Am. Fed'n of Teachers v. Ledbetter

• Decision Date: 20 November 2012
• Docket Number: No. SC 91766.,SC 91766.
• Citation: 387 S.W.3d 360
• Parties: AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, et al., Appellants, v. Richard LEDBETTER, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

387 S.W.3d 360

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, et al., Appellants,

v.Richard LEDBETTER, et al., Respondents.

No. SC 91766.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

Nov. 20, 2012.

George O. Suggs and J. Christopher Chostner, Schichat, Cook & Werner, St. Loius, MO, for appellants.

Cindy Reeds Ormsby, Amy J. White and Darold E. Crotzer, Crotzer & Ormsby LLC, Clayton, MO, for respondents.

Ivan L. Schraeder and Corey L. Franklin, The Lowenbaum Partnership LLC, St. Louis, MO, for the Missouri Municipal League, which filed a brief as a friend of the Court.

PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, Judge.

The American Federation of Teachers, its St. Louis affiliate Local 420, and individual representatives, Mary Armstrong and Byron Clemens,¹ appeal the trial court's summary judgment declaring that the board of education of the Construction Career Center Charter School District and the individual members of the board ² have no duty to “meet and confer” or to bargain collectively in good faith with the union. Because article I, section 29 of the Missouri Constitution provides that all employees, public and private, have a right to organize and to bargain collectively, it necessarilyrequires the board to meet and confer with the union, in good faith, with the present intention to reach an agreement. The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded.

Facts and Procedural Background

After receiving formal recognition as the collective bargaining representative for all teachers and other certified employees, the union met and conferred with the board on 18 occasions between May 13, 2008, and April 9, 2009, to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement. In January 2009, the negotiators reached a tentative agreement for all issues except for salaries, but both parties recognized that the agreement was subject to ratification by the local union members and the board members. No agreement was finalized.

The board then discussed the labor negotiations and its tentative agreement during closed meetings in January, February, and March 2009. Advance notice of the meetings and a tentative agenda were posted 24 hours prior to each meeting at the board's meeting place. During its February 17, 2009, meeting, the board unanimously rejected the tentative labor agreement and instructed its negotiators to present a revised proposal to the union. At the March 30, 2009, meeting, the board resolved not to negotiate teacher tenure matters with the union and unilaterally adopted teacher salaries for the 2009–2010 academic year. No minutes or votes were recorded from those meetings.

The day following the board's March 30th meeting, the board's representatives met with the union, but it failed to mention salaries for the 2009–2010 school year. During an April 9, 2009, meeting between the board and union representatives, the board proposed teachers' salaries for the 2009–2010 school year and announced that contracts would be presented to teachers the next day. At the end of that meeting, the board agreed to extend its deadline by six days to allow the union to respond to its decision. On April 13, 2009, the union offered a counterproposal that the board rejected.

The union filed a petition for declaratory judgment asserting that the board violated the Missouri “sunshine law,” section 610.010, et seq., RSMo Supp.2011,³ and failed to satisfy its duty to bargain collectively under article I, section 29. The case was submitted to the trial court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court held that the Missouri Constitution imposes no duty on a public employer to “meet and confer” or to bargain in good faith with a collective bargaining representative. The trial court further found that, if there is a duty to bargain in good faith, the board did not bargain in “good faith” as that term is understood under federal labor law. Accordingly, the trial court granted summary judgment for the board. The union appeals.

Standard of Review

The propriety of a grant of summary judgment is an issue of law that this Court reviews de novo. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid–Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). The criteria on appeal for testing the propriety of summary judgment are no different from those that should be employed by the trial court to determine the propriety of sustaining the motion initially. Id. This Court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party has demonstrated, on the basis of facts as to which there is no genuine dispute, a right to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 74.04(c)(6); Grattan v. Union Elec. Co., 151 S.W.3d 59, 61 (Mo. banc 2004).

Because this case concerns a declaratory judgment, the trial court's decision will be affirmed unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Guyer v. City of Kirkwood, 38 S.W.3d 412, 413 (Mo. banc 2001) (citing McDermott v. Carnahan, 934 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Mo. banc 1996); Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976)).

Discussion

On appeal, the union claims that the trial court erred in declaring that employers do not owe a duty to bargain in good faith under article I, section 29. The union asserts that because it has a constitutional right to bargain collectively with the board, the board has a corresponding duty to bargain collectively in good faith with the union. Contrary to the trial court's judgment, the board concedes that it has an obligation to meet and confer with the union but asserts that such duty does not also impose the duty to bargain collectively in good faith.

Article I, section 29 of the Missouri Constitution provides that “employees shall have the right to organize and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.” This guarantee applies to both public and private sector employees. Independence–Nat. Educ. Ass'n v. Independence Sch. Dist., 223 S.W.3d 131, 133 (Mo. banc 2007). Missouri's public sector labor law, codified in section 105.500, et seq., creates a procedural framework for collective bargaining for public employees, but it expressly excludes certain professions, including law enforcement officers and teachers. Section 105.510. When a procedural framework for bargaining is not codified, i.e., for excluded employees, the lack of a framework does not excuse the public employer from its constitutional duty to bargain collectively with public employees. See Independence, 223 S.W.3d at 136. When bargaining, “proposals are made and either accepted or rejected.” Id. at 138. While the employer remains free to reject any proposal, id. at 136, the right to bargain collectively still requires “ ‘negotiations between an employer and the representatives of organized employees to determine the conditions of employment ...,’ ” id. at 138 n. 6 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 280 (8th ed.2004)).

Unlike most states, Missouri does not have a statutorily imposed duty to bargain collectively in good faith. See, e.g.,Alaska Stat. § 23.40.110(a)(5); Cal. Gov.Code § 3543.5; Conn. Gen.Stat. § 10–153a(a); Del.Code Ann. § 4007(5); Fla. Stat. § 447.309(1). The question, then, is whether article I, section 29 requires public employers to bargain in good faith. “Constitutional provisions are subject to the same rules of construction as other laws, except that constitutional provisions are given a broader construction due to their more permanent character.” Neske v. City of St. Louis, 218 S.W.3d 417, 421 (Mo. banc 2007), overruled on other grounds by King–Willmann v. Webster Groves School Dist., 361 S.W.3d 414 (Mo. banc 2012). “Statutory construction is favored that avoids unjust or unreasonable results.” David Ranken, Jr. Tech. Inst. v. Boykins, 816 S.W.2d 189, 192 (Mo. banc 1991), overruled on other grounds by Alumax Foils, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 939 S.W.2d 907, 911 (Mo. banc 1997). In a constitutional context, “[a] constitutional provision should never be construed to work confusion and mischief unless no otherreasonable construction is possible.” Theodoro v. Dept. of Liquor Control, 527 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Mo. banc 1975).

Without an interpretation that imposes a duty to negotiate in good faith, the article I, section 29 right to bargain collectively would be nullified or redundant. Both of those results are unreasonable. The ultimate purpose of bargaining is to reach an agreement. Independence, 223 S.W.3d at 138;City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539, 543 (1947), overruled by Independence, 223 S.W.3d at 137 (“Surely the real purpose of such bargaining is to reach agreements and to result in binding contracts between unions representing employees and their employer.”). If public employers were not required to negotiate in good faith, they could act with the intent to thwart collective bargaining so as never to reach an agreement—frustrating the very purpose of bargaining and invalidating the right.

Moreover, if the right did not include a duty for the public employer to negotiate in good faith, article I, section 29 would be reduced to the right to petition an employer for redress of grievances. In situations in which the employer is a government entity, that interpretation would make the right redundant because this goes no further than the limited right to petition the government already guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, sections 8 and 9 of the Missouri Constitution. While debating section 29's application to public employees, delegates to Missouri's constitutional convention noted this distinction, finding that the right to bargain collectively was separate and different from rights of speech, petition, and press. See 9 Debates of the 1943–1944 Constitutional Convention of Missouri 2546–47 (2008).⁴

Most importantly, “collective bargaining,” as a technical...