Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Balmer

• Decision Date: 06 June 1927
• Docket Number: No. 96,April Term.,96
• Citation: 238 Mich. 580,214 N.W. 208
• Parties: AMERICAN LIFE INS. CO. v. BALMER.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

238 Mich. 580

214 N.W. 208

AMERICAN LIFE INS. CO.

v.BALMER.

No. 96, April Term.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

June 6, 1927.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Ingham County, in Chancery; Charles B. Collingwood, Judge.

Suit by the American Life Insurance Company against Harriet Balmer. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

On April 18, 1922, the plaintiff filed with the Department of Labor and Industry its acceptance of the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Pub. Acts Ex. Sess. 1912, No. 10, as amended). The language of the acceptance was as follows:

‘Department of Labor and Industry,

Lansing, Mich.:

‘Take notice that the undersigned employer of labor in Michigan accepts the provisions of Act No. 10 of Public Acts, First Extra Session, 1912, for all the employees and all the business of said employer to which the Michigan Workmen's Compensation Law may legally apply.’

This was followed by a statement of the approximate number of employees (50), their place of employment as 408 West Fort street, Detroit, the nature of their employment to be office employees, that it would carry its own risk and other formal matters. The application was approved by the department. In 1924 the plaintiff maintained an office in Lansing; when it was established does not appear. William J. Balmer was one of its agents connected with the Lansing office. On November 10, 1924, he met his death in an accident. Defendant is his widow and applied for compensation as dependent under the provisions of the act. A hearing was had before Deputy Commissioner Ravins. Plaintiff appeared by its attorney and denied liability principally on the ground that deceased was an independent contractor. Compensation was awarded, and the award affirmed by the commission on appeal. Plaintiff acting under the provisions of section 5465, C. L. 1915, and, conceiving itself aggrieved, applied to this court for a writ of certiorari, accompanying such application with an elaborate brief on the question of who is an independent contractor. In so doing it followed the usual practice in this court. This court likewise followed the usual practice. While under various statutes a single Justice of the court is authorized to perform certain acts, i. e., admit to bail, allow writs of certiorari, allow appeals, extend time, et cetera, it is the uniform practice of this court to consider such application en banc. Following such practice, this court considered plaintiff's application en banc and denied it upon its merits but without opinion. Some time later plaintiff applied for a rehearing, alleging as an additional reason that the act infringes both the federal and state Constitutions. This was the first time the constitutional question was raised. This application was likewise considered by this court and denied on its merits. Thereupon this bill was filed to restrain defendant from enforcing the award of the commission upon the ground that the act was invalid and the award without support in law or in fact. From a decree dismissing the bill plaintiff appeals.

Argued before the Entire Bench.Fred H. Aldrich and Geo. E. Leonard, both of Detroit, for appellant.

Thomas, Shields & Silsbee, of Lansing, (Clayton F. Jennings, of Lansing, of counsel), for appellee.

FELLOWS, J. (after stating the facts as above).

There is much force in defendants' contention that the proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act are res adjudicata and may not be collaterally attacked as is sought to be done in the instant case. In Lumberman's Mutual, etc., Co. v. Bissell, 220 Mich. 352, 190 N. W. 283, 28 A. L. R. 874, this court held that the doctrine of res adjudicata was applicable to the award of the (then) board like the award of arbitrators, as well as to judgments and decrees in judicial proceedings.

Such award, like awards of arbitrators, may be set aside for fraud. Smith v. Port Huron Gas & Electric Co., 217 Mich. 519, 187 N. W. 292. But there is no fraud alleged here. If the doctrine of res adjudicata is applicable, and we think it is, it is difficult to perceive what jurisdiction a court of equity has, in the absence of fraud, to weigh and consider the sufficiency of the evidence taken in that proceeding and then determine whether the commission correctly applied the applicable law to the facts found. But we have again read the testimony taken before the deputy commissioner and reach the same conclusion we did when we originally decided the matter that there was testimony in the case supporting the findings of the commission and that the commission correctly applied the law; in other words, there was testimony that deceased was an employee of plaintiff, and that his accidental death arose out of and in the course of his employment.

Passing the fact that the constitutional question was not raised until the application was made for a rehearing and is here raised collaterally, we are persuaded that it is not well founded. In Mackin v. Detroit-Timkin Axle Co., 187 Mich. 8, 153 N. W. 49, this court had before it the constitutionality of the act. In that case, as here, it was urged that judicial power was given the board. After considering the question at length, it was said:

‘We conclude that the Industrial Accident Board is a ministerial and administrative body with incidental quasi judicial powers, exercised by consent of those electing to be governed by the act, not vested with powers or duties in violation of constitutional limitations.’

While the act of this state has not been before the United States Supreme Court, that court has overruled objections on constitutional grounds to similar acts of our sister states. Jeffrey Manufacturing Co. v. Blagg, 235 U. S. 571, 35 S. Ct. 167, 59 L. Ed. 364 (Ohio); New York Cent. R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 S. Ct. 247, 61 L. Ed. 667, L. R. A. 1917...