Am. Furniture Co. v. I. B. of T. C.

• Decision Date: 29 June 1936
• Parties: AMERICAN FURNITURE CO. v. I. B. OF T. C. AND H. OF A., CHAUFFEURS, TEAMSTERS AND HELPERS GENERAL LOCAL NO. 200 OF MILWAUKEE ET AL.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

222 Wis. 338

268 N.W. 250

AMERICAN FURNITURE CO.

v.I. B. OF T. C. AND H. OF A., CHAUFFEURS, TEAMSTERS AND HELPERS GENERAL LOCAL NO. 200 OF MILWAUKEE ET AL.^a1

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

June 29, 1936.

Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County; Daniel W. Sullivan, Judge.

Affirmed.

FAIRCHILD, FOWLER, and NELSON, JJ., dissenting.

This was an action commenced on September 11, 1935, by American Furniture Company against I. B. of T. C. and H. of A., Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers General Local No. 200 of Milwaukee, Wis., Joseph F. Scislowski, William Nagorski, Furniture Sales and Servicemen's Union Local 1342, Alex. H. Kolbing, and Philip F. Koerner, in which an injunction was sought restraining the picketing by defendants of a retail furniture store owned and operated by plaintiff in the city of Milwaukee. The action was tried to the court upon a stipulation of facts. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were duly made and entered, and a judgment entered in accordance with the findings and conclusions on December 19, 1935. By the terms of this judgment, it was decreed that the Wisconsin Labor Code, sections 103.51-103.63, inclusive (formerly numbered sections 268.18-268.30, inclusive), is constitutional and valid; that the action involves a labor dispute within the meaning of section 103.62 (formerly section 268.29), Stats., and that the Wisconsin Labor Code is applicable thereto; that the prayer of the complaint to prohibit all picketing of plaintiff's store and all persuasion of persons to refrain from dealing with plaintiff and from representing that plaintiff is unfair to organized labor be denied; that defendants are restrained from employing more than four pickets; from so picketing as to interfere with rights of customers to have free ingress and egress from plaintiff's store; from intimidating customers of plaintiffs or the public who may become customers; from displaying to customers and other people signs or banners stating that plaintiff is unfair to organized labor or unfair to the defendant unions, unless the banners also fairly state in immediate connection therewith the essential facts of the labor dispute; from stating orally or in writing or printing to the public the same matters unless accompanied by the same exposition of the facts; and from in any manner publishing or representing that there is a strike at plaintiff's store.

Plaintiff appeals. Defendants filed a motion to review such portions of the judgment as impose restraints upon defendants. This motion, however, has been abandoned, and defendants make no effort to sustain it either in brief or oral argument.

The material facts will be stated in the opinion.Eugene Wengert, of Milwaukee (Walter H. Bender, of Milwaukee, of counsel), for appellant.

Joseph A. Padway and Nora B. Padway, both of Milwaukee, for respondents.

WICKHEM, Justice.

The facts in this case are not in dispute, and the questions presented are two: (1) Upon the facts presented, was there a labor dispute as defined in subsection 3 of section 103.62 so as to bring the activities of defendants within the protection of the Wisconsin Labor Code and render lawful picketing of plaintiff's store by defendants? (2) If so construed, is the labor code to that extent unconstitutional, (1) as denying due process and equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and (2) as invalidly limiting the jurisdiction of the circuit court in violation of sections 1, 9, and 22 of article 1, and sections 2 and 8 of article 7 of the Constitution of Wisconsin.

It now becomes convenient to state briefly the facts as set forth in the stipulation. [The findings of fact are set forth in the margin.^a1]

Plaintiff is a corporation engaged in the retail furniture business. Its employees include seventeen men who are workers in the crafts represented by defendant unions. None of the seventeen employees are members of the defendant unions. Many of these employees have been employed by plaintiff continuously for ten or more years. On July 15, 1935, defendant Koerner, business agent of defendant Local 1342 Furniture Sales and Service Men's Union, communicated to plaintiff a request that plaintiff execute certain contracts affecting the labor relations of plaintiff's employees in the crafts represented by the union. The proposed contracts involve the following agreements on the part of the employer:

(1) Recognition of the unions as bargaining agents in matters of wages, hours, and working conditions for the respective crafts; (2) the payment of a wage scale included in the agreement; (3) regulation of hours and holidays. Other details of the relationship such as vacations with pay, the seniority rule with respect to lay-offs, an agreement that the employer will not, during the term of the contract, attempt to persuade any employee not to join the union and other matters were covered by this proposed agreement. The president agreed to submit the matter to the directors, but expressed some doubt as to the disposition of the company to sign the contract, whereupon Koerner stated that unless the contracts were signed the unions would picket the store. The officers of plaintiff brought the demands of the union to the attention of the seventeen employees affected by the contracts. These employees thereupon took a secret ballot on the question whether they desired to join one of the defendant unions and unanimously voted against so joining. The result of the vote being communicated to the representatives of the union, Koerner insisted that plaintiff require the employees to join one of the unions, and upon their refusal, the unions would furnish men to fill their places from its members or from men who were willing to join unions. On of the officers of plaintiff then stated that plaintiff company had no objection to the men joining the union, but did not feel it proper to bring pressure upon the men to join since that was a matter which should be left to the employees to decide; that if the defendant unions desired to induce the employees to join and the men were willing to do so, there would be no objection on the part of the plaintiff. Several days thereafter, representatives of the union expressed doubt whether the vote previously taken was the free expression of the employees. As a result, the employees were requested to reconsider their answer, and representatives of the plaintiff told the employees that they were perfectly free to do as they desired, and that whatever course they took would be satisfactory to the company. The vote was again taken and resulted in a unanimous decision not to join the union and in an expression of satisfaction with their services, labor conditions, and relations with their employer. Plaintiff elected to abide by the employees' decision and declined to sign the contracts. On September 3, 1935, picketing of plaintiff's store took place. The character of the picketing need not be discussed since defendants have abandoned their motion to review, and plaintiff's appeal is based on a contention that, under the facts as presented, picketing in any form is not permitted by the code.

Upon these facts, the question is squarely presented whether there was a labor dispute involving plaintiff and defendants in view of the fact (1) that no employee of plaintiff was a member of defendant unions; (2) that none desired or was willing to become a member; (3) that the employees were wholly satisfied with the conditions of their employment; (4) that the employees opposed the execution of the contracts proposed for plaintiff's execution; (5) that plaintiff has been unwilling to coerce its employees to join the unions and has throughout been willing to take such position in that respect as its employees desired.

Section 103.62 (3) reads as follows:

“The term ‘labor dispute’ includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, or concerning employment relations, or any other controversy arising out of the respective interests of employer and employe, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employe.”

The act of which this section is a part is substantially similar to the Federal Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-115). The italicized words in section 103.62 (3) are not contained in the Norris-LaGuardia Act as finally enacted by Congress, although this clause was in the act as originally introduced. Consideration must also be given to sections 103.62 (1) and (2) which read as follows:

“When used in sections 103.51 to 103.63, and for the purposes of these sections:

(1) A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when the case involves persons who are engaged in a single industry, trade, craft, or occupation; or who are employes of one employer; or who are members of the same or an affiliated organization of employers or employes; whether such dispute is (1) between one or more employers or associations of employers and one or more employes or associations of employes; (2) between one or more employers or associations of employers and one or more employers or associations of employers; or (3) between one or more employes or associations of employes and one or more employees or associations of employes; or when the case involves any conflicting or competing interests in a ‘labor dispute’ (as defined in subsection (3)) of ‘Persons participating or interested’ therein (as defined in subsection (2)).

(2) A person or association shall be held to be a person participating or interested in a labor dispute if relief is sought against him or it and if he or it is engaged in the industry, trade, craft, or occupation in which such dispute occurs, or is a member,...