Am. Sur. Co. v. Marsh

CourtOklahoma Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtREID, C.
CitationAm. Sur. Co. v. Marsh, 1930 OK 324, 293 P. 1041, 146 Okla. 261 (Okla. 1930)
Decision Date01 July 1930
Docket NumberCase Number: 19449
PartiesAMERICAN SURETY CO. et al. v. MARSH.
Syllabus

¶0 1. Appeal and Error--Supersedeas Bond--Conditions of Bond Given by Defendant in Appeal from Adverse Judgment Canceling Its Oil Lease and Adjudging Possession for Another not Controlled by Statute.

Where the plaintiff brought a suit in equity wherein the claims between him and the defendant under different oil and gas leases were determined and the lease of plaintiff was held to be the valid one and the defendant's lease was canceled and removed as a cloud on plaintiff's title, and defendant was enjoined from exercising possession of the leased premises as against plaintiff's right under his lease, and possession adjudged for plaintiffs under his lease, held, such judgment was not primarily for the delivery of possession of real property, and the trial court in fixing the conditions of the supersedeas bond of defendant to stay the judgment on appeal was not governed by section 794, subs. 3, C. O. S. 1921, or any other statute of this state.

2. Same--Discretion of Trial Court as to Conditions of Bond.

"In cases where the statute makes no provision for a supersedeas, or a stay of the judgment or final order, as a matter of right, the trial court may, in the exercise of its discretion, allow a supersedeas or stay on such terms as it may prescribe for the protection of the parties pending an appeal to the appellate court." In re Epley, 10 Okla. 631, 64 P. 18.

3. Oil and Gas--Enforceable Property Rights of Lessee.

"The exclusive right to enter on land, drill wells thereon, and remove therefrom the oil to exhaustion, paying therefor a portion of the oil when extracted, or the equivalent of such portion, is a property right which the law will protect." Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Kishi (Tex. Com. App.) 276 S.W. 190.

4. Same--Possession by Lessee After Expiration of Lease as Trespass Against Rights of Second Lessee.

Where the term of an oil and gas lease had expired and there was no production from the premises by the lessee sufficient to extend the lease, the act of the lessee in remaining in possession of such premises after the expiration of its lease made it a trespasser against the rights of a second lessee from the effective date of the second lease beginning its term after the expiration of the first lease.

5. Same--Appeal and Error--Liability on Supersedeas Bond Given by Defendant After Judgment Canceling Its Oil Lease and Adjudging Possession for Another Lessee--Depreciation in Value of Lease as Damages.

Where the defendant mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof retained possession of the premises and executed a supersedeas bond on its appeal, which bond, among other things, provided that it would pay to the plaintiff all damages the defendant might be legally liable for, and at the time the bond was made and appeal taken the plaintiff had an opportunity and was willing to sell his lease for its market value, but was prevented from selling by the conduct of defendant, and pending the appeal and affirmance of the judgment such opportunity was lost to plaintiff, and the lease greatly depreciated in value, held, actual damages for such depreciation can be recovered by the plaintiff on the supersedeas bond though the defendant attempted in good faith to hold the premises and returned them to the plaintiff upon affirmance of the judgment.

6. Same--Parties in Interest.

The defendant has the right to have a cause of action prosecuted against him by all the real parties in interest, but his concern ends when a judgment for or against the nominal plaintiff would protect him from any action upon the same demand by another, unless it appear that there are equities between him and the other real parties in interest which should be settled in the action; held, that the foregoing rule applies in this case, as the legal title to the oil and gas lease out of which plaintiff's action grew was in him and the supersedeas bond herein sued on was made payable to him, and a judgment for or against him would preclude recovery by any other party on the same cause of action.

7. Same--Judgment on Supersedeas Bond Sustained.

Record examined and held, that the instructions contain no material error and that the evidence and record support the verdict and judgment.

Commissioners' Opinion, Division No. 1.

Error from District Court, Carter County; John B. Ogden, Judge.

Action by Stanley Marsh against the Gypsy Oil Company and the American Surety Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Tomerlin & Chandler, for plaintiff in error American Surety Company of New York.

James B. Diggs, William C. Liedtke, Russell G. Lowe, Redmond S. Cole, and C. L. Billings, for plaintiff in error Gypsy Oil Company.

J. B. Moore, Rainey, Flynn, Green & Anderson, Calvin Jones, and Lydick, McPherren & Jordan, for defendant in error.

REID, C.

¶1 On the 25th day of November, 1919, James Moyer gave to the Gypsy Oil Company an oil and gas lease on 80 acres of land owned by him and situated in Carter county, for a term ending December 15, 1922, and as long thereafter as oil and gas or either of them should be produced from the land by the lessee or its successors. On November 10, 1922, William Moyer, then the owner of the land, gave to Stanley Marsh a lease on the land for five years to begin on January 2, 1923, and continue as long after the term as production was had on the premises. On February 28, 1923, Marsh brought a suit against the Gypsy Oil Company claiming under his lease, seeking the cancellation of the Gypsy Company's lease, and an order placing him in the possession of the leased premises, quieting his title thereto, and enjoining the oil company from asserting any rights or interest in the premises adverse to his claim. The Gypsy Company had attempted to hold over after the expiration of its lease on the ground that production from the premises by it had operated to continue the lease in effect, which was the issue tried in the case.

¶2 The trial resulted in favor of Marsh, giving him the relief he sought, and the Gypsy Company appealed from that judgment and in doing so made a supersedeas bond in the sum of $ 50,000, with the American Surety Company as its surety, containing the promissory condition in the following language:

"Now, therefore, if the principal obligor shall abide by said judgment, if the same shall be affirmed, and shall not commit or suffer to be committed any waste upon the above-described land, and if, in the event said judgment shall be affirmed, the principal obligor shall pay to the obligee the value of the use and occupancy of said premises from the date hereof until the delivery of the possession thereof to the obligee, pursuant to the judgment, and all costs, and all other damages the obligee may be legally liable for, then this obligation to be void, otherwise, to be and remain in full force and effect."

¶3 The issues involved in that case may be more fully understood by an examination of the opinion which will be found in Gypsy Oil Co. v. Marsh, 121 Okla. 135, 248 P. 329.

¶4 When the mandate had been returned to the trial court upon affirmance of that case by this court, the defendant, Gypsy Company, turned the litigated premises over to Marsh. Marsh thereafter brought this suit upon the supersedeas bond and alleged in his petition and claimed on the trial of the case that he had been damaged by the oil company in the sum of $ 50,000 by reason of the facts that he was entitled to the immediate possession of the premises under the terms of his lease and by virtue of the decree made and entered on the trial of said cause on June 7, 1923, establishing the validity of his lease; that shortly after the decree was entered he was willing and had an opportunity to sell said lease to certain named parties who were ready and willing to pay therefor $ 60,000, conditioned on his delivering the possession of the premises, but by reason of the wrongful conduct of defendant in holding and trespassing on the property, and in executing the supersedeas bond, and continuing to exclude plaintiff from possession, he was prevented from selling and assigning the lease. Then when he was able to get possession under the mandate of this court the lease had depreciated to the value of not more than $ 2,000, and he asked damages in the amount of the bond. The answer of the defendant will be stated in discussing the questions presented by the appeal, as the same defenses were raised by the answer as are done in the appeal.

¶5 On the trial to a jury there was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $ 24,000, hence this appeal.

¶6 The defendant contends that in the first place it was entitled to supersede the judgment by giving the bond provided for by that part of subsection 3, section 794, C. O. S. 1921, reading as follows:

"When it (the judgment) directs the sale or delivery of possession of real property, the undertaking shall be in such sum as may be prescribed by the court or the judge thereof, to the effect that during the possession of such property by the plaintiff in error, he will not commit, or suffer to be committed, any waste thereon, and if the judgment be affirmed, he will pay the value of the use and occupation of the property, from the date of the undertaking until the delivery of the possession, pursuant to the judgment, and all costs"

--and that, relying on such right, it presented to the trial judge a bond complying with said section, but that the judge arbitrarily required it to insert in the bond the words: "and all other damages the obligee may be legally liable for"; that the additional covenant required to be inserted was without authority of law, because more onerous than is required by the statute, and is therefore void as to such condition.

¶7 The judgment in the former case found the lease of Marsh to be the valid one and canceled the lease under which...

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6 cases
  • State ex inf. McKittrick v. American Colony Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • February 7, 1935
    ... ... v. Talbot, 135 Mo ... 170; Ex parte Woods, 3 Ark. 532; Davis v. Tarwater, ... 13 Ark. 52; American Surety Co. v. Marsh, 146 Okla ... 261; Gandy v. Nebraska, 10 Neb. 243; Hart & Hoyt ... v. Mayor of Albany, 3 Paige Ch. Rep. 381; Burke v ... Brown, 15 Vesey, ... ...
  • Meriwether v. Lovett
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • October 24, 1933
    ...the courts have recognized that the conveyance of said rights is a valuable property right which will be protected ( American Surety Co. v. Marsh, 146 Okla. 261, 293 P. 1041), and such right is subject to reservation and sale ( Myers v. Hines, 149 Okla. 232, 300 P. 309; Ramey v. Stephney, 7......
  • Mcmillan v. Pawnee Petroleum Corp.
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • July 21, 1931
    ...title to the premises in question, which deed under the authorities of this state conveyed an interest in realty ( American Surety Co. v. Marks, 146 Okla. 261, 293 P. 1041; Nicholson Corporation v. Ferguson, 114 Okla. 16, 243 P. 195; Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Carseloway, 45 F.2d 744), then......
  • American Sur. Co. of New York v. Marsh
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • July 1, 1930
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