Am. Petroleum Inst. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior
| Decision Date | 29 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2:21-CV-02506 |
| Parties | AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE ET AL. v. U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the court is a Motion to Intervene filed by Healthy Gulf Center for Biological Diversity, Citizens for a Healthy Community, Cook Inletkeeper, Defenders of Wildlife, Food & Water Watch, Friends of the Earth, Great Old Broads for Wilderness, Montana Environmental Information Center, Oceana Sierra Club, The Wilderness Society, Valley Organic Growers Association, Western Organization of Resource Councils Western Watersheds Project, and WildEarth Guardians (collectively, the “Conservation Groups”). Doc. 32. The Conservation Groups seek to intervene in this proceeding under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 24 (a) or (b). Id. The motion was opposed by plaintiffs herein.[1] Doc. 64.
For reasons set forth below, the court finds that this motion is DENIED.
On August 16, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed this suit. Doc. 1. The Plaintiffs are associations with ties to the oil and gas industry (the “Industry Plaintiffs”).[2] Named as defendants are the U.S. Department of the Interior (the “DOI”) and several other government defendants (collectively, the “Government Defendants”).[3] The suit alleges that DOI, acting through the other Government Defendants, instituted a de facto “indefinite moratorium on all federal oil and gas lease sales onshore and on the Outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”)” in response to Section 208 of President Biden's Executive Order 14008. Doc. 1, ¶ 1-2. The Industry Plaintiffs allege that in doing so, the Government Defendants acted in contravention of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), the Mineral Leasing Act (“MLA”), the Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands (“MLAAL”), the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act's (“OCSLA's”) Five-Year Leasing Program, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (“FLPMA”), applicable Resource Management Plans (“RMPs”) and the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). Doc. 1, ¶ 6. Industry Plaintiffs seek declarations that the Government Defendants' actions do not comply with the requirements of the APA, MLA, MLAAL, OCSLA, FLPMA, and NEPA; they seek an order compelling lease sales under MLA, MLAAL, and OCSLA to proceed; and they seek an order compelling the Government Defendants to adopt a new Five-Year Leasing Program for OCS leasing. Doc. 1, p. 28-29.
On October 27, 2021, the Conservation Groups moved to intervene in this action. Doc. 32. They argue that their intervention is necessary to “protect their and their members' interest in minimizing harms to the environment and climate from oil and gas leasing on federal lands and in federal waters.” Doc. 32, att. 3, p. 6.
In a related case, Louisiana v. Biden, the court denied a motion to intervene made on similar grounds by many of the same Conservation Groups who bring the instant motion. Louisiana v. Biden, 338 F.R.D. 219, 221 (Memorandum Order, No. 2:21-0778, Doc. 111) (W.D. La. 5/10/21). Both this suit and Louisiana v. Biden concern the legality of the Federal government's pause on oil and gas leasing under Section 208 of President Biden's Executive Order 14008. Although the court has determined that this matter is not sufficiently related to Louisiana v. Biden to warrant consolidation of this matter with Louisiana v. Biden [doc. 85], the reasoning on the motion to intervene is pertinent here because the argument in favor of intervention is similar.[4] The Conservation Groups assert, for example, that they “have legally protectable interests in this case for the same reasons they did in the Louisiana case.” Doc. 32, att. 3. We therefore restate and adopt much of the reasoning of the Louisiana v. Biden order on intervention herein.
Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, states:
To obtain intervention as of right, an intervenor must satisfy a four-prong test:
(1) The application must be timely; (2) the applicant must have an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action; (3) the applicant must be so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede its ability to protect its interest; and (4) the applicant's interest must be inadequately represented by the existing parties to the suit.
Brumfield v. Dodd, 749 F.3d 339, 341 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1204-05 (5th Cir. 1994)); Texas v. United States, 805 F.3d 653, 657 (5th Cir. 2015).
“Failure to satisfy any one requirement precludes intervention of right.” Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 999 (5th Cir. 1996). “Although the movant bears the burden of establishing its right to intervene, Rule 24 is to be liberally construed.” Brumfield v. Dodd, 749 F.3d 339, 341 (5th Cir. 2014)(citing 6 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.03 (3d ed. 2008)). Federal courts should allow intervention when no one would be hurt, and the greater justice could be attained. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 834 F.3d 562 (5th Cir. 2016).
Prong one requires the motion to be timely.
The timeliness inquiry is contextual; absolute measures of timeliness should be ignored. Timeliness is not limited to chronological considerations but is to be determined from all the circumstances. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 834 F.3d at 565.
Conservation Groups' Motion to Intervene is timely. The Complaint [doc. 1] was filed on August 16, 2021. Conservation Groups' motion was filed approximately two months later on October 17, 2021. Doc. 32. Consistent with the reasoning of Louisiana v. Biden, we find that the motion here is timely.
Prong two requires the applicant to have an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action.
The touchtone of the inquiry is whether the interest alleged is alleged to be “legally protectible.” New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 732 F.2d 452, 464 (5th Cir. 1984). An interest is sufficient if it is of the type that the law deems worthy of protection, even if the intervenor does not have an enforceable legal entitlement or would not have standing to pursue her own claim. Texas v. United States, 805 F.3d 653, 657 (5th Cir. 2015). Conservation Groups allege a legally protected interest in protecting the environment in reference to oil and gas leasing practices conducted by the U.S. Department of the Interior.
Prong three requires the applicant to be so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to protect that interest.
The primary issue in this matter is whether Section 208 of the Executive Order No. 14008 and the subsequent “pause” by the Government Defendants is consistent with the APA, MLA, OCSLA, FLPMA, NEPA, and applicable RMPs. Arguably, a determination of this issue could impair or impede Conservation Groups' ability to protect their interests.
Prong four requires the applicant to show that its interests are inadequately represented by the existing parties to the suit.
The Conservation Groups maintain that their interests may not be adequately represented by existing parties to the litigation, arguing that recent events show that the Conservation Groups and the Government Defendants have a difference of objectives. Doc. 32, att. 3, p. 13-25. The burden of establishing inadequate representation is on the applicant for intervention. Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 1005 (5th Cir. 1996). The applicant for intervention need not show that the representation by existing parties will be, for certain, inadequate. Id. Instead, inadequacy is satisfied if the applicant shows that the representation of applicant's interest “may be” inadequate. Id. Although the applicant for intervention's burden is “minimal, ” it cannot be treated as so minimal as to write the requirement completely out of the rule. Id.
Fifth Circuit jurisprudence has created two presumptions of adequate representation that Conservation Groups must overcome. One presumption arises when the applicant has the “same ultimate objective” as a party to the lawsuit. If the “same ultimate objective” presumption applies, “the applicant for intervention must show adversity of interest, collusion, or nonfeasance on the part of the existing party to overcome the presumption.” Texas v. United States, 805 F.3d 653, 661 (5th Cir. 2015); Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d at 1005; and Bush v. Viterna, 740 F.2d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1984).
In ruling on the Louisiana v. Biden intervention, this court held that the Conservation Groups had been unable to rebut the presumption of adequate representation that arises when a would-be intervenor and an existing party share the “same ultimate objective.” 338 F.R.D. 219, 223-24 (Memorandum Order, No. 2:21-0778, Doc. 111 at 7) (W.D. La. 5/10/21).
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