied with this court's procedure for those seeking direct review of administrative orders. Ill. S.Ct. R. 335 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). Therefore, this court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
¶ 5 In reviewing an administrative decision, “ ‘[t]he findings and conclusions of the administrative agency on questions of fact shall be held to be prima facie true and correct’ and ‘[n]o new or additional evidence in support of or in opposition to any finding, order, determination or decision by the administrative agency shall be heard by the court.’ ” Provena Covenant Medical Center v. Department of Revenue, 236 Ill.2d 368, 386, 339 Ill.Dec. 10, 925 N.E.2d 1131 (2010)
(quoting 735 ILCS 5/3–110 (West 2002) ). Id. We review an agency's factual findings to determine if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. at 386–87, 339 Ill.Dec. 10, 925 N.E.2d 1131. The agency's factual findings will not be found to be against the manifest weight of the evidence unless “the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.” Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill.2d 200, 210, 319 Ill.Dec. 887, 886 N.E.2d 1011 (2008). However, “when the only point in dispute is an agency's conclusion on a point of law,” our review is de novo.
Provena, 236 Ill.2d at 387, 339 Ill.Dec. 10, 925 N.E.2d 1131.
¶ 6 For mixed questions of law and fact, “i.e., where the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard,” we review the agency's decision for clear error. Id. When reviewing mixed questions of fact and law, this court gives deference to the agency's decision. AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill.2d 380, 395, 261 Ill.Dec. 302, 763 N.E.2d 272 (2001)
. Reversal of mixed questions of fact and law is inappropriate unless, after review of the entire record, the court has “ ‘the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948) ). In other words, a reversal of the Board's final order is not justified merely because an opposite conclusion is reasonable or the appellate court may have ruled differently. Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill.2d 76, 88, 180 Ill.Dec. 34, 606 N.E.2d 1111 (1992). But “[t]hat the clearly erroneous standard is largely deferential does not mean * * * that a reviewing court must blindly defer to the agency's decision.” AFM Messenger Service, 198 Ill.2d at 395, 261 Ill.Dec. 302, 763 N.E.2d 272.
¶ 7 The parties agree that we review the Board's decision that a position qualifies as a “confidential employee” position under the “clearly erroneous” standard. However, we note that there is also authority for applying the “manifest weight of the evidence” standard. See Niles Township High School District 219 v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 387 Ill.App.3d 58, 69–70, 326 Ill.Dec. 700, 900 N.E.2d 336 (2008)
(Niles ) (discussing precedent for the “manifest weight of the evidence” standard of review); Chief Judge of the Circuit Court v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31, 153 Ill.2d 508, 523, 180 Ill.Dec. 288, 607 N.E.2d 182 (1992) (Chief Judge II ) (). Here, because the parties are in agreement, we will review the Board's decision under the “clearly erroneous” standard.
¶ 9 On April 26, 2012, the Treasurer filed a unit clarification petition with the Board stating that the ISA II position should be properly classified as a “confidential employee” position as defined under the Act and that any incumbent in that position should be excluded from participation in the existing Union.1 On May 17, 2012, the Union filed its objections to the petition arguing that it was procedurally defective and that an ISA II employee does not perform duties of a “confidential employee” as that term is statutorily defined.
¶ 10 Prehearing memos were filed by the parties, and on November 9, 2012, the administrative law judge heard testimony regarding whether the ISA II position was a “confidential employee” position pursuant to the Act.
¶ 11 Deborah Price testified for the Treasurer. Price was the information technology director for the Treasurer's office from 2003 and has currently held that position since February 2011. Price supervises 10 information technology employees, including the incumbent in the ISA II position, Sarah Schuering. Price's subordinates provide computer network support, including application and development, to the Treasurer, the chief of staff and his subordinates, general counsel and legal staff, the human resources' director and staff, and the director of accounting and budget personnel, including the Treasurer's chief budgeter.
¶ 12 Price testified that she supervises two employees who function as computer network administrators: (1) Schuering, the incumbent in the ISA II position under review, and (2) Joey Lau, a network administrator in charge of the computer servers who keeps all communication lines “up and running.” Price further explained that in 1999, the Treasurer's office inherited the ISA II position and the position's incumbent, Schuering, when the ISA II functions were transferred from the Department of Financial Institutions to the Treasurer's office. Of the 10 job positions in Price's division, the ISA II position is the only one included in the Union. Specifically, Price testified that the co-network administrator position held by Joey Lau is not included in the Union. Schuering and Lau are the only two employees who have “network administrator passwords,” and they perform similar duties. According to Price, “basically, if someone has a problem with anything computer related, network related, [Schuering and Lau] * * * get called to help troubleshoot any of those problems.” Both employees assist staff with Excel functions, which is a program “used in the budget processing * * * in the financial area” of the Treasurer's office.” Price testified that she has not been given a network password because she is not qualified for network administration and “rel[ies] on [Schuering's and Lau's] expertise and knowledge and advice to keep [the] network running.”
¶ 13 During her testimony, Price also discussed the “Position Description” for the ISA II position, which was entered into evidence. According to the “position summary” in the description, the employee in the ISA II position
¶ 14 In addition, the specific “Duties and Responsibilities” for the ISA II position are: (1) “[r]esponsible for setting up and administering users”; (2) “[r]esponsible for suspending and archiving users as required due to termination”; (3) “[r]esponsible for setting up and administering shared data access file directories with proper rights and configuration”; (4) “[r]esponsible for setting up and administering SQL...
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