Am. Fedn. of State v. Warren
| Decision Date | 01 August 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 2007-T-0110.,2007-T-0110. |
| Citation | 177 Ohio App.3d 530,895 N.E.2d 238,2008 Ohio 3805 |
| Parties | AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES LOCAL # 74 et al., Appellees, v. CITY OF WARREN et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Gregory V. Hicks, Warren City Law Director, and James R. Ries, Deputy Law Director, for appellants.
Nancy Hardin Rogers, Attorney General, and Sharon A. Jennings and Pearl M. Chin, Assistant Attorneys General, for intervening defendant, State of Ohio.
{¶ 1} The city of Warren appeals from a judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas finding R.C. 9.481 constitutionally enacted pursuant to Section 34, Article II, Ohio Constitution and therefore superseding the city's residency requirement, codified in Section 155.05 of the Codified Ordinances of the city of Warren.
{¶ 2} The issue on appeal concerns the constitutionality of R.C. 9.481. After a careful review of the pertinent constitutional provisions, statutes, and case law authority, this court concludes that R.C. 9.481 is constitutionally enacted pursuant to Section 34, Article II, Ohio Constitution, and therefore we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
{¶ 3} Mindful of the presumption of constitutionality afforded the General Assembly's legislative enactments, we have concluded that R.C. 9.481 is a valid exercise of the legislature's broad authority to regulate public employees' right to collectively bargain the terms and conditions of their employment pursuant to Section 34, Article II, Ohio Constitution. We hold that the statute regulates a matter of statewide concern and therefore does not unconstitutionally infringe on the city's home rule powers, and we have also determined that the statute offends neither the Uniformity Clause nor the Contract Clause of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶ 4} We recognize that many economically depressed cities sought to either maintain or regain a stable, economically productive workforce through enactment of residency requirements for their public employees, but if a municipality such as the city of Warren wishes to challenge the wisdom of the General Assembly in enacting R.C. 9.481, its resort is to the political process and not the court.
{¶ 6} The parties in this case are (1) the city of Warren, a municipal corporation organized under the laws of the state of Ohio, and (2) the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Local # 74, and Warren Management Association ("unions"), two labor organizations representing various employees of Warren.
{¶ 7} On May 29, 1991, Warren City Council passed City Ordinance No. 10262/91, which enacted Section 155.05 of the city's Codified Ordinances. Section 155.05 requires, as a condition of employment, that any person appointed as a non-elected official or employee of the city become a resident of the city and remain a resident throughout his employment.
{¶ 8} On May 1, 2006, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 9.481, which prohibits municipalities from imposing a residency requirement as a condition of employment on their employees. The statute provides:
{¶ 9} "(B)(1) Except as otherwise provided in division (B)(2) of this section, no political subdivision shall require any of its employees, as a condition of employment, to reside in any specific area of the state.
{¶ 10} "(2)(a) Division (B)(1) of this section does not apply to a volunteer.
{¶ 11} "(b) To ensure adequate response times by certain employees of political subdivisions to emergencies or disasters while ensuring that those employees generally are free to reside throughout the state, the electors of any political subdivision may file an initiative petition to submit a local law to the electorate, or the legislative authority of the political subdivision may adopt an ordinance or resolution, that requires any individual employed by that political subdivision, as a condition of employment, to reside either in the county where the political subdivision is located or in any adjacent county in this state. * * *."
{¶ 12} Senate Bill 82, which enacted R.C. 9.481, contains two uncodified sections declaring the legislative intent in the enactment of R.C. 9.481. Section 2 of Senate Bill 82 states:
{¶ 13} "In enacting section 9.481 of the Revised Code in this act, the General Assembly hereby declares its intent to recognize both of the following:
{¶ 14} "(A) The inalienable and fundamental right of an individual to choose where to live pursuant to Section 1 of Article I, Ohio Constitution.
{¶ 15} "(B) Section 34 of Article II, Ohio Constitution, specifies that laws may be passed providing for the comfort, health, safety, and general welfare of all employees, and that no other provision of the Ohio Constitution impairs or limits this power, including Section 3 of Article XVI-II, Ohio Constitution."
{¶ 16} Furthermore, Section 3 of Senate Bill 82 states:
{¶ 17} "The General Assembly finds, in enacting section 9.481 of the Revised Code in this act, that it is a matter of statewide concern to generally allow the employees of Ohio's political subdivisions to choose where to live, and that it is necessary to generally prohibit political subdivisions from requiring their employees, as a condition of employment, to reside in any specific area of the state in order to provide for the comfort, health, safety, and general welfare of those public employees."
{¶ 18} Also, in connection with the enactment of R.C. 9.481, the Ohio Legislative Service Commission stated its finding that there are 125 cities and 13 villages throughout the state of Ohio that have some form of residency requirements in their charters. 1
{¶ 19} On June 14, 2006, the unions filed a complaint in the Trumbull County Common Pleas Court against Warren and its mayor, Michael J. O'Brien, seeking a judgment declaring that (1) Section 155.05 of Codified Ordinances of Warren is in conflict with R.C. 9.481; (2) R.C. 9.481 preempts Section 155.05 of the Codified Ordinances of Warren; and (3) Section 155.05 of the Codified Ordinances of Warren is of no force or effect.
{¶ 20} Warren filed an answer and a counterclaim alleging that the enactment of R.C. 9.481 is an infringement of its power pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII, Ohio Constitution, and also a violation of (1) Section 28, Article II, Ohio Constitution (the Contract Clause), (2) Section 26, Article II, Ohio Constitution (the Uniformity Clause), and (3) the separation of powers.
{¶ 21} On October 23, 2006, the Ohio Attorney General filed a motion to intervene, which the trial court granted. All three parties subsequently filed motions for summary judgment.
{¶ 22} On September 14, 2007, the trial court granted the unions' motion for summary judgment and denied Warren's motion for summary judgment. The trial court found R.C. 9.481 to have been enacted constitutionally pursuant to the authority granted to the General Assembly in Section 34, Article II, Ohio Constitution. Therefore, the trial court struck down Section 155.05 of the Warren Codified Ordinances as having been superseded by R.C. 9.481.
{¶ 23} Warren now appeals, raising four assignments of error for our review.
{¶ 24} "[1.] The trial court erred in concluding that section 9.481 of the Ohio Revised Code was a valid enactment pursuant to Article II, Section 34 of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶ 25} "[2.] The trial court erred in striking down Section 155.05 of the Codified Ordinances of the City of Warren by concluding that Section 155.05 of the Codified Ordinances of the City of Warren was superseded by Section 9.481 of the Ohio Revised Code.
{¶ 26} "[3.] The trial court erred in not finding Section 9.481 of the Ohio Revised Code to be in violation of Article II, Section 26 of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶ 27}
{¶ 29} Summary judgment is appropriate under Civ.R. 56(C) when (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact remaining to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion favors the moving party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 4 O.O.3d 466, 364 N.E.2d 267. An appellate court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. Comer v. Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185, 2005-Ohio-4559, 833 N.E.2d 712, ¶ 8.
{¶ 30} Moreover, whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law reviewed de novo by an appellate court. Wilson v. AC&S, Inc., 169 Ohio App.3d 720, 2006-Ohio-6704, 864 N.E.2d 682, ¶ 61.
{¶ 32} We begin our review with the recognition that all statutes have a strong presumption of constitutionality. See Sorrell v. Thevenir (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 415, 418, 633 N.E.2d 504. Before a court may declare unconstitutional an enactment of the legislative branch, "`it must appear beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and constitutional provisions are clearly incompatible.'" Doyle v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 46, 47, 554 N.E.2d 97, quoting State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher (1955), 164 Ohio St. 142, 57 O.O. 134, 128 N.E.2d 59, paragraph one of the syllabus. A party raising a...
To continue reading
Request your trial